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SELECTED ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION'S DOHA ROUND:
OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION
VED P. NANDA*

I.
International trade is credited with alleviating poverty for hundreds of
millions in the world, especially in India and China.1 However, not all have
benefited from it. To illustrate, Africa's share in the world trade has declined since
the 1990s, and sub-Saharan countries have been marginalized. The United Nations
Development Program reported in 2005 that if Africa could have maintained the
share of global export that it had in 1980, its export earnings would have been
about $119 billion higher then. The report noted that "the share of world export of
sub-Saharan Africa, with 689 million people, is less than one half that of Belgium,
with ten million people." 3
Multilateral trade negotiations are always complex and never easy to
conclude. The current "Doha Round," formally called the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA), was launched with high expectations in November 2001 in Doha,
Qatar, after the failed Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 1999. Conceived as a
development round, it was scheduled to be concluded in 2005 and is still awaiting
completion. The Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, had earlier
suspended the Doha Round Talks in July 2006 following a meeting of the principal
negotiating countries-the United States, the European Community, Japan,
Austria, Brazil, and India-as no agreement could be reached on agricultural
* Vice Provost and John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh
Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law. I would like to thank the University of Denver Sturm College of Law for the Summer
Research Stipend that supported the writing of this paper.
Editor's Note: This Symposium edition of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy
includes works by scholarly presenters at the annual University of Denver Sturm College of Law Sutton
Colloquium and Myres S. McDougal Lecture, Spring 2007, and the International Law Student
Association annual fall conference held at the University of Denver, Fall 2007. Professors Cai, Duong,
Kennedy, and Mr. Stencel presented at the Sutton Colloquium. Professor Halvorssen, Mr. Emory, and
Mr. Jones presented at the ILSA conference. Professor Nanda graciously presented at both.
1. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION, ch. 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
2. U.N. Devel. Prog. [UNDP], Human Development Report 2005: InternationalCooperationat a
Crossroads-Aid,Trade and Security in an Unequal World, 117, UN Doe. HDR2005 (2005) (Kevin
Watkins lead author).
3. Id.
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issues-both subsidies and tariff and quota protections-which remain the most
contentious during this round.
Two years later, Lamy convened a meeting of the world trade minister in
Geneva the week of July 21, 2008, "to bridge gaps in your positions," and in the
belief that "the chances are reaching agreement this month are better than 50
percent.",4 On July 4, in an open memorandum to the trade ministers, he said:
The coming weeks represent the moment of truth for the Doha Round.
If we are to conclude the Doha Round, we must strike a deal this month
on trade in agriculture and industrial goods, provide clear signals on
opening services markets and clear the decks on the remaining issues. 5
To the ministers "from our poorest and weakest members," his message was:
"You know this agreement will create new opportunities in the global marketplace
and, coupled with an effective Aid for Trade package, could transform entire
sections of your economy." 6 Subsequently, in opening the meeting of the Trade
Negotiations Committee on July 21, 2008, Lamy said that for the action to
conclude the Doha Round by the end of 2008 he could think of "no stronger
spur... than the threats which are facing the world community across several
fronts, including rises in food prices and energy prices and financial market
turbulences." He added, "There is widespread recognition that a balanced outcome
of the Doha Round could in these circumstances could provide a strong push to
stimulate economic growth, providing better prospects for development and
ensuring a stable and more predictable trading system."7
II.
There was a broad consensus in the 1980s that the weakness of the GATT
must be corrected for the functioning of a viable multilateral trading system. The
Uruguay Round negotiations were launched in September 1986, which were
contemplated to last four years, but the Round was eventually signed in April
1994. The outcome was a most comprehensive trade agreement. Its success
included the establishment of a framework of rules and commitments. It further
reduced tariffs, opened up new markets and expanded the GATT reach by bringing
under multilateral trade rules trade related to services, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, investment, and intellectual property, and by extending some
multilateral disciplines to textile and clothing and agricultural issues. Its crowning
achievement, however, has to be the creation of a new institution, the World Trade
Organization, as the successor to GATT, which indeed heralded the transformation
of the new international trading system.
In his appraisal of the Uruguay Round, the former Director General of
GATT/WTO, Peter Sutherland, observes that developing countries were not
4.
5.
6.
7.

Pascal Lamy, The moment of truth, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 4, 2008, at 6 col. 3.
Id.
Id.
World Trade Organization, Lamv Says Time for Action is Now Amid Economic Threats, WTO:
2008
NEWS
ITEMS,
July
21,
2008,
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news08_e/meetO8_chair_2 ljulyO8_e.htm.
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"really left out of the process," while conceding that "the demands the Uruguay
Round made on some developing countries were considerable and sometimes
beyond their means. The need for capacity building and technical assistance was
8
underestimated and only in recent years has that lack of support been corrected."
He acknowledges "the terrible reality that some of the poorest States are denied
access to the trading system because they have neither the necessary human nor
physical infrastructure." 9 The current Director General Lamy concurs:
[W]hile political decolonization took place more than 50 years ago, we
have not yet completed economic decolonization. A fundamental aspect
of the current Round of trade negotiations-the DDA-is to correct
thee remaining imbalances in the trade rules in favor of developing
countries and to improve the rules 1by
providing developing countries
0
with authentic market opportunities.
Notwithstanding these successes, the major criticism of the Uruguay Round is
that overall the developing countries received little benefit from the negotiations.
Although they were granted phase-in periods in many instances for assuming new
obligations, developing countries faced large adjustment costs and lacked the
necessary institutions, physical infrastructure and human resources to take
advantage of these concessions. Also, developed countries failed to fulfill their
promises to provide enhanced market access for developing countries and make
significant reductions in trade-distorting agricultural subsidies.
Ill.
In contrast to the Uruguay Round, the Doha Round has emphasized the
developing countries' needs. The developing countries were actively engaged
through the participation process in producing the Doha Development Agenda,
which indeed was the beginning of a new era, for in all the prior eight WTO
rounds, a small number of the developed countries were involved in the so-called
Green Room negotiations, where they made the major decisions for all members.
The reach of the Agenda, however, was seen by several developing countries as
too extensive and ambitious, as they were concerned about their limited resources
to effectively address the so-called "Singapore issues"-investment, competition
policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation-as well as the inclusion of
electronic commerce; the European Communities had insisted on the inclusion of
these issues. But for the trade facilitation issue, the others were eventually
dropped.

8. Peter D. Sutherland, Leadership and Vision: Some Lessons From the Uruguay Round, in
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 49, 50 (Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson & Alan Yanovich eds., 2008) [hereinafter The

WTO].
9. Id. at 59.
10. Pascal Lamy, The WTO Doha Development Agenda: Working For a FairerGlobal Trading
System, in The WTO, supra note 8, at 5, 9.
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The Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001,11 contains several
elements related to development and alleviation of poverty. Among other benefits,
developing countries would gain from technical assistance and capacity-building
programs and from enhanced market access. The least developed countries
(LDCs), 12 left behind and marginalized in the multilateral trading system, would
be assisted so as to become effective participants.
The Doha Declaration calls for negotiation on outstanding implementation
issues of special concern to developing countries and adopts the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns,1 3 under which members expressed
their determination "to take concrete action" to address implementation concerns
of developing countries, including obstacles to implementation such as resource
constraints. It includes, along with general implementation concerns, those related
to specific agreements, such as the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Rules of Origin, and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The
members also committed to negotiations on agricultural issues aimed at improving
market access and reducing all forms of subsidies, reducing trade-distorting
domestic support, and to negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating tariff and
non-tariff barriers to non-agricultural products, and negotiation on services.
The Doha Declaration especially addresses three issues of special importance
to developing countries-trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs), technical cooperation and capacity-building, and special and differential
treatment. It also makes special provisions for LDCs.
The Declaration calls upon the Council for TRIPs to study the relationship
between the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and TRIPs, paying special
attention to development.14 It emphasizes that TRIPs should be interpreted and
implemented "in a manner supportive of public health, by promoting both access
to existing medicines and research and development into new medicines."' 15 On
technical cooperation and capacity building, growth and integration, the
Declaration endorses the New Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation for
Capacity Building, Growth and Integration, and calls upon the Secretariat to
support efforts to bring trade into national development and poverty reduction
plans. 16 It also calls for the WTO to devise a plan for long-term funding of WTO
technical assistance. 17
11. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
12. LDCs are the world's 50 poorest nations as identified by international organizations.
13. Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17, in Doha
Declaration, supranote 11, at para. 12.
14. Id. para. 19.
15. Id. para. 17.
16. Id. para. 38.
17. See generally id. paras. 39-41.
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The Declaration notes the developing country-proposed 2001 Framework
18
Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment, which had contended that the
Uruguay Round had resulted in a "dramatic erosion" of Special and Differential
Treatment (S&DT).' 9 The Declaration agrees to review all S&DT provisions
"with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational," and endorses the work program set out in the Decision on
20
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns. Responding to the concern that
few of the several S&DT provisions in the Uruguay Round Agreements are legally
enforceable, it calls on the Committee on Trade and Development to consider how
to identify mandatory S&DT provisions and how to incorporate them into the
WTO rules. 2'
As to the LDCs, while the Doha Declaration expresses commitment to the
goal of duty-free, quota-free market access for LDC exports, it acknowledges the
commitments made by some WTO members to make their markets more
accessible to LDC exports, including such initiatives as the European Union's
"Everything but Arms, 2 the "African Growth and Opportunity Act" of the United
States, 23 and the "LDC Market Access" initiative of Canada. The Declaration also
calls for continued work on LDC accessions to the WTO. 24
LDCs may not be able to take full advantage of the preference schemes
mentioned above, in part because of restrictive "rules of origin" and non-tariff
These
barriers such as stringent sanitary and phytosanitary requirements.
initiatives are often criticized because there are conditions attached.2 5 In reality,
market access for LDCs often remains illusory, for they lack the infrastructure as
well as the resources for meaningful participation.
Over the years, the developed countries have failed to match the promising
commitments they made in the Doha Declaration. For example, developed
countries' tariff escalation for many agricultural exports of developing countries
18. World Trade Organization, Preparationsfor the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference:
Proposalfor a FrameworkAgreement on Special and Differential Treatment, WT/GC/W/442 (2001).
19. Doha Declaration, supranote 11, para. 7.
at
available
44,
para.
20. Id.
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/dev-special differential-provisions-e.htm.
21. Doha Declaration, supra note 11, para. 12.
22. Under the "Everything but Arms" agreement, the EU gives LDCs complete duty- and quotafree access to the EU markets. Generalised System of Preferences Council Regulation (EC) No
2501/2001.
23. Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act the U.S. allows duty-free imports from subSaharan Africa when African nations meet certain criteria.
24. Doha Declaration, supra note 11, para. 42. See also Doha Declaration (endorsement of the
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries), para. 43.
25. See, e.g., Belinda Calaguas, et al., Comment & Debate: No deal on Doha, THE GUARDIAN,
July 18, 2008, at 37 The July meeting in Geneva "will see the EU and the US once again attempt to
pressure developing countries into opening their markets and natural resources to multinational
companies in return for minimal reform of their damaging agricultural policies. Despite the fact that
European politicians and Pascal Lamy are still calling these talks the 'Doha development agenda', real
development dropped off the agenda a long time ago." Id. The writers represent the civil society
groups Action Aid, Friends of the Earth, War on Want, and the World Development Movement.
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remains an acute problem. Also, the developed countries did not provide market
access to the developing countries' products, especially textiles and agricultural
products. Border protection measures in developed countries remained high, with
even higher tariffs for processed products, creating the so-called "tariff escalation
problem." As stated in a 2003 World Bank study, a processed final cocoa product
faced as high as 186 percent tariffs in the United States and 63 percent in the
European Union, while the average tariff on the import of the unprocessed product
is no higher than 0.5 percent in the United States and European Union.2 6Director
General Lamy states that "[i]n Japan, tariffs on coffee escalate from 0% on the raw
product to 24% on the final product. Bound tariffs of the European Union for
unprocessed coffee, tea, mate, and cocoa stand mostly at 0%, while some tariffs
are above 50% for prepared or preserved products. 27 Trade distorting agricultural
subsidies in both the US and the EC are also of great concern to the developing
countries.
The trade negotiations stalled at the following ministerial meeting in Cancun
in 2003.28 Amid recriminations the meeting ended as a dismal failure without
reaching any agreement. A coalition of the developing countries led by Brazil,
China, and India found the US-EU joint proposal on agriculture inadequate and
hence unacceptable because it lacked the needed reform on agricultural subsidies
and tariff escalation. They responded to it with their own agricultural proposal,
and were unwilling to give concession on other issues, including market access on
industrial products and services.29
The talks were resurrected with the July 2004 Framework Agreement reached
at a meeting of the General Council in Geneva. 30 The Framework Agreement gave
the LDCs exemption from liberalization commitments in agriculture. It also
allowed developing countries to specify certain products as special, to which they
could apply a special safeguard clause to be negotiated in order to combat import
surges. The WTO members also accepted the principle that deeper cuts should be
made to higher tariffs than lower tariffs.
The next ministerial meeting, held in Hong Kong, was a modest success as it
ratified the decisions made at the Geneva meeting without, however,
accomplishing much more. 31 The members emphasized "the central importance of
26. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004 -- REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS OF THE DOHA AGENDA 2004, at 104 (2003).
27. Lamy, supra note 10, at 9.
28. For the concluding Ministerial Declaration, see World Trade Organization, Doc.
WT/MIN(03)/20,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min03_e/min03_20_e.doc.
29. See generally Ernesto Zedillo, The World Trade Organization's Biggest Problem at Ten:
Surviving the Doha Round, in The WTO, supranote 8, at 63, 67.
30. See Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Counsel on 1 August 2004,
WTO Doc. WT/L/579.
31. For the concluding Ministerial Declaration, see Doha Work Programme, Ministerial
Declaration
of
18
December
2005,
WT/MIN(05)/Dec,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTOe/ministe/min05_e/final-text e.htm [hereinafter Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration].
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the development dimension in every aspect of the Doha Work Programme and
recommit[ted themselves] to making it a meaningful reality, in terms both of the
results of the negotiations on market access and rule-making and of the specific
32
development-related issues" they set out in the declaration. Of special note is the
agreement to eliminate all forms of export subsidies, reduce trade-distorting
33
domestic support, and restructure tariff cuts in agriculture negotiations.
Developed countries reaffirmed their commitment to eliminate all forms of export
subsidies on cotton in 2006 and to give duty- and quota-free access for cotton
34
exports from LDCs "from the commencement of the implementation period.
Among LDC Agreement-Specific Proposals related to S&DT, developed
countries are mandated and developing countries are encouraged to provide dutyfree and quota-free market access for all LDC products by 2008 or no later than the
start of the implementation period. Members who faced difficulties in doing so are
to provide such market access for at least 97 percent of LDC products by that time
period.35 Members agreed that
the implementation by LDCs of their obligations or commitments will
require further technical and financial support directly related to the
nature and scope of such obligations or commitments, and direct[ed] the
WTO to coordinate its efforts with donors and relevant agencies to
significantly increase aid for trade-related technical assistance and
capacity building.36
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration also had a special emphasis on aid
for trade. This initiative includes technical assistance so as to help countries to
develop their strategies on trade, to negotiate more effectively, and implement
outcomes of negotiating rounds. It also includes infrastructure, that is, building the
roads, ports, and telecommunications linking domestic and global markets;
productive capacity, which means that countries invest in industries and sectors so
that they can diversify exports; and adjustment assistance to help developing
countries with the costs associated with tariff reductions or declining terms of
trade.37 The Declaration calls aid for trade a "valuable complement" to the Doha
Development Agenda," which "should aim to help developing countries,
particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure
and benefit from WTO's Agreements
that they need to assist them to implement
38
and more broadly to expand their trade."
Members invited the Director General to create a task force to provide
recommendations on how to operationalize aid for trade so that it could contribute
most effectively to the development dimension of the DDA. They also invited the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. para. 2.
Id. paras. 4-10.
Id. para. 11.
Id. Annex F.
Id.

37. See generally World Trade Organization, Development: Aid for Trade -- Aid for Trade fact
sheet, availableat http://www.wto.org/englilsh/tratop-e/devel-e/a4te/a4tfactsheete.htm.
38. Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 31, para. 57.
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Director General to consult with members as well as with relevant international
organizations, the regional development banks, the IMF and the World Bank, with
a view to reporting to the General Council on appropriate mechanisms to secure
additional financial resources for aid for trade, where appropriate through grants
and concessional loans.
The Director General accepted these recommendations. He engaged in a
series of consultations with the pertinent institutions on securing additional
financial resources for aid for trade. He also established a task force as suggested
to advise on how best to deliver this additional funding. The task force's
recommendations 39 included a call for strengthening the "demand side" and the
"donor response," and for closing the gap between "demand" and "response" at the
country, regional, and global level. Another recommendation was for the WTO to
monitor and evaluate aid for trade.
Director General Lamy is a strong proponent of aid for trade in the WTO
agenda. The following two statements clearly indicate the importance he attaches
to this initiative. In his words, aid for trade
has an important political role to play as a complement to the trade
negotiations.
Additional development assistance can help [the
developing] countries address trade bottlenecks and unlock their full
trade and growth potential. Aid for Trade is about translating
theoretical trade opportunities for developing countries into realities.
Results on aid for trade are not contingent on the conclusion of the
[Doha] Round, but its value and importance will be greatly increased if
it is implemented in conjunction with substantial new market access
opportunities and new rules on trade facilitation.4
In opening a conference in September 2007 in Lima, Peru, entitled
"Mobilizing Aid for Trade: Focus Latin America and the Caribbean," Lamy
highlighted the role of aid for trade in meeting developing countries' needs. He
said:
Today's global economy-which could be widened and strengthened by
the conclusion of the Doha Round-is fundamentally changing the
development dynamic, creating huge potential for developing countries
to harness trade as an engine of growth. But to seize this opportunity,
they also need access to the basic infrastructure that drives
globalization-21st century transport corridors and telecommunications
networks that can connect exporters to world markets; modem customs
facilities that can move products rapidly and efficiently across borders;
testing labs to ensure that exports meet international standards; financial
"safety nets" to east concerns about economic adjustment and shocks;

39. World Trade Organization, Task Force on Aid for Trade, Recommendations of the Task Force
on Aid for Trade, WTO Doc. WT/AFT/l, 27 July 2006.
40. Lamy, supra note 10, at 11.
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and the sophisticated expertise and institutions needed to navigate a
highly complex world trading system.41
Three regional reviews on Aid for Trade were organized with the help of the
WTO in 2007 in Lima, Peru; Manila, the Philippines; and Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania. Subsequently, the first global Aid for Trade review was held in Geneva
in 2007, which featured the participation of a number of trade and development
ministers and heads of regional development banks and the World Bank, IMF, and
the OECD.42
In February 2008, the WTO Director General proposed an Aid-for-Trade
Roadmap, which featured national and sub-regional reviews in Africa, Latin
America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. These reviews would be
focused, technical, and results-oriented, with the aim of assisting in
advancing-and then monitoring-the implementation of concrete
national and sub-regional strategies. The broad objective would be to
are
showcase how Aid-for-Trade strategies can progress-and
43
progressing-and to create incentives for others to follow suit.
The next global review of aid for trade by the WTO General Council is
scheduled to be held in Geneva in spring/summer 2009, to "provide political
guidance, momentum and the 'big picture' on implementation and evaluation."
The European Union provides a promising example of a region
operationalizing aid for trade. On October 15, 2007, it adopted an Aid-for-Trade
Strategy. 45 The strategy is designed to support all developing countries, especially
LDCs, so that they could better integrate into the world trading system and to use
trade more effectively toward the objective of eradicating poverty in the context of
sustainable development.
In April 2008, an EU Commission staff working paper provided a report as
the first monitoring exercise after the adoption of this strategy.46 According to the
report, 20 of the 27 EU member states "had on-going co-operation activities in the
field of Aid for Trade," and "good progress is being made" toward meeting the
specific EU pledge to provide C2 billion annually to Trade Related Assistance by
2010.4 7 The report states:

41. World Trade Organization, Aid-for-Trade Initiative "Critical" for Latin America and the
SPEECHES,
NEWS:
WTO
2007,
13
September
Lamy,
Caribbean
www.wto.org/english/news.e/sppl-e/sppl68-e.htm.
42. See World Trade Organization, Aid For Trade -- From Making Trade Possible to Making
Trade Happen, www.WTO.org/english/tratop-e/dda e/meet08_briefl0_edoc.
43. World Trade Organization, 2008 Aid-for-Trade Roadmap, Annotated Update, 4 June 2008,
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/deveLe/a4t-e/a4t/ext/roadmapO8_e.doc.
44. Id.
45. Aid for Trade: EU Council agrees on Strategy, 15 October 2007, http://www.europa-euun.org/articles/en/article 7395_en.htm.
46. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff working paper, Com (2008)
177 final SEC (2008) 431-435 (April 9, 2008).
47. Id. at 2.
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The EU AfT [Aid for Trade] Strategy is comprehensive: it embraces
"classical" Trade Related Assistance (TRA: Trade Policy and
Regulation; and Trade Development), as well the other areas stressed by
the WTO Aid for Trade Task Force: Productive Capacity Building;
Trade Related Infrastructure; and Trade Related Adjustment. The
double focus on more resources and better impact on development
objectives is complementary. The strategy is closely linked to a
growing international momentum.... 48
This initiative could indeed provide the assistance needed by developing
countries so that they could become active participants in the international trade
arena. The obvious prerequisite for its success, however, is that the existing trade
rules be changed to show sensitivity to what the developing countries need mostsubstantial market access to their products in rich countries and a change in the
rules on trade facilitation.
IV.
The week of July 21, 2008, was a period of intense negotiations in Geneva.
The revised draft texts of the July 10, 2008, proposals for agricultural market
access 49 and for non-agricultural market access 5° provided the bases for these
negotiations. Ultimately, on July 29, the talks collapsed. The seven representative
negotiating partners -Australia, Brazil, China, India, Japan, the European Union,
and the US-finally gave up when access to developing countries' markets for
agricultural products from developing countries could not be resolved and Director
General Pascal Lamy's efforts to broker a compromise failed. The demand of
India and China that their farmers be given special protection was a major point of
division, revealing those countries' new and growing impact in the international
trade arena. 5 ' Most observers felt that the Doha Round is not finished, however,
because the compromises already in place could form the basis for further talks.

48. Id.
49. Committee on Agriculture, Revised DraftModalitiesfor Agriculture,TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 (July
10, 2008) available at www.wto.org/english/tratop e/agric-e/agchairtxt.julyO8_e.pdf
The aim of
negotiations is to reform agricultural trade primarily in three areas: market access (tariffs, tariff quotas,
and safeguards), domestic support for farmers and for agriculture, and export subsidies. The modalities
are the way or method of doing something, which in the Doha negotiations means the plans for the
final deal, for example, how to cut tariffs and reduce agricultural subsidies and support, along with
flexibilities to address various sensitivities.
50. Negotiating Group on Market Access, Draft Modalitiesfor Non-Agricultural Market Access
Third
Revision,
TN/NAIW/103/Rev.2
(July
10,
2008)
available
at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/markacce/namachairtxt..july08-e.pdf. The aim of the negotiation is
elimination or reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on industrial products, especially products for
export from developing countries. The crucial elements for negotiation include flexibilities for
developing countries to shelter some sensitive sectors from the full impact of tariff reductions and
special treatment for LDCs.
51. See So Near and Yet So Far; World trade, ECONOMIST (London), August 2, 2008; The Next
Step for World Trade, N.Y. TIMES, August 2, 2008.
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V.
This Symposium edition addresses several pertinent issues related to
international trade, including the Doha Round. Professor Kevin C. Kennedy and
John Stencel, past president of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, present their
distinct perspectives on an issue of critical importance to developing countriesagricultural subsidies and US protection of farmers and agriculture. Professor
Phoenix Cai studies the vast potential of aid for trade and recommends the means
necessary to make this initiative a success. Other issues related to international
trade are those of global warming, discussed by Professor Anita Halvorssen, and
enforcement issues, discussed by W. Davis Jones and Richard W. Emory, Jr., of
the US Environmental Protection Agency. Finally, Professor Wendy Duong
studies the impact of artificial intelligence on the future trends of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in developing countries, especially LDCs.
In his contribution, The Doha Round Negotiations on AgriculturalSubsidies,
Professor Kennedy discusses at length the special situation of the west and central
Africa countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo, whose exports are
dominated by cotton. Agricultural exports represent over 60 percent of their
earnings and nearly 30 percent of their total export earnings.
After discussing the level of subsidies to their cotton producers by several
countries, including the United States, Kennedy reviews the efforts made in the
WTO negotiations to treat cotton subsidies as a stand-alone issue and outside the
agricultural negotiations, but without any success. He also considers the impact of
the 2004 Brazilian proceedings against the United States through the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. The Appellate Body ruled in 2005 that US domestic
subsidies to cotton producers had caused serious prejudice to Brazil in world
cotton markets because they had a price-suppressing effect on world prices. He
refers to various studies that demonstrate that US subsidies also affect world cotton
prices.
Professor Kennedy provides a detailed analysis of the efforts made thus far to
reform cotton subsidies and explores the future prospects of similar efforts. As to
domestic subsidies, he considers the best near-term solution to be for subsidizing
nations to fully decouple support-that is, support not tied to production in any
respect-rather than provide price support. And he discusses specific features of
such support-that it has to be the only form of farm support; that the existing
condition for such support that land stay in agriculture should be eliminated; and
that all export subsidies and domestic subsidies in the form of decoupled support
should be progressively phased out. He also recommends internal reforms that
sub-Saharan countries should undertake and suggests that they form a regional
trading bloc.
Professor Kennedy endorses a suggestion made by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that phasing out of
agricultural support should coincide with increased international financial and
technical assistance to agriculture in the LDCs aimed at promoting agricultural
productivity growth and commercialization. He finds US agricultural policy to be
unintentionally working at cross purposes with the African Growth and
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Opportunity Act. He surmises that successful Doha Round negotiations could
perhaps achieve meaningful reform of agricultural subsidies. If these negotiations
were to fail, he fears that "litigation may unfortunately replace negotiation as the
default mechanism for forcing reforms."
In Free Trade Versus Fair Trade, John Stencel, past president of Rocky

Mountain Famers Union, warns that liberalized trade will not cure all of
agriculture's ills. He argues instead for "fair trade" as essential to American
agriculture. In his words,
markets fluctuate, currency values change, trade balances shift, and
supply and demand varies. That is the way markets work. That is why
farmers and ranchers need federal farm programs, antitrust protections,
and transparent trade agreements. The nature of the markets, coupled
with the current free market ideology and undue market influence of
international corporations, mean that the present situation in agriculture
is not an aberration but a chronic condition brought to bear upon
farmers by our public policy choices.52
By a fair trade system, he means the one that "protects the economic wellbeing, health and environmental concerns, working conditions
and labor rights" of
53
US producers as well as producers from all other countries.
Stencel contends that bilateral Free Trade Agreements and regional trade
agreements the US has negotiated have damaged the US agricultural economy. He
considers the expanding export market for US agricultural products as failed policy
for, in his opinion, the export problems our policy-makers identify and the freetrade answers they seek do not address the fundamental problems faced by
American agriculture and do not reflect the realities of global trade either.
Overproduction, he says, is not a key problem, which he considers to be an
oversimplification. Instead, he argues that domestic farm policy and trade
agreements, not farmers' overproduction, create the problem. Stencel suggests the
establishment of a farmer-owned inventory control mechanism for farmers, as
advocated by the Farmers Union. This, he argues, would protect against supply
and demand market fluctuations as part of an income support mechanism to bolster
farm prices for producers. The free trade mentality, he says, is not the answer.
Stencel supports a community-based strategic biofuels program and a US
policy of "managing plenty" of the farm programs with a floor under commodity
prices and effective control of crop mix and acreage and price stabilization to
producers. Just eliminating trade barriers and eliminating subsidies, he argues,
would not result in significantly higher prices for farmers anywhere, as in his view
the high subsidy levels both in the US and Europe are not the cause but the result
of low prices. He believes that in agriculture, and especially in the global
marketplace, giant multinational corporations have the capability to dominate
conditions of trade at the expense of smaller businesses and individuals. Thus,

52. See Stencel, infra p. 366 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 349.
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eliminating trade barriers and globalizing markets would encourage these
dominant players to grow even bigger.
Stencel is critical of trade agreements because they could eliminate the
farmers' few protections, such as domestic safety net programs and marketing
agencies, and could result in lowering labor standards and environmental
protections. He recommends new trade rules to combat world hunger and
malnutrition. These new rules should ensure the establishment of an international
food reserve to assure supply when production is hampered by natural disasters.
He also would like to have established a national or international energy reserve of
commodities that could be processed into energy. He concludes: "Agricultural
producers are in a global market that whipsaws food producers into the fruitless
quest to be the lowest cost producers. We need a global market that rewards
54
farmers for participating in the world's greatest occupation-growing food.",
In Aid for Trade: A Roadmap for Success, Professor Phoenix Cai critically
examines in an historical context this new initiative as a complement to the Doha
Round. She first describes the evolution of trade-related aid from the middle of the
20th Century, which was initially characterized by the recipients' having little say
in the decision-making process, as aid was usually driven by political or
commercial considerations of the donors. Thus, recipients had no sense of
ownership or meaningful participation in the trade negotiations. She relates one
success story-that of the Ozone Convention and its Protocols-where the
developing countries assumed ownership and actively participated in the process;
they were provided the needed financial and technological assistance to do so
through the Convention's Multilateral Fund. This she offers as a promising model
framework for a successful aid for trade system.
After sketching the current state of aid for trade, Professor Cai provides a
compelling case for the WTO to use this initiative as a promising opportunity for
the organization to shed its image as a non-transparent organization and instead
enhance its transparency and increase its democratic participation. Aid for trade,
she argues, plays a significant part in facilitating the developing countries'
participation in the multilateral trading system. However, she evidences how
developing nations have been marginalized because of their lack of adequate and
effective market access for their goods and services, coupled with technical
implementation challenges related to agreements on textiles and clothing, antidumping, and TRIPs. She suggests that only at the level of ministerial negotiations
can these issues be addressed and obstacles overcome.
Professor Cai's discussion of the tension between aid and trade is thorough
and insightful. She discusses among other issues the challenge of donor control
and the pivotal role of the recipient government in taking ownership to ensure
development success. She is a strong proponent of developing countries' active
participation in trade negotiations.

54. Id. at 367.
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In her "roadmap for success," Professor Cai provides concrete
recommendations for the main actors-the WTO, developing countries, the trade
legal community-academics, practitioners, and experts -, and donors. These
include bringing Doha to a successful conclusion, providing demand-driven
technical assistance, assisting developing countries in bolstering their participation,
and enhancing transparency and democracy in the multilateral trading system.
Professor Cai recommends that the developing nations should consider aid for
trade as an opportunity to gather the necessary empirical evidence to convince
developed countries that they need to change their policies so that they provide
This would require the
meaningful benefits to the developing countries.
and
detailed"
assessments
to the Task Force
developing countries to provide "frank
on Aid for Trade, to ensure better coordination among themselves, and to skillfully
use the pertinent information in multilateral trade negotiations.
Professor Cai proposes that the trade legal community play a prominent role
in making aid for trade a success by actively engaging with their aid counterparts
and by providing pro bono legal assistance. As for the donors, she has several
suggestions. In addition to contributing aid funds, they must ensure that the
recipients assume ownership so that aid is country-driven. They should refrain
from attaching damaging conditions to providing aid for trade-they should give it
simply as aid and not "in the guise of complex financial arrangements that may
result in greater debt for developing countries. 55 Also, they should decouple aid
for trade from results in the Doha Round or future trade negotiations.
In her conclusion, Professor Cai sums up the significant role that aid for trade
can play: "The international trading system has much to gain from the effective use
of aid for trade as a tool for fulfilling the promise of the Doha Development
Agenda, alleviating global poverty and giving developing nations a well-deserved
place at the table in the global trade regime. ' 56
In her article, UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the WTO-Brewing
Conflicts or are They Mutually Supportive?, Professor Anita Halvorssen suggests
that the climate change treaties and the WTO regime share the common goal of
promoting human welfare. She examines the relationship between the WTO and
the climate regime-the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its
Kyoto Protocol-and recommends the necessary changes in this relationship
which would allow the urgent action needed to address climate change can be
taken. Her advice: "Any trade measures inserted into the climate treaties should be
carefully written in order to avoid conflicts with the WTO rules and the WTO rules
need to become more sensitive to the new scenario of trade measures used to
address climate change." 57
The changes she recommends include a suggestion that the WTO membership
negotiate and adopt an agreement on climate change and trade, which would

55. See Cai, infra p. 322.
56. Id. at 324.
57. See Halvorssen, infra p. 377 (citation omitted).
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encompass the already-proposed trade in climate friendly technology, not only
covering goods and services but also addressing emissions-trading issues. She
further calls for the establishment of a Committee on Trade and Climate Change to
address areas where trade and climate issues intersect.
In her study of the WTO background, she suggests that the ruling of the
Shrimp-Turtle Case
has opened the door to the possibility of the WTO deciding future cases
in favor of states utilizing measures to address the PPMs, not just the
products' attributes. In the context of climate change, WTO member
states can perhaps claim Art.XX(g) directly when taking measures
against other members' products produced using highly GHG emitting
energy sources. The argument would be that the PPM measures were
used for the protection of an exhaustive natural resource, specifically
58
the climate system which is being endangered by GHG emissions.
Professor Halvorssen offers these proposals after providing a thorough
background on anthropogenic sources of GHG emissions and their relationship to
trade, and reviewing the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, especially the pertinent
trade-related articles and Kyoto's flexible market mechanisms-emission trading,
joint implementation, and the clean development mechanism.
In the first of the two essays on national enforcement, Richard Emory, Jr.,
senior attorney in the international compliance assurance unit of the US
Environmental Protection Agency, offers recommendations for Secretariats and
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to multinational environmental agreements
(MEAs) so that they can support and strengthen enforcement by governments to
achieve compliance with national laws to implement a Party's MEA obligations.
In his essay, Improving National Enforcement for Better Governance
Implementing MEAs, he describes the essential structural and institutional
measures a Party should undertake so that MEAs are better able to support national
enforcement.
Emory offers a number of recommendations addressing mostly systems,
process, and operations. One is for the Parties to an MEA to form an enforcement
committee. Another is for the MEA secretariat to hire more staff with the relevant
experience as enforcers. Also, one unit of the United Nations Environment
Program should be designated as the coordinating lead agency, perhaps with some
new powers and duties, for enforcement issues affecting all or many MEAs.
Focusing on import/export control, Emory offers "simple and effective"
measures to combat illegal international trade that undercuts MEAs. Each Party
should designate and empower one unit among its MEA Focal Points to be
"National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination," and should link its customs
ministry with its environmental (and other MEA focal point) ministries. Among
other recommendations, Parties should move, with the assistance of secretariats, to
develop and, by decisions of the COPs, require product-specific codes so that
58. Id. at 376.
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modem methods including computers can be used. Parties should also adopt
systematic approaches to monitor compliance for imports and exports. For this to
happen, MEA secretariats should design and propose more standardized licensing
schemes and movement documents.
Emory's other "commonsense" approaches for Parties include their
developing an intelligence capability to anticipate illegality and to assess threats.
He cites the example of the Montreal Protocol, as the Parties to that Protocol failed
to anticipate illegality and to assess threats, because they did not foresee that the
Protocol's implementation would bring about black markets and smuggling by
organized and entrepreneurial criminals. Thus, he recommends that each chemical
and its market should be studied for most chemicals covered by the Stockholm
Convention and the Rotterdam Convention. Also, criminal penalties must be
available to maximize deterrence so that prosecutors and judges are able to punish
serious violations.
Emory's final recommendation is that legitimate trade industry, such as trade
associations of importers and exporters, should be engaged as partners by MEAs'
secretariats and parties. He cites the example of the private sector providing key
assistance, including intelligence and sampling equipment, to the US government
in its enforcement of the US Clean Air Act which is required for the
implementation of the Montreal Protocol. MEA secretariats and concerned parties
are asked to exercise more leadership in proposing models and possible standards
to all parties, piloting these measures among willing parties. Successful measures
should become international standards and MEA treaty obligations as prescriptions
by decisions of COPs.
In his essay, The RelationshipBetween Trade and Effective Enforcement, W.
Davis Jones, International Enforcement Training Coordinator in the US EPA,
discusses the role of the EPA and other government agencies, such as the
Department of State and the Agency for International Development, in helping to
build long-term capacity with trading partners; this capacity is aimed at achieving
effective environmental compliance and enforcement programs. He explains that
because the US is entering into so many bilateral and regional preferential trade
agreements, which include environmental provisions to promote public
participation, there is a need to build the partners' capacity. These agreements also
include measures to enhance environmental performance and to provide
appropriate remedies for violation of environmental laws. He notes that there are
significant enforcement concerns with the various environmental provisions of
these agreements.
Jones gives the example of the provision on public submission process
embodied in the agreement between five countries in Central America, the
Dominican Republic, and the United States (CAFTA/DR), and another provision
outlining an enforcement procedure to follow if the prior clause is violated. Under
this process, the Humane Society International filed such a submission in May
2007 alleging that
by failing to complete a comprehensive inventory of products made
form sea turtles as required by domestic law, the Dominican Republic is
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failing to effectively enforce sea turtle protection laws prohibiting the
sale of products manufactured from endangered sea turtles that were
captured and killed in the country after July 31, 2001."9
The Dominican Republic has been formally requested to submit a response to
the points raised in the submission.
Jones suggests that many US partners in these agreements have gaps in their
compliance programs, and that an effective compliance program must include
compliance incentives and compliance assistance, along with compliance
monitoring. It also must have provisions for sanctions and legal remedies for
violation of the Party's obligations under the law.
Although "effective enforcement" is not clearly defined in such bilateral and
regional agreements, these agreements do include provisions for judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative proceedings to be in place to sanction and remedy
violations. Jones details the full range of activities to be undertaken in an
enforcement cycle. These include setting environmental goals, creating awareness
and understanding of the problem, and planning and implementation of a program
to address the problem's causes. Evaluation of the effectiveness and results, and
recommendations for changes to improve the various components of the cycle, are
essential as well.
Jones warns that the ideal response does not lie with the transplants of US
laws in these countries, for the situations there could be different and most of the
US laws may not work effectively in other contexts and would need to be adapted
for particular situations. He also recommends that the programs must set priorities
and the regulators must develop strategies to effectively monitor compliance,
which could be done in many ways, such as through government inspections,
industrial self-monitoring, or citizen monitoring and reporting.
Finally, Jones suggests that punitive responses to violations, which are
consistently, fairly, and appropriately applied, are essential. Also, there should be
internal and external program evaluation and Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement Indicators could be helpful to assess whether resources have been
utilized appropriately and to assess the kind of benefits resulting to the
environment. He concludes:
It took USEPA over thirty years to evolve into the existing Compliance
and Enforcement program. Through cooperation with trading partners,
the U.S. government can use its experience in environmental control to
share successes and failures and accelerate the program development in
countries worldwide to ensure that everyone effectively enforces their
environmental laws, achieving high levels of environmental
protection. 60

In Effect ofArtificial Intelligence on the Pattern of ForeignDirect Investment
in the Third World. A Possible Reversal of Trend, Professor Wendy Duong
59. See Jones, infra p. 391.
60. Id. at 394.
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expresses her concern that large-scale industrial application of optimum Artificial
Intelligence (AI) in the 21 st Century may halt the flow of foreign direct investment
from the developed countries to the developing countries by changing investor
behavior and eliminating the developing countries' comparative advantages.
Consequently, Al could bring about the return of 19th Century colonialism.
Professor Duong provides a simple definition of AI as the simulation of the
human brain by a computer. She explains:
In AI research, scientific efforts are made to identify those superior
functions of the brain that can be simulated - for example, what an
engineer will do to come up with the system design for factory
production. Then, mathematical models, especially algorithm, are used
to express, memorialize, and document these human brain functions.
The models are then fed into a computer, such that when a standardized
instruction or an inquiry is given, the computer will generate the result
exactly like the work product of the engineer. This enables the computer
software to replace the engineer. 6'
She supports her thesis with several studies by UNCTAD, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. She
suggests that multinationals from the developed world may substitute AI for many
employees in developing countries, for Al
can literally eliminate the "middle level" of native labor where training and
technology transfer once typically occurred - those mid-level supervisors who
used to handle machineries and make the system run by exercising and
implementing human decisions. Now, Al will be doing their job. The foreign
investor (i.e., the multinational) can now limit knowledge of the At system
design to the "privileged few" in the native population who can receive the
knowledge-base crucial to Al - only those "privileged few" can afford and are
given the opportunity to join the information-based global society. Thus, Al can
tremendously increase the gap between these few ruling elites and the massive
bottom-level workforce, bringing the scenario back to the 19 'hcentury model of
production, despite the high-tech sophistication of the "digital factory" work
environment.62

She asks, "So, in such a vision, what good does it do for a Third World
country to join the WTO? Free trade will only enable such Third World country to
keep on exporting raw materials and agricultural products to feed the world, a
world ruled by the high-tech producers. 63 And she warns that Al can perpetuate
this imbalance.
Professor Duong calls for systematic and coordinated transnational regulation
in all relevant areas of the law, ranging from global labor laws and policies to
global anti-trust, intellectual property, technology export control, immigration,

61. See Duong, infra p. 327
62. Id. at 329.
63. Id.
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communication, and technology licensing laws and policies. She suggests that
"the only real solution that can effectively protect the global workforce must lie in
a revolutionary framework that can somehow transcend, or even abolish, the
existing sovereign structure in order to achieve universal, transnational
democracy." 64

64. Id. at 334.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Myres McDougal was a great American lawyer, professor and conceptual
engineer, building a bridge between private and public law and constructing the
great New Haven school of legal theory based on "public order and values." He
was distinctive, even among sociologically oriented colleagues in jurisprudence, in
insisting on detailed attention to social and power processes. Although I never had
the pleasure of studying under Professor McDougal (or "Mac" as he was known) I
was among his many admirers. I am deeply honoured to have been asked by the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law and my very good friend, Professor
Ved Nanda to deliver this lecture in honour of Mac.
This lecture is not intended to be on Mac's theories and jurisprudence, a task
clearly beyond the time allowed and more to the point, beyond my own
capabilities. Rather, I intend to discuss one aspect of international criminal lawthe development of United Nations-based international criminal tribunals, to be
exact. But before embarking on that, let me mention just a few phrases or concepts
which I believe are found in Mac's approach.**
For Mac, law was not a body of rules but was a process of making decisions
about how values-power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection,
respect and rectitude-are to be produced and distributed in a given community.
The role of the lawyer, as advocate or decision-maker, was to influence the process
in order to achieve the desired results. The goals of this process are those of a
public order of human dignity. The concept of community needs to be viewed in a

* Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, United Nations. The views expressed in this lecture are
those of the speaker alone and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations nor of its Office
of Legal Affairs.
- For an authoritative exposition of Mac's jurisprudence and theories, see W. Michael Reisman,
"McDougal, Myres S." in InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences, BiographicalSupplement,
vol. 18, p. 479 (1979).
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globally comprehensive and interdependent manner, with effective power
processes incorporated. Law is conceived as processes of authoritative decision by
which people clarify and implement their common interests, incorporating both
authority and control. In the field of international law, goals should be postulated
to guide decision-makers if community responses are to contribute to a public
order of human dignity. Perhaps some of these phrases or elements may be
instructive as we now proceed to the subject at hand.
When examining United Nations (UN)-based international criminal tribunals,
it is most important from the outset to note how recent this remarkable
development has been. Fifteen years ago, no such tribunals existed. The
establishment of such institutions has occurred rapidly and is one of the most
exciting and hopeful reaffirmations that the progressive development of
international law is very much alive and that the search for human dignity as been
advanced. It would have been inconceivable just a few years ago that a tribunal of
international judges--or mixed international/domestic judges--could by some
action under international law (UN resolution or treaty) have the authority to
prosecute individuals for crimes and sentence the guilty to imprisonment.
I will not discuss the International Criminal Court (ICC), the tribunal
established by universal multilateral treaty, nor the "Sarajevo War Crimes
Chamber," a non-UN domestic court but with international judges. I will also not
discuss war crimes prosecutions or courts established as part of a UN temporary
administration of territory such as in East Timor and Kosovo. Rather, I will
examine the international criminal tribunals established under UN auspices for the
former Yugoslavia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2002), Cambodia (2003)
and Lebanon (2007). Rather than taking them one by one, let us re-group under
headings to highlight their similarities and differences: a) broad goals; b) legal
basis; c) applicable law/jurisdiction; d) composition and location; e) financing; and
f) effectiveness. This presentation, given time and length constraints, can only be
somewhat superficial and deal with matters in a "broad stroke" manner.
II. BROAD GOALS
In terms of broad goals, here all the tribunals share the same community
values and goals: accountability for heinous crimes, no impunity for those who
commit them and, hopefully, through that process contribute to peace and
reconciliation in the community concerned.
III.

LEGAL BASIS

It is on the legal basis of the tribunals that the differences begin. The first two
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are subsidiary organs of the Security
Council, established by the Council under its Chapter VII enforcement powers.
They are thus "imposed" as it were---obligations were created by the Council
which bind all States, including that of complying with orders of the Tribunals.
The first tribunal, for the former Yugoslavia, was set up during the conflict in
1993, when the thrust was providing a deterrent to further violations of
international humanitarian law and providing a mechanism to bring to justice those
who allegedly committed such crimes; there was little talk of reconciliation as the
war was still raging in the Balkans. These two tribunals have "power" bases which
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the other tribunals lack: the Council could, in the appropriate circumstances, adopt
enforcement measures (such as imposing sanctions) against States which do not
comply with tribunal orders or judgments. Although the Yugoslav tribunal has
reported non-compliance to the Council on a number of occasions, no sanctions
have ever been imposed by the Council on States based on those reports. From
Mac's point of view, what would be interesting is to examine the effective use of
power (or political pressure) to achieve the desired community result in another
way: so-called "conditionality" of membership of Balkan States in NATO and the
EU. Those two organizations made the commencement of steps towards
membership of former Yugoslav countries conditional on full cooperation on the
part of the country concerned with the tribunal, including good faith efforts to
arrest fugitives and turn them over to the tribunal. Quite a number of fugitives
were turned over or "voluntarily surrendered" to the tribunal, so that very few
fugitives are left, although the two notorious ones-Mladic and Karadzic-are still
at large.
For the Sierra Leone and Cambodia tribunals, while the genesis for their
creation emanated from the Security Council for the former and the General
Assembly for the latter, their legal basis is not a decision of a UN body, but rather
a bilateral treaty between the UN and the country concerned. Thus these tribunals
were not "imposed" but rather exist at the request and with the consent of the
States concerned. There are no enforcement powers for these tribunals outside the
States concerned. While the Lebanon tribunal was modeled on the Sierra Leone
example, because of internal political difficulties the bilateral agreement between
the UN and the Government was not put before Lebanon's Parliament for
ratification. Acting on the request of the Government of Lebanon, the Security
Council under Chapter VII decided that the agreement would enter into force on a
certain date if the Parliament had not acted by that date. Thus, while clearly a
tribunal created at the request and with the consent of the Government of Lebanon,
the actual agreement establishing the tribunal was put into effect by virtue of a
binding decision of the Council.
Please note that the legal basis or method of establishment is directly related
to the accountability of the tribunals for their work. For the two Council tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, they must report periodically to the
Security Council and the General Assembly on their work, the former as the parent
organ often giving policy and management direction to the two tribunals. For the
Sierra Leone and Lebanon tribunals, however, there is no reporting to any organ of
the United Nations. For the Cambodia tribunal, the Secretary-General reports to
the General Assembly on its progress of work.
IV. APPLICABLE LAW/ JURISDICTION

The former Yugoslav tribunal is a direct descendant of the Nuremburg
tribunals, covering war crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity.
These crimes are often referred to as the "core crimes." The Rwanda tribunal
statute focused on crimes committed in internal armed conflict. In the case of the
Sierra Leone and Cambodia tribunals, they both included in the applicable law the
core crimes (except for the Sierra Leone tribunal which did not cover genocide)
but added other crimes more domestic in nature to take into account the particular
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situation of the country concerned. For example, the Sierra Leone tribunal had in
its subject matter jurisdiction recruitment of child soldiers and cruelty to children;
the Cambodia tribunal included torture and religious prosecution. A further
difference may be noted here: while the Sierra Leone tribunal is independent and
not linked to the domestic judicial system, the Cambodia tribunal is part of the
Cambodian domestic judicial system. Nonetheless, in both cases the tribunal is to
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness
and due process of law.
The Lebanon tribunal is radically different from the others: there are no
international crimes involved, at least on its face. While it is a tribunal of an
international character (see below), the crimes in its jurisdiction all flow from the
Lebanese Penal Code and relate to terrorist attacks and assassinations. Whether
the jurisprudence of this future tribunal will advance the argument that
international terrorism is an international crime outside a given treaty context
remains to be seen.
The applicable procedural law of the four "war crimes" tribunals is fairly
similar and is based on the international standards of justice and due process
inspired by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Lebanese
tribunal, being a tribunal applying the domestic law of Lebanon, will have to adopt
its rules of procedure and evidence in the light of the Lebanese Code of Criminal
Procedure. Such rules will also have to reflect international standards of justice
and due process.
V. COMPOSITION AND LOCATION

For the two Security Council ("ad hoc") tribunals-for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda-all the judges are international and no national judges serve. Those
two tribunals, it may be recalled, were Council enforcement measures. For the
Sierra Leone and Lebanese tribunals, the majority of judges are international with
a minority of judges being national judges. In the case of Cambodia, the situation
changes. The majority ofjudges are national with the international judges being in
the minority. But to guard against a purely "national" decision, no decision can be
taken by a chamber unless at least one international judge joins the majority of
national judges. The "dual" nature of this tribunal is further seen in the fact that
there are both UN and national "co-prosecutors" and "investigative judges" and
two sides to the staff-a Cambodian side where staff are hired by the Government
and the "UN" side hired as UN staff. This has created a complicated and
challenging structure.
On location, for the Yugoslav tribunal there was no question that it would
obviously have to be located outside the region as it was in flames at the time of
the tribunal's establishment. Thus The Hague was selected as it was already the
site of the principal judicial organ of the UN, the International Court of Justice.
For Rwanda the tribunal was established shortly after the end of internal conflict.
It was thought best for a variety of reasons to locate the tribunal outside the
country, in this case in Arusha, Tanzania, but with an office in Kigali. In both
cases, commentators have noted that placing the tribunals some distance outside
the country where the crimes occurred goes against the usual criminal law tenet
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that trials should normally be held where the crime occurred, where the evidence
can be found and where the witnesses can be located. The local population can
attend the trials and see that justice is indeed being done; they feel they are
participating in the process. Certainly in the former Yugoslavia, there is a feeling
of resentment by various segments of the population that the tribunal's work has
not been impartial, targeting some ethnic groups while leaving others untouched.
Partly as a reaction to this, in both the cases of Sierra Leone and Cambodia
the tribunals were located in the affected countries themselves, to engage the
population and local authorities in the international justice system and to facilitate
national peace and reconciliation. The results for the Sierra Leone tribunal have
been very positive, with highly successful and popular "outreach" programmes
reaching remote towns and villages. But even in Sierra Leone, the sensitive nature
of a defendant can affect the location of the trial. At the request of the leaders of
countries in West Africa, the trial of Charles Taylor in the Sierra Leone tribunal is
being held in The Hague, not in Freetown, the site of the tribunal. The trial of the
ex-President of Liberia in near-by Sierra Leone with Taylor supporters still active
in both countries would have risked instability in the region. In Cambodia, the
trials have yet to begin but the fact of "embedding" the tribunal in the Cambodian
judicial system and providing for a split national/international structure has
allegedly undermined international justice. The Open Society Initiative has
alleged that corruption, kickbacks and improper hiring procedures occurred on the
Cambodian side of the tribunal. Obviously if such practices are condoned,
international standards of justice and due process would be undermined and its
proceedings could be fatally contaminated. Audits have been conducted and
measures put in place to prevent such practices. Whether investigations of past
allegations of corruption need to be conducted is a matter for consideration.
For the Lebanon tribunal, the divisions and tensions among the various groups
in Lebanon-sometimes leading to violence and assassinations-made it
implausible to consider establishing the tribunal in Beirut. It will be located in The
Hague with an office in Beirut.
VI. FINANCING
For the two Security Council tribunals for the former Yugoslav and Rwanda,
as they are subsidiary bodies of the Council reporting to it, they are part of the
established programme of activities of the United Nations. Their expenses are
assessed and allocated among all the Member States of the Organization as decided
by the relevant budgetary bodies of the General Assembly.
For the other three tribunals, they are financed from voluntary contributions
of Member States and not from the budget of the United Nations. At the time of
establishing the Sierra Leone tribunal, major contributors to the budget of the UN
Pelt that the two Council criminal tribunals had grown too large and too expensive;
the new one should be funded from voluntary contributions from States and closely
monitored by the donors. The then Secretary-General and Legal Counsel resisted
that approach, noting that justice cannot be subject to the availability of funds
which could "dry up" at any time in the middle of a trial or when an accused is

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 36:3/4

awaiting trial. Power and allocation of resources won the day: that tribunal as well
as the subsequent UN-based tribunals are funded by voluntary contributions.
For the Sierra Leone tribunal, the money did in fact run out at one point, and
the General Assembly, as an exception and for one time only, gave a "subvention"
or loan to the tribunal so that it could continue functioning. The Cambodian
tribunal has difficulty in raising funds. The Lebanon tribunal is just in the course
of being established and is still collecting the required funds and pledges in order
to begin functioning. It is interesting to note that for that tribunal a special
contribution formula was chosen: the Lebanese Government contributes 49% of
the expenses and other States contribute 51% of the expenses.
VII. EFFECTIVENESS
Effectiveness involves matters of power, achieving goals and advancing
shared community values. If you ask the detainees waiting trial or those serving
time in prison as a result of tribunal convictions, chances are they would consider
the tribunals highly effective-they have lost their liberty. In the Yugoslav
tribunal alone, over 100 persons have been tried and almost 50 are or have been
sentenced to serve time in prison.
Some commentators claim that the tribunals have not been effective since
they have not achieved the goal of peace and reconciliation. But was that the goal
of the tribunals? Or was it to prosecute, as in any other criminal court, those
accused of heinous crimes in accordance with the law and standards of due
process? The influence of human rights and the rights of victims has entered the
policy goals of these tribunals which are different or absent from trials on the
domestic level. Here, the prosecutor represents the victims and intemational
community and wants to prove as much as can possibly be proven, to show the
monstrosity and enormity of the crimes the individual is charged with having
committed-not just what is needed for a successful conviction (more or less the
usual domestic goal). Rather, the prosecutorial policy includes showing and
proving to the world, to the victims and to the affected population, all the
international crimes the person allegedly committed. This means complicated and
thus lengthy trials with many witnesses and pieces of evidence. The tensions
between the goal of representing the interests of the victims and the goal of
financial restraint and speedy trials are evident. Some say the tribunals also have
an important role to play in getting the historical record straight to avoid future
denials and facilitating reconciliation, while others would say that is not the
function of a court of law. Finally, it must be pointed out that proving the elements
of core crimes (such as a "widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population") may require more evidence and testimony than that of a domestic
murder prosecution.
Each tribunal faces its own challenges of effectiveness depending on its own
circumstances and political/social context: the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals
have to begin winding down as they are searching for the final fugitives and
grappling with populations and Governments in their affected regions not
necessarily supportive; for the Sierra Leone tribunal, judgments will soon begin to
be announced, some of which might not prove popular; for the Cambodia tribunal,
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the first trials will be a test of the application of international standards by a
tribunal "embedded" in a country's national system; and for the Lebanon tribunal
the challenge is to be established and function in a volatile environment, where
violence and assassination, including against tribunal judges and officials, will be a
constant risk.
On the core value or purposes, however, there can be little doubt: the tribunals
and their jurisprudence have advanced the cause of promoting and protecting the
human dignity of the individual against crimes of the worst order on the
international level. Accountability and no impunity have been the driving forces
behind all these tribunals, with peace and reconciliation part of the process. The
tribunals will leave behind a powerful and effective legacy for the ICC.
As to power to enforce and achieving truth and reconciliation, the report card
is mixed depending on the tribunal concerned and its particular mandate and ability
to bring about goals sought. How much consensus is needed in the relevant
community in order to succeed is, again, a matter for each individual tribunal.
Each one was established and operates in its own social/political/legal context;
each must be judged within its own context. Under this umbrella one can find
various intersecting interests and policies: differences between civil and common
law approaches; truth and reconciliation processes compared to judicial
mechanisms; peace negotiations alongside no impunity for committing core
crimes; and local community values compared with universal community values.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Summing up, no single "legal" mold fits all. The success and study of each
tribunal will have to be judged on its own in its own context. But I think there is
no doubt that the experiment begun 15 years ago was overall a success and more
than worth it. The establishment of these UN-based tribunals, while some would
criticize as being examples of "selective justice," nonetheless proved to the world
that at least in some cases, heinous acts by individuals would not go unnoticed by
the larger community and that legal mechanisms would be established to try the
accused and deliver justice. There would be accountability and no impunity for
those found guilty of committing the worst of crimes. Even though Milosevic died
before his trial was over and thus was never technically found "guilty" by the
tribunal, I do not view that a failure. The fact remains he was in detention when he
died, on trial by an international mechanism for crimes he allegedly committed
against thousands of people. He did not die in a palace in Belgrade; he did not die
while at the Casino on the Riviera. An international criminal justice system was
operating against a former Head of State. Frankly, 15 years ago that would have
been beyond almost anyone's imagination.
I believe that the story of the UN-based criminal tribunals show that when the
constellation of the various factors and elements are right, a "public order of
human dignity" can be achieved.

AID FOR TRADE:

A ROADMAP FOR SUCCESS

PHOENIX

X.F. CAI*

I. INTRODUCTION

Let us imagine a cooperative of mango growers in Mali,' one of the poorest
countries in Western Africa. These mango farmers grow delicious mangos prized
by local consumers for their sweetness, firmness, and long shelf life. Let us further
imagine that our mango farmers dream of expanding their business beyond local
demands to export their mangos to markets in Europe, where they can garner
higher prices for their produce. How would they make their dream come true?
Imagine the difficulties our mango growers would have to overcome. Perhaps the
roads from Mali to the closest seaport of Dakar, Senegal are poorly maintained and
unreliable. Perhaps no fleet of refrigerated trucks is available to transport the
mangoes to port. Perhaps the Mali government does not have a system in place for
inspecting agricultural products for export to meet the safety and health regulations
of the European Union. Aside from these infrastructural concerns, the farmers
may not possess the know-how to market their products to compete effectively

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, University of California at
Berkeley College of Law: Boalt Hall, J.D. 1999; Washington University in St. Louis, B.A. 1996. I
would also like to thank the editors of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy and Peter
Smith, the Sutton Colloquium Issue editor for their invaluable assistance. Any errors in the article are
solely my responsibility.
1. Mali is, of course, one of the major producers of cotton in Africa. As a member of the Cotton
Four, Mali has been pushing, thus far in vain, for the United States, European Union, and other
developed countries to open their markets to imported cotton from Africa. For an excellent description
of the intractable position of the Cotton Four, see generally, Kevin C. Kennedy, The Incoherence of
Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-SaharanAfrica: Sowing the Seeds of False Hope
for Sub-Saharan Africa's Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 307, 315 (2005) (arguing that
"[c]otton subsidies, especially those bestowed by the United States upon its cotton farmers, have had at
the least a price suppressing effect on world prices for cotton, to the detriment of cotton farmers in subSaharan Africa"); see also Oxfam, "White Gold" Turns to Dust: Which Way Forwardfor Cotton in
West
Africa?,
Oxfam
Briefing
Paper,
Mar.
2004,
4-6,
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bp58_cottonwafrica.pdf;
Charles
E.
Hanrahan, CRS Report for Congress, The African Cotton Initiative and WTO Agricultural Negotiations
1-2 (2004), available at http:// www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets /crs/RS21712.pdf; Ruth Gordon,
Essay: Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brave New World of the WTO Multilateral Trade Regime, 8
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 79, 121 (2006) (arguing that sub-Saharan African countries may
have no choice but to disengage from the international trade regime and explore regional solutions).
Largely because Mali's dominant agricultural product, cotton, is so controversial and on which
negotiated market access issues overshadow aid for trade possibilities, I choose to focus the
hypothetical on a less fraught and complicated agricultural product.
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with mangos grown in Mexico, California, or the Philippines. To whom should
our hypothetical farmers turn for assistance? The answer, surprisingly, may be the
WTO.
Traditionally, when one thinks of development and aid, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) does not immediately come to mind. Rather, the usual
suspects are the development agencies of the UN,2 private non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and the much beleaguered World Bank 3 and International
4
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Nonetheless, development had been a hot topic at the
WTO recently. In particular, aid for trade has emerged as the rising star, invested
with the hopes of many as the best means to carry out the laudable goals of the so
called "development ' 5 or Doha Round 6 of multilateral negotiations. While the
2. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN's global development
network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and
resources to help people build a better life. The UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries, working with
them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. Under the sponsorship of
UNDP, world leaders have pledged to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, including the
overarching goal of cutting poverty in half by 2015. For more information on the Millennium
Development Goals, see infra text pp. 119-20.
3. Steven R. Weisman, Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fightat World Bank N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/I8wolfowitz.html.
4. Steven R. Weisman, LM.F. Faces a Question ofldentity, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2007, at Cl,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/business/worldbusiness/28imf.html
(quoting a
statement by the newly appointed managing director that the IMF faces questions of both "relevance
and legitimacy.").
5. The member nations of the WTO launched the Doha Development Agenda ("DDA") on
November 14, 2001. The initiative seeks to change the orientation of the global trade architecture to
make it more supportive of development. See World Trade Org., The WTO Hosts Public Symposium:
The
Doha
Development
Agenda
and
Beyond,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/symp-devagenda-02-e.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008)
(quoting statements by then WTO Director General Mike Moore, who spoke about the Doha
Declaration's emphasis on the major role of international trade in the promotion of economic
development and the alleviation of poverty).
6. The Doha Round of trade negotiations were launched in 2001, soon after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. The self-styled "development round" was to be an ambitious effort to extend the
reach of globalization to help the world's poor gain access to global markets for agricultural products,
among other goals. In order for the Doha Round to succeed, more developed economies had to agree
to lower tariffs for foreign farm products and slash barriers and subsidies in farming domestically. The
Doha Round was suspended officially on July 24, 2006, when it became obvious that gaps were still too
wide among the six principal negotiating countries (Australia, Brazil, the European Union (E.U.), India,
Japan and the United States (U.S.)). As the talks continued to stall, Mr. Lamy observed, on October 10,
2006, that "it is now obvious that the cost of failure, and the missed opportunity to rebalance the trading
system, would hurt developing countries more than others." World Trade Org., Lamy: Round Failure
Would
Hurt
Developing
Countries
More
Than
Others,
Oct.
10,
2006,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/tncchairjreport_10oct06 e.htm; see also, In the
Twilight of Doha, THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 2006, at 63. Little progress was made in 2007, but Pascal
Lamy, the Director General of the WTO, believes that the round may be concluded in 2008 following
the issuance of new draft framework deals from the chairs of the WTO negotiating committees on
agriculture and industrial goods trade. These reports should contain proposals, called modalities, for
expanding market access for agricultural and industrial products by developing nations. On December
5, 2007 Pascal Lamy told reporters that "[I]f we agree on modalities early next year, I believe we could
be able to conclude the round before 2008." WTO Negotiators Look to 2008, Though DOHA Deal
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Doha Round has collapsed, seemingly moribund for moment, WTO officials have
been casting about for another means of spurring economic growth in the
developing countries. 7 The answer of the moment is aid for trade, the appealing
simple idea of building trade capacity from the ground up with various forms of
trade-targeted aid. Aid for trade is broad, multifaceted, and complex, comprising
forms such as technical assistance (helping countries develop trade policies,
negotiate more effectively, and implement outcomes), technology transfers,
infrastructural projects, capacity-building, and adjustment assistance (helping with
the costs associated with tariff reductions and declining terms of trade). Aid for
Prospects Look Slim, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 5, 2007,
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-12-05/storyl.htm. The WTO did issue a new framework containing
modalities or formulas for reducing agricultural subsidies on February 8, 2008. See World Trade Org.,
Draft Blueprints Issued for Final Deal on Agricultural and non-Agricultural Trade, (Feb. 8, 2008)
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric.e/chair._texts08_e.htm (last visited May8, 2008). The initial
response to the draft framework has not been very promising, however. See Press Release, Institute for
Agriculture and Trade Policy, New WTO Agriculture Text Falls Short-Again (Feb. 8, 2008),
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/press.cfm?refid=101542. (last visited May 8, 2008). See also David Blandford
et al., Implications of the WTO February 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities for the United States,
available at www.ifpri.org/events/seminars/2008/20080501/20080501USLabordeetal.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2008).
7. See World Trade Organization, The Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/devel e/dev sub committee ldc e.htm. (last visited Feb. 18,
2008) (explaining that the WTO recognizes as LDCs those countries which have been designated as
such by the United Nations. There are at present 50 LDCs on the UN list, thirty-three (with the
accession of Cape Verde as a member in December 18, 2007) of which are Members of the WTO); see
also United Nations Statistics Division: Definition of Developed, Developing countries,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb dict_xrxx.asp?def code=491 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (stating that
"[t]here is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or
areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States
in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania and Europe are considered "developed"
regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as
developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are
treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and the former USSR countries in
Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions."). But see United Nations
(LDCs),
Developed
Countries
of
Least
Division:
Definition
Statistics
(last visited January 18, 2008)
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdbdict-xrxx.asp?defcode=481
(explaining that the UN, however, does have a system to designate a list of those countries considered
to be Least Developed Nations (LDCs), whereby on the recommendation of the Committee for
Development Policy, the General Assembly decides on the countries to be included in the list of the
least developed countries. In Africa, they are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, D. R. of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo,
Uganda, U.R. of Tanzania, Zambia. In Asia and the Pacific, they are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao P.D.R., Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu, Yemen; In Latin America and the Caribbean: Haiti). While there are numerous significant
differences among countries falling into these groups, in this article, I refer generally to "developing
nations" to include all the LDCs and all the developing economies, without necessary differentiating
between them. This is not to say the differences between them are not important -they certainly are.
Instead, it reflects on the fact that they share certain common concerns, particularly with respect to
trade, such that they may be treated as one group for the purpose of this article. Thus, the term
"developing nations" is used merely as a convenient short-hand.
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trade is such a hot topic these days that Pascal Lamy, Director General of the
WTO, recently devoted a whole conference (a Global Forum on Aid for Trade) to
it, and afterwards went on tour to promote its virtues to WTO member nations and
NGOs. 8
This article seeks to critically examine aid for trade, to assess its shortcomings
and strengths, and to offer a roadmap for implementing it with success. Part II
begins by taking a very selective and brief look at the development of trade-related
aid from the end of World War II into the 21st century, with a focus on the
historical and political tensions that have lingered and continue to shape aid for
trade today. Part III provides both a description and a frank assessment of how aid
for trade is currently conducted, and argues that it is still largely ineffectual in
promoting sustainable economic development where it is most needed. Part IV
examines the inherent conflicts between the aid regime and the trade regime,
which conflicts yield implications for how aid for trade should be structured.
Another goal of Part IV is to encourage greater dialogue between aid experts and
trade experts, who have much to learn from each other. Lastly, Part V coalesces
the lessons from the first three parts into a normative roadmap for success, one in
which aid for trade is not a substitute for meaningful changes to WTO multilateral
trade regime, but rather an effective tool both for promoting economic growth and
laying the informational and institutional foundations for effective reform of the
WTO system to ensure it works for both developed and developing nations.
II.

THE HISTORICAL LESSONS

Aid for trade is not new. So long as development agencies have been in
existence, some portion of the aid they oversee has been ear-marked for traderelated projects. While it is beyond the scope of this article to canvass the
complete history of trade-related development aid, it is worthwhile to highlight
some of the trends in such aid since the end of World War II. The broad themes
that emerge are important guideposts in shaping aid for trade programs today.
A. Recipient Countries ofAid had Limited Autonomy
Development aid and trade-targeted aid in the post-World War II era was

8. The first Global Review of Aid for Trade was held at a conference in Geneva on November
20-21, 2007. The objectives of "Mobilizing Aid for Trade: A Global Review" are threefold: (1) Take
stock of what's happening: The global review weaves together various inputs in the monitoring process,
including a discussion on the results and recommendations of the three regional reviews that took place
prior to the Global Review, in Lima, Peru for Latin America and the Caribbean; in Manila, Philippines
for Asia and the Pacific; and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania for Africa. (2) Identify what should happen
next: The meeting was expected to help develop roadmaps for mainstreaming trade in national
development strategies. For the next steps, partner countries, donors and agencies were encouraged to
identify key objectives and to discuss how these objectives can most effectively be met. (3) Better
monitoring and evaluation: The global review discussed ways of better monitoring and evaluating
progress by partner and donor countries, including efforts to launch a work program aimed at
developing qualitative targets for improving trade capacity. In addition to the Global Review, the WTO
has launched a blog about aid for trade as well as an online chat with Director General Pascal Lamy
about aid for trade. See World Trade Org., Aid for Trade Can Turn Possibilityinto Reality, Lamy Tells
Global Review, Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl 8le.htm.
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largely donor-run, politically driven, and characterized by a lack of country
ownership. For example, beginning with the Marshall Plan, the United States used
aid in a politically-driven way to advance its Cold War policies - in order to
prevent the spread of communism. 9 Other developed nations subsequently used
aid to ensure "a relatively peaceful transfer of power to independent governments
at the end of colonialism." 10 Recipient nations also exercised little autonomy over
the uses of aid funds. Aid grants often came with political or commercial strings."
It is important for aid for trade not to repeat the mistakes of the past by avoiding
similar problems. Part IV will develop detailed suggestions to ensure aid for trade
is country-driven, politically and commercially untied, and characterized by a high
degree of country ownership.
B. Exclusion of Developing Nationsfrom Meaningful Participationin Multilateral
Trade Negotiations
Until very recently, developing nations played little, or no, role in the shaping
of the global trading system. 12 Immediately in the aftermath of World War II, the
reconstruction of Europe was the number one priority of the victorious allies.
When twenty-three nations, consisting of primarily wealthy but war-ravaged
nations, formed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) institutions
in 1947, their focus was on the rebuilding of trade linkages among themselves. For
the most part, the developing nations of Asia, Central and South America, and
Africa, many of whom were still under colonial control, were not part of the
calculus. 13 Economic growth and integration were principally goals for Europe,

9. See Pierre de Senarclens, How the United Nations Promotes Development Through Technical
Assistance, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER 190 (Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 4th ed.
2003) (1997) (noting that just as the Marshall Plan was to contain the communist threat in Europe,
economic aid became part of the American political strategy during the Cold War with respect to other
parts of the world as well).
10. Nicolas Van De Walle, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT CRISIS,
1979-1999 189 (2001) (describing the crisis of foreign aid in post-independence Africa).
11. See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, Back to Basics: The ACP-EU Cotonou Trade Agreement
and Challengesfor the African Union, 40 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59, 100 (2004) (arguing that the "increasing
tendencies to impose conditionalities of a political nature for development assistance to Africa has had
unintended but negative consequences.").
12. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing
Countries in from the Cold, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 7-9
(Bernard Hoekman & Will Martin eds., 2001) (noting that rich countries sometimes play-down the
political imbalances within developing countries); see also Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards
and Accountabilityfor the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based
Relations andEstablishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L
L 413, 419-20 (2001) (recognizing the special needs of developing countries in the WTO agreements
and arguing that the absence of standards perpetuated by a minority of powerful countries pose a threat
to the security of the entire international trade system).
13. In the aftermath of World War II, fifty countries convened at the Bretton Woods Conference
to create, among other things, the International Trade Organization (ITO), a specialized agency of the
United Nations. Those at the conference hoped that the creation and development of an ancillary
institution dealing solely with trade would decrease obstacles to international trade and give effect to
multilateral nondiscriminatory trade principles. Along with the ITO, the countries created the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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North America, and Japan, achieved through a series of multilateral trade
liberalization agreements negotiated under the auspices of the GATT. In fact,
developing nations continued to not have a seat at the table for many decades. One
explanation is that the majority of developing nations continued to export only
primary commodities, an area in which the trade regime was already fully
developed and solidified. In fact, with respect to agricultural commodities, the
GATT system was so mature and inflexible that major changes to it critical to the
trade interests of developing nations are being negotiated only now under the Doha
Rounds. The upshot is that developing nations were, and remained for a long time,
marginalized voices in the global trade system. As one scholar has noted:
Instead of aggressively seeking market access in the industrialized
world, these countries defensively sought special and differential
treatment on commitments to open their markets, and they obtained
marginal trade preferences or concessions on a nonreciprocal basis. Not
surprisingly, even while they were "free-riding" by virtue of the
GATT's most favored nation (MFN) 4principle, they received new
concessions of specific interest to them. 1
The history of exclusion of developing countries means that much rides on the
ability of the Doha Development Agenda to both fix and make some amends for
past lack of participation.
C. How Aid for Technical Assistance can be Used Successfully
History does offer one model of success, albeit not from the trade arena.
Commentators are virtually unanimous in hailing the Ozone Convention and
accompanying protocols 15 as a success in the reduction of ozone depleting

(the World Bank). The countries designed the three organizations with three purposes in mind: the IMF
would repair the disintegration of the world economy; the World Bank would stimulate and support
foreign investment; and the ITO would reverse the protectionist and discriminatory trade practices
believed by many to have in part caused the two World Wars. In the fall of 1946, twenty-three of the
countries present at the Bretton Woods Conference formed a provisional agreement, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These countries ratified the GATT in 1947 as a permanent
treaty. The original GATT agreement is often referred to as the 1947 GATT. It remains largely in
place today even though many revisions and additions have been made to it. When it came time in
1948 for the formal ratification of the ITO, the U.S. refused to sign the charter and the ITO was aborted.
The GATT was initially signed by twenty-three countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada,
Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United

Kingdom, and the U.S.

JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF

TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMiC RELATIONS 200, 199-201, 211 (4th ed. 2002).
14. Jayashree Watal, Developing Countries' Interests in a Development Round, in THE WTO
AFTER SEATTLE 71 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (explaining that for many decades, developing nations
were not significant players in the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT).
15. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S.
293[hereinafter the Ozone Convention]. See also John W. Kindt & Samuel P. Menefee, The Vexing
Problem of Ozone Depletion in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw and Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L. J. 261,
277-82 (1989) (arguing that the Ozone Convention was a success because it provided an umbrella treaty
on the ozone problem along with mechanisms for adopting subsequent protocols for future CFC control
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16
The
cholorofloridecarbons (CFCs), halons, and certain other greenhouse gases.
factors,
to
a
number
of
can
be
attributed
Ozone
Convention
success
of
the
relative
including, among others, the presence of strong public support, widespread
political will, the efforts of the UNEP in consensus building among interested
constituencies including industrial CFC producers,1 7 education, and
implementation, the imposition of measurable milestones and other binding
obligations in the Ozone Convention's progeny. For the purposes of this article,
one characteristic of the ozone regime is especially salient for the aid for trade
discussion, i.e., its technology transfer and technical assistance mechanisms to
enable developing nations to comply with the Ozone Convention.

Certain similarities between the ozone regime and the trade regime are
striking. First, no regime to reduce the emission of ozone-depleting substances
would work without the buy-in of developing nations, in particular of rapidly
industrializing or developing economies like China, India, Brazil, and the former
Soviet republics. Likewise, the world trade regime functions optimally only with
full participation. Second, developing nations felt that developed nations bore the
lion's share of the blame for the ozone problem. After all, industrialized nations
had the benefit of using dirty technologies to fuel their economies for decades. It
seemed both hypocritical and morally wrong to ask developing nations to wean
themselves off such technology, resulting in a slowing of their own development.
The same feeling of moral outrage explains why for many years developing
nations sought special concessions to trading rules.
They felt severely
disadvantaged by having a system in whose creation they played no part imposed
upon them. Third, for developing nations to comply with the emission standards
and milestones of the Ozone Convention, they would need financial, technical, and
technological assistance. Developing nations need similar assistance today to
make the world trade system work for them.
The Multilateral Fund was one of the keystones of the Ozone Convention's
success. It was a brilliant idea, and like many brilliant ideas, it was simple at its
core and complex in its implementation. The Fund was created under the London

measures); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1541; Carol A. Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the
Development of International Environmental Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 351, 367-72 (1990)
(describing the framework of the Montreal Protocol and arguing that it was unique among
environmental agreements because it contains economic incentives to encourage participation and
compliance).
16. See e.g., Elias Mossos, The Montreal Protocol and the Difficulty with InternationalChange,
10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 1, 1-5 (2005); Laura Thoms, A ComparativeAnalysis of International
Regimes on Ozone and Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 795, 802-03 (2003); Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the EquitablePrinciple of Common
but DifferentiatedResponsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution
in the Global Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 473 (2002); 0. Yoshida,
Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol'sNoncompliance Procedure and the Functionsof
Internal InternationalInstitutions, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 95, 96-100 (1999).
17. See Petsonk, supra note 15, at 367 (pointing out that the UNEP took care to involve not only
environmental NGOs, but also industry groups).
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Amendment to the Montreal Protocol in 1992.18 Developed nations pledged to
contribute money to the Multilateral Fund, which would be disbursed, under the
auspices of an implementation team consisting of both governmental and NGO
representatives at the UN, to developing nations for either retrofitting or cleaning
up ozone depleting industries. The Fund also provided for assistance in kind, in
the form of free technology transfers for new non-polluting industrial chemicals or
methods and know-how and clean-up technologies, which developing countries
might not otherwise be able to afford. The fund was also well designed to mitigate
the North/South conflict, the impasse between developed and developing nations,
which inspired its creation. The rotating membership on the Executive Committee
that oversees fund decision-making, comprised equal numbers of developed and
developing nations' representatives. Decisions are taken by consensus where
possible; if votes must be taken they require a two-thirds majority vote overall,
which also had to consist of a majority among both developed and developing
countries. 19 The fund had the intended effect. China joined immediately in 1990,
followed by India and Brazil in 1992 and eventually by almost all the developing
nations.20 "By early 1999 developed nations had contributed more than $847
million to the fund, and the Executive Committee had approved nearly 3,000
projects ........
Therefore, the Multilateral Fund addressed all three of the problems
highlighted above. It gave tacit acknowledgement to the historical responsibility
developed nations bear for ozone depletion. At the same time, it balanced the need
for uniformity in the application of standards to a transnational problem like the
protection of the environment with the recognition that poorer nations may lack the
resources to remedy such problems. Most critically, the Fund provided the
necessary means to enable developing nations to meet their commitments.
Similarly, a successful aid for trade system must also provide a compelling
framework for developing nations. It too should give implicit or explicit
acknowledge to the historical exclusion of developing nations in decision-making
that shaped the global trade regime. It would reflect the responsibility that
developed nations must now play in bringing in their developing nation
counterparts into the trade regime. It must also provide the resources to allow
developing nations to take full advantage of the global trade regime, including
meaningful participation in its decision-making.

18. London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art.
10, June 29, 1990, 1598 U.N.T.S. 469, 30 I.L.M. 537; see also Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience
of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and Remarkably Particular, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 49, 49-55, 57, 69-76 (2000-01) (describing the Montreal Protocol framework and the
Multilateral Fund as the innovative mechanism that brought in developing nations into the ozone
regulation scheme).
19. Elizabeth R. DeSombre & Joanne Kauffman, The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund:
Partial Success Story, in INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID: PITFALLS AND PROMISE 89, 99

(1996).
20. DeSombre, supranote 18, at 71.
21. Id.at 71-72.
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In conclusion, the history of trade-related aid, characterized by
marginalization and limited success, has several important implications for aid for
trade policy today. First, developing nations are beginning with a severe
disadvantage, not just in terms of economic and political clout, but in terms of
familiarity with the trade regime and the ability to negotiate its vagaries to their
advantage. There is a great deal of scholarship about the lack of meaningful
participation by developing nations in both trade negotiations and dispute
settlement. 22 It is not my goal to re-play such insights and arguments. Rather, I
wish to merely point out that aid for trade can play a pivotal role in correcting such
historical imbalances. Aid in the form of technical assistance and training focused
on the formulation and implementation of trade policies and on negotiation or
litigation strategies for achieving meaningful changes at the WTO has the potential
to making developing nations real players in the system. Such gains by developing
nations, if widespread and deep, coupled with cooperation among blocs of
developing nations as a negotiation strategy, could lend voice to a historically
disenfranchised group. Such is the promise of aid for trade.
III. AID

FOR TRADE TODAY

Today, the total volume of aid for trade is estimated by the OECD to be about
$25 to $30 billion annually. 23 Most aid for trade is disbursed directly by donors or
disbursed multilaterally through regional finance and development organizations
like the World Bank and the regional development banks.
The WTO participates in a very small distribution of aid for trade funds. It is

not a development or aid agency, and it does not wish to become one. Rather, its
role can best be described as that of a facilitator. The WTO clearly has a role and
22. See generally, William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 90
(1987) (questioning whether less developed countries will "have the diplomatic or economic muscle to
ensure that the decision is implemented" even if they win their case, based on the United States' past
refusal to implement successful GATT findings against the United States by smaller countries); William
J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 24 (2005);
Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2002: A Statistical Analysis, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 251, 255-56 (2003) (presenting empirical data showing that the WTO dispute settlement
process is often quite slow).
23. The OECD has compiled its estimate based on 2002-2005 data, the most recent years for
which data was available. The four categories of spending in 2005 were divided as follows: "(a) Trade
policy and regulation [which] amounted to roughly $0.9 billion in 2005. This helps build local
capacities of national trade policies, participate in trade negotiations and implement trade agreements.
(b) Building productive capacity amounting to roughly $9.5 billion. This includes trade development
spending targeted at helping enterprises to trade and at creating favorable business climate. (c)
Economic infrastructure spending was $12.1 billion in 2005. This assistance helps countries build the
physical means - transport and storage, communications and energy - to produce and move goods and
export them ....
Since there is no way of breaking out the amount that is strictly trade-related (how
much of a road is used for export trade as opposed to general domestic transport, for example), the total
is treated as a proxy for aid for trade. (d) Another component of the broadest measure of aid for trade is
assistance for trade-related structural adjustment (about $3-6 billion a year). [This is assistance to offset
the costs associated with tariff reductions, loss of industries, or declining terms of trade.]" World Trade
Organization,
Aid
for
Trade
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/a4t-e/a4tfactsheet-e.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2008)
[hereinafter, Aid for Trade Fact Sheet].
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responsibility for ensuring that countries can effectively participate in, and benefit
from, trade. As such, it has an interest in ensuring that the existing development
mechanisms work together efficiently and synergistically to promote trade. The
WTO was given a specific mandate by its General Council as part of the Uruguay
Round, the so-called Coherence Mandate, to ensure and promote coherence in
global economic policy making.24 The WTO's interest in aid for trade is an
extension, and a test, of the Coherence Mandate.
A. Opportunitiesfor the WTO
As a facilitator, the WTO can play a pivotal role. First, it can work with the
World Bank, the IMF, governmental and NGO donors, regional development
banks, and the U.N. development agencies to deliver a more coordinated
international policy. It can do so by ensuring that aid is directed where it can do
the most good for each recipient country. For instance, while the World Bank may
have particular expertise about the need for certain infrastructure projects (ports or
roads, for example), the WTO might be able to optimize the value of such
infrastructural improvements by coupling it with aid designed to draft and
implement export control regulation. The WTO can assist in coordinating projects
between countries, by ensuring, for example, that our mango farmers in Mali have
good roads not only in Mali, but also through Senegal to the western port of Dakar
or through the C6te d'Ivoire to the southern port of Abidjan.
However, these types of advising roles, while important, are not the areas in
which the WTO can have the greatest impact. The WTO can, and currently does,
play an important role in providing more and better aid for trade. It does so in two
major ways - advocacy and assessment. The 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong
Kong set in motion both steps by establishing a two-track process. First, Director
General Lamy engaged in a series of consultations with partner development
organizations on securing additional financial resources in aid for trade. The result
was a Ministerial Meeting affirmation by donors of their commitment to step up
their aid for trade contributions.25 The United States, the European Union, and
Japan made specific pledges to increase their aid for trade contributions. The
consultations also made clear that a number of new and non-traditional donors,
including some developing nations, were willing to be part of the process. This
advocacy role continues to be a critical one for the WTO to play because of its
linkages with donor governments and development agencies. It is ideally placed to
lobby for broadening and deepening the donor pool for aid for trade.
Step two of the two-track process consisted of the creation of a Task Force to
advise on how best to deliver any additional funding for aid for trade. The Task
Force issued a report in October of 2006 that was endorsed by the WTO's General
24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation art. IlI, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867

U.N.T.S. 154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto.pdf. See World Trade
Organization,
Task
Force,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/a4t-e/implementing-par57_e.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2008).
25. See World Trade Org., WTO to Press for Additional Aid for Trade Resources, September 18,
2006, available at http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/sppl-e/sppl36_e.htm (last visited May 8, 2008).
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Council. 26 The report set out a series of recommendations for optimizing aid for
trade. In particular, it called for strengthening the demand side, improving the
donor response, and closing the gap between demand and response at the country,
regional, and global level. It also suggested that the WTO should take a lead in
monitoring and evaluating aid for trade. The WTO heeded the suggestion and
initiated a three-part monitoring system. First, the OECD undertook a global
report on aid for trade. Next, donor and recipient-country monitoring took shape
in the form of self-evaluations. All three assessments would be examined in an
annual conference and debate in the WTO General Council, the first of which took
place in November 2007.
Both the advocacy and monitoring roles are obviously quite important. For
instance, since the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in 2005, annual
27
contributions for building productive capacity have increased by 75 percent.
Monitoring on a global level enables better decision-making in the investment of
aid for trade funds. More information and transparency generally leads to more
informed policies at both the donor and recipient country levels. Coordination in
monitoring is also a crucial first step towards greater coordination in the
implementation of regional or global aid for trade policies.
However, aid for trade also creates a great opportunity for the WTO to
enhance its own transparency and increase its democratic participation. The WTO
has been criticized by many for being secretive, non-transparent, and unsusceptible
to democratic oversight. Critics point to many shortcomings, such as the lack of
NGO and citizen participation in the trade negotiation process, and the total
absence of methods for interested parties like consumers, trade unions, and
advocacy groups to be heard in cases in the dispute settlement process.2 8 While
26. See World Trade Org., Development: Aid for Trade: Task Force, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/deveLe/a4t-e/implementing-par57_e.htm (last visited May 8,
2008)
27. See Aid for Trade Fact Sheet, supra note 23. However, it is not possible to determine if this
increase represents a net increase in donor giving for all development purposes, including aid for trade,
or is merely a reallocation of existing donor commitments for aid.
28. The Appellate Body did briefly accept amicus briefs in WTO dispute proceedings, but has
drawn back from the position after a loud outcry by member nations. According to the Appellate Body,
the panels' comprehensive authority to seek information from any relevant source (Article 13 of the
DSU) and to add to or depart from the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 to the DSU (Article 12.1 of
the DSU) permits panels to accept and consider or to reject information and advice, even if submitted in
an unsolicited fashion. The Appellate Body has confirmed this ruling several times, but the issue
remains extremely contentious among WTO Members. See Appellate Body Report, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 105-108, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter US - Shrimp]. Many Members are of the strong view that the DSU does not allow panels
to accept and consider non-requested amicus curiae submissions. They consider WTO disputes as
procedures purely between Members and see no role whatsoever for non-parties, particularly NGOs.
The statements of these Members can be found in the minutes of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")
in which the DSB adopted the US- Shrimp panel (and Appellate Body) report. To date, only a few
panels have in fact made use of their discretionary right to accept and consider unsolicited briefs. On
the basis of the Appellate Body's interpretation, panels have no obligation whatsoever to accept and
consider these briefs. Accordingly, interested entities, which are neither parties nor third parties to the
dispute, have no legal right to be heard by a panel. Id.

DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 36:3/4

deliberations during multilateral rounds of negotiations are conducted in public,
many critics allege that many critical provisions are hammered out in "late night
secret" negotiation sessions among key players. 29 These, and other perceived
failings by the WTO, can be summed up in the phrase "democratic deficit," which
has become a touchstone of dissatisfaction about the WTO. 30 These criticisms are
valid and should be taken seriously because they may ultimately erode the WTO's
legitimacy.
In the international economic literature, discussion of the WTO's democratic
deficit is contextualized within the broader so-called constitutionalization debate.
The term constitutionalization came into use with regard to the WTO in 1995, at
end of Uruguay Round, invoking both fears (loss of sovereignty) and hopes (the
ability to "exert control over decisions the State makes, the democratic community
itself'). 31 There is wide-spread disagreement within the literature about the
precise meaning of constitutionalization or constitutionalism, 32 similar to the

29. For example, critical negotiations surrounding the language of the standard of review
provision (Article 17.6) in the Anti-dumping Agreement was resolved in a late-night session. See
Phoenix X.F. Cai, Between Intensive Care and the Crematorium: Using the Standard of Review to
Restore Balance to the WTO, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 465, 488 (2007).
30. For a thoughtful discussion of the global democratic deficient in general, not specific to the
WTO, see generally Andrew Strauss, Considering Global Democracy, An Introduction to the
Symposium: Envisioning a More Democratic Global System, 13 WIDENER L. REV.(2006-2007);
Gregory H. Fox, InternationalizingNational Politics: Lessons for International Organizations, 13
WIDENER L. REV. 265 (2007).
The literature on the democratic deficient in the WTO is quite
extensive. See generally Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451
(2001); Steve Chamovitz, The WTO and Cosmopolitics, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 675 (2004); Robert Howse,
How to Begin to Think About the 'DemocraticDeficit' at the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS 79, 91 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003) (critiquing WTO
procedure); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623 (2006). In
contrast, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann advocates constitutionalization from a human rights point of view,
even arguing that the WTO's mandatory dispute settlement system should be a model for the United
Nations. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism,
InternationalLaw, and InternationalOrganizations, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 421 (1997); Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons from the International Economic Law
Revolution, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 185 (1997-98); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to
ConstitutionalizeInternationalLaw and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1998); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations? Lessons from the
"InternationalEconomic Law Revolution," 53 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT: SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR INTERNATIONALE WIRTSCHAFTSBEZIEHUNGEN [Swiss REV. INT'L ECON. REL.] 193 (1998); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in InternationalEconomic Law - Lessons for Strengthening
InternationalDispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 189 (1999); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the UN.
Dispute Settlement System? 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 753 (1999).
31.

Deborah Z. Cass, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:

16 (2005).
32. Some international trade lawyers take constitutionalization of the WTO to refer to increasing
strength of the institutional structure. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 6, 14 (1998). Others believe constitutionalization in the WTO
context refers to the deepening of rights penetration into national legal systems. See. e.g., ERNSTULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (1997). Yet others distinguish
between a "structural" form focusing on matters such as division of powers, or establishment of
LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM
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33
confusion over the meaning of the same terms within the European Union.
These divergent views can best be reconciled with the observation that
"constitutionalism and constitutionalisation are... not... black- and-white, all-ornothing terms [but are questions] of nuance and gradation. 34 Moreover, no
commentators seem to seriously doubt that the WTO has already embarked on a
course of constitutionalization, they just disagree as to scope and degree. Among
those who accept the constitutionalization discourse, there seems to be some
agreement that participation by a broad spectrum of civil society actors is both a
definitional characteristic of constitutionalization and a core part of its success.
For instance, according to one respected scholar, three (out of seven) of the indices
of constitutionalization institutional structure, specification of conditions and
incidents of membership, and terms of representation of membership - all speak to
the question of democratic participation, in one way or another.35
The WTO performs relatively weakly on each of these three indices of
democratic participation. On institutional structure, the WTO is completely stateactor focused, with state actors acting in both legislative and executive capacities,
through respectively the Ministerial Conference (consisting of all members acting
in a legislative capacity) and the General Counsel (again consisting of all members
acting in an executive capacity).
There are no formal mechanisms for
representative decision-making or formal civil society involvement. With respect
to specification of conditions and incidents of membership, aside from certain
broad concepts like Most Favored Nation treatment,36 none are specified or
understood before-hand, but are instead subject to individualized negotiation
culminating in the terms and conditions of accession. Again, with respect to the
terms of representation of membership, there are no formal mechanisms, and civil
society actors are not given a formal role or means of giving input.

institutions for representation, and between a "material" form in which obstacles to free trade are
eliminated. See, e.g., J. H. H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of InternationalTrade, in
THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 201,
206 (J. H. H. Weiler ed., 2000).
33. For a discussion of some of the multiple meanings of the term in the European Union context,
see, e.g., Gilnter Frankenberg, The Return of the Contract: Problems and Pitfalls of European
Constitutionalism, 6 EUR. L. J. 257 (2000) (arguing that the meaning varies depending on whether a
constitution is perceived as a contract, political manifesto, plan/program, or statute).
34. Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31, 35 (Grdinne de Bflrca & Joanne Scott, eds., 2001).
Walker argues there are seven indices of constitutionalization: explicit constitutional discourse, a claim
to foundational legal authority, jurisdictional scope, interpretative autonomy, institutional structure,
specification of conditions and incidents of membership, and terms of representation of membership.
Id. at 35.
35. Id. at 35.
36. At its most basic level, most-favored-nation treatment means non-discrimination between
countries. See generally, Martin Domike & John N. Hazard, State Trading and the Most-FavoredNation Clause, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1958). See also World Trade Org., WTO: Seattle Misinformation,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min 9 9-e/english/misinf-e/7ineq-e.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2008) (providing a more colloquial description of the principle).
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Professor Cass has argued convincingly that traditionally constitutionalization
consists of six elements:
1.

[A] set of social practices to constrain economic and political
behavior...

2.

[A] belief that a new foundational device or Grundnorm has emerged
such that what was once merely a set of rules is transformed into a
coherent and unified body of rules with the appearance of a new
system of law...

3.

[A] political community to authorize its making and that the
community's interests are represented...

4.

[A] process of deliberative law-making...

5.

Some realignment of the relationship between the sub-entities and
the central, putatively constitutionalized entity...

6.

37
[A] level of social acceptance, or legitimacy of the process itself.

Under Professor Cass' formulation, the WTO falls short in the same ways, in
the areas of representation and deliberative law-making, with the most prominent
failure being the lack of participation by some developing nation members.
The constitutionalization debate is a rich and complex one. It shall no doubt
provide fertile ground for international law scholars for many, many decades. In
this short article, I wish to make only one modest contribution to the debate.
Whatever the form or direction constitutionalization may take in the WTO in the
coming years, it must first confront head-on the problem of developing nations.
They must not be left out of the process. Today, the WTO has 151 member
nations. 38 Two-thirds of them are developing nations. 39 They hold a large stake in
the WTO and the WTO's future success will depend on them to a great extent.
Any opening for greater participation by developing countries in the rule-making,
institutional-building, implementation and adjudicative functions of the WTO must
be fully exploited.
How can aid for trade play a part in facilitating the participation of developing
nations? Aid for trade enables the WTO to reach out to a broader community,
including many who have historically been excluded from participation in the
world trade regime. The most obvious constituency comprises developing nations,
the recipients of aid for trade. Each project successfully completed brings a
developing country closer into the fold of the world trade regime. While each
project may not bring great leaps in economic integration by itself, it does
represent one more baby step in the right direction. At a minimum, each aid for
trade project opens channels of communication about the particular needs of the
37. See

Cass,

supra note

31,

at

19

(listing

the

traits

of the received

account

of

constitutionalization) (bullet numbers added).
38. World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO - Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
Overview,
WTO
the
Org.,
Understanding
Trade
39. World
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/devle.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
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developing country and available resources to meet those needs. Beyond that, each
project allows key actors to learn about each other. For example, in a productive
capacity project, in-country government officials may become familiar with the
inner workings of a regional development bank disbursing the funding. They may
also learn a great deal about the necessary domestic regulatory changes to comply
with the WTO's regulatory regime. Involved industry leaders learn how to make
their products safe for export and navigate the complex customs and tariffs system,
which information may be passed on to other sectors and leaders. These types of
informational flows are critical to the acquisition of intellectual capital that can be
no less valuable than the financial capital invested.
Another important constituency consists of other multilateral agencies, like
the World Bank, the IMF, and most importantly, the United Nations. The WTO
has traditionally worked relatively closely with both the World Bank and the IMF
in terms of coordinating monetary, trade, and economic policy. However, aid for
trade requires even tighter cooperation, often at the local and regional level.
Engaging in such cooperation lies clearly within the WTO's Coherence Mandate.
With respect to the U.N., however, the WTO does not have such a clear
relationship. However, that doesn't mean the relationship would not a desirable
one.
The WTO should leverage its involvement with aid for trade to actively seek
closer ties with the U.N. In order to carry out the coordination and monitoring
tasks given to it by the General Council, the WTO must interface with the U.N.
Development Agencies. However, it should go beyond that, to seek support for
and input on aid for trade from the General Assembly. It can do so by asking one
of its member nations, one that is also a member of the General Assembly, to put
forth a resolution, similar to the one adopted by the Hong Kong Ministerial
Conference in 2005, affirming the commitment to aid for trade. Such a resolution
should pass quite easily. Its value lies in the legitimization function of a U.N.
resolution. A motion of support coming from the largest, oldest, and most
respected multilateral organization would not only draw attention to the WTO's
laudable efforts in promoting aid for trade, but also send an important signal to the
General Assembly. That signal would be that the WTO does value the input and
support of a body that is now largely made up of developing nations. 40 Moreover,
resolutions in the U.N. are often valued for their moral and persuasive force, which
would only re-enforce the value of aid for trade.
The WTO can also advance its monitoring function by soliciting in-country
self-assessment reports at the General Assembly. Only seven self-assessments
were submitted as part of the 2007 Global Review, 4' a very small fraction of the
number of countries that received some form of aid for trade. A bit of spurring
40. The General Assembly has 192 members, of whom approximately two-thirds are developing
nations. United Nations Gen. Assembly, U.N. GeneralAssembly: Functions and Powers of the General
Assembly, http://www.un.org/ga/about/background.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2008),
41. World Trade Org. & The Org. for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Aid For Trade
at A
Glance 2007 First Global Review
at
49
(2007),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/a4t-e/a4tata.glance07_e.pdf.
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from the General Assembly may lead to more voluntary self-reporting. This is
likely because there is some evidence that in the General Assembly, peer pressure,
especially among regional blocs of nations, can translate into real action.42
Most critically, aid for trade brings the WTO into contact with a constituency
with whom it has not engaged in dialogue previously NGOs, advocacy groups,
and local citizens' groups. As previously mentioned, critics have decried the lack
of direct access to the WTO's proceedings and deliberations by interested nongovernmental entities. Unfortunately, aid for trade can not completely redress the
asymmetries in the WTO decision-making process - the WTO is unlikely to
abandon its state-oriented approach any time soon.
Nonetheless, aid for trade does provide some avenues for the traditionally
disenfranchised to be heard. Because the WTO is not a development agency, it
needs the input of experts in both development and aid. NGOs, advocacy groups,
industry associations, citizens' advocacy groups, and other similar civil society
organizations could play a potentially pivotal role. By participating in aid for trade
projects, either as beneficiaries, advisors, facilitators, or monitors, grassroots
organizations would gain an important toe-hold at the WTO. Granted, the toe-hold
may be small, but it must be exploited nonetheless. No similar foothold has
become available in the last fifty years of the WTO's existence. Thus, it represents
a unique and valuable opportunity.
How might NGOs and others interface with the WTO in connection with aid
for trade? Let's go back to the Malian mango farmers hypothetical at the
beginning of the article for some illustrative examples. Recall that one of the
obstacles we posited was lack of expertise about the health and safety inspections
required to export to Europe. A two-pronged approach is required to address this
problem. First, Mali needs to be able to formulate a set of domestic policies to
implement the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, the WTO agreement that
deals with health and safety issued related to agricultural and food products.43
Second, health inspection personnel need to be trained in operationalizing and
enforcing the new policies.
What would the WTO gain from greater cooperation with NGOs? The
answer is a great deal. First, the WTO would gain legitimacy in the eyes of NGOs
with whom it collaborates in aid for trade projects. Many NGOs are skeptical of
the WTO's ability to reach out to civil society organizations. Aid for trade projects
provide a means to de-fuse some of the skepticism. Second, opening channels of
communications with NGOs initially, with respect to specific aid for trade projects,
will hopefully lead to the establishment of some permanent avenues of dialog, a
result that the current Director General would welcome. Lastly, aid for aid
provides a chance to receive informal input from NGOs which might shape policy
at the multilateral level. NGOs possess a valuable base of knowledge about the
42. For example, the G77, a coalition of 77 founding developing nation members which now has
132 members, has coordinated opposition against weighted voting in the General Assembly. See
Editorial, Resolving the U.N. Power Struggle, 184 N.J. L. J. 410 (2006).
43. See infra note 91.
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needs of developing nations that might guide in creative solutions or compromises
to move the Doha Round forward. If closer cooperation with NGOs through aid
for trade initiatives yields ideas for putting the Doha Round back on track, then it
would be well worth the effort.
B. Limits ofAid for Trade
No matter how effective aid for trade is, or becomes, it can be no substitute
for a successful Doha Round. No matter the scope, aid for trade is fundamentally a
form of triage. Elements of it should and will remain in effect for a long time,
even after the conclusion of the Doha Round and the next round of multilateral
negotiations, because some developing nations will continue to need transitional
and development assistance. However, aid for trade fails to accomplish the types
of structural changes necessary to meaningfully advance the interests of developing
nations.
In order to understand this, some background regarding the history of the
Doha Round, and the nature of multilateralism at the WTO, is necessary. As
previously stated, industrialized nations dominated the agenda and policies of the
GATT regime for many decades. It was not until the creation of the WTO in 1994,
at the end of the Uruguay Round, that a significant change took place in the nature
of participation by developing countries. 4 Even though developing nations were
not happy with many of the results of the Uruguay Round,45 the shift in their
attitude towards multilateralism represented a watershed. Instead of seeking
special concessions as they had in the past, developing nation participants choose
to strike bargains on the basis of reciprocity, and thereby become fully a part of the
trading system.46 The willingness to play by the rules of a game in which they
were little more than spectators in the past is significant in another sense. It
suggests that developing nations saw themselves as having a stake in the success of
the multilateral trading system and desired a role in shaping its evolution. 47 The
benefits of a transparent and rule-based trading system, rather than a power-based
one, coupled with an effective dispute settlement system, are arguably stronger for
developing nations than for powerful industrialized ones. 4 ' Developing nations

44. See The World Bank, GlobalEconomic Prospects and the Developing Countries, at xi (2002),
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/02/16/000094946_020202041
1334/additional/310436360 20050012014722.pdf (discussing the background information of past
negotiations, focusing on the type and number of participating countries).
45. See Watal, supra note 14, at 72 (explaining that low market access payoffs and the heavy
burden of implementing certain WTO agreements made developing nations believe they were not
gaining much from the Uruguay Round).
46. As one trade scholar elaborated, "[b]y and large, they committed themselves to lowered
industrial and agricultural tariffs, accepted stringent disciplines in new areas such as intellectual
property, and opened up some of their services sectors in return for improved and more secure market
access for their exports, particularly for agricultural products and clothing." Id. at 71.
47. See A.V. Ganesan, Seattle and Beyond: Developing-Country Perspectives, in THE WTO
AFTER SEATTLE 85, 85 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (describing the developing countries' view of the
importance of their active participation in multilateral trade negotiations).
48. Id. (describing the type of trading system developing nations would prefer and benefit from
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also pragmatically understand the rationale for open trade and the necessity of
expanding the multilateral trade agenda. 49 However, they also have some serious,
and justified, reservations about the current course of such agenda.50
When developing nations arrived in Doha, they had some serious qualms
about the multilateral system. They felt that it had become less fair and less
responsive to their development concerns; that the trade agenda was expanding to
address only issues relevant to developed nations; that the multilateral rules were
increasingly becoming no more than codifications of existing rules and laws
prevalent in developed countries, but which are inappropriate or unenforceable in
developing countries. 51 These fears were so prevalent, that a group of like-minded
developing countries actually opposed the launching of a new round of multilateral
negotiations at Doha. Despite recognizing the potential benefits of a new round,
these nations feared that (i) they would be the main targets for extracting
concessions in any new round; (ii) the round would take up subjects of interest to
developing countries which would be irrelevant to their concerns; and (iii) the
subjects which had been of interest to them for a long time would get ignored, as
the focus of the WTO would shift to the new issues initiated in the round. 52 Other
developing nations supported the launching of a new round because they felt that
these and, and other pressing problems,53 could be addressed only through
comprehensive negotiations and bargaining.
As we can see from the above discussion about the launching of the Doha
Round, the priorities and interests of developing nations are not monolithic.
Rather, they are marked by variety and even divergence.54 The pivotal substantive
issues of concern to developing nations fall into several categories. The first, of
critical importance, is to secure greater market access for their goods and
services. 55 Within this broad context, developing nations sought both the faithful

the most).
49. Id. (arguing that developing nations understand the need for trade agenda expansion).
50. Id. (detailing the concerns of developing nations about the evolution of the trade system and
noting that developing countries are apprehensive that developed nations are influencing new rounds of
negotiation too much).
51. See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Like Minded Group Sets Out
Positions Before Doha, 5 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 26 (2001), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/10-07-01/story2.htm (listing the members of the Like-Minded Group
as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).
52. See id. (clarifying the Like-Minded Group's position that even if progress is made on
implementation issues of concern to them, it does not guarantee that the group would participate in the
negotiations).
53. See Jeffrey J. Schott, The WTO After Seattle, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 3, 15-16 (Jeffrey J.
Schott ed., 2000) (listing the numerous issues of developing nations that could only be addressed
through the Ministerial Conference negotiations at a new round).
54. See BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, THE WTO AGREEMENTS: DEFICIENCIES, IMBALANCES AND
REQUIRED CHANGES, at xi (1998) (stating that some researchers believe that the developing nations are
so diverse that they should not be joined together as a group for analysis for negotiating purposes).
55. See Ganesan, supra note 47, at 85 (stating that the central element of developing nations'
strategy is to gain market access in order to compete in the global marketplace).
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execution of commitments made in the Uruguay Round by developed nations
(particularly with respect to subsidies and export supports) as well as increased
flexibility in the implementation of WTO rules on their own part.56 The second
category consists of numerous technical implementation issues relating to the
separate agreements on textiles and clothing, anti-dumping, the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"), as well as the built-in
agenda items relating to agriculture, services, and intellectual property.
Developing nations pushed (and continue to push heavily) for further reductions of
domestic farm subsidies, elimination of export supports, and substantial reductions
in agricultural tariffs, particularly for com, sugar, and cotton. With respect to
services, developing nations sought greater movement of labor. With respect to
TRIPS, they advocated for both the correction of perceived imbalances in the
agreement as well as substantial reviews of the existing accord. Lastly, they were
very concerned, even apprehensive, about the incorporation of non-trade issues,
like environmental and labor standards, within the WTO.
All of the listed issues can only be addressed at the level of ministerial
negotiations. No amount of aid for trade can address these issues. To give a
simplified example, no amount of aid for trade targeted at productive capacity
building and infrastructural projects will help our hypothetical Malian mango
farmers who wish to export to Europe if the European Union subsidizes its
domestic mango producers (if any) directly. The mangos from Mali simply would
not be price competitive with subsidized European mangoes. The removal of such
a subsidy must be done through comprehensive negotiations, in which not only the
European Union, but also the U.S., Canada, Japan, and other core markets all agree
to remove their agricultural subsidies. In order to achieve the type of structural
changes developing nations hope for in the WTO, developing nations must play an
active role in current and future rounds of negotiations. Aid for trade, can never be
a substitute for active, meaningful, and sustained participation in the multilateral
process.
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN AID AND TRADE

While the potential synergies between aid and trade are substantial, the two
are locked in an uneasy marriage, characterized by a marked lack of
communication and even apparent conflict. Experts in both fields have failed to
communicate with each other. The academic scholarship in both aid and trade has
grown up in isolation, with little to no dialogue between the two disciplines. Yet,
the two fields overlap in many ways and have much to learn from one another.
One of the goals of this section is to start the conversation by pointing out ways in
which aid for trade can be structured so as to benefit from research done in both
disciplines. I hope that as aid for trade continues to be important, more
opportunities for cross-disciplinary work will arise.
Both historically and currently, the focus of aid organizations has been
poverty reduction and alleviation. The poverty reduction aims of the Millennium
56. See id. at 87 (arguing that increased flexibility in the application and definition of rules would
help developing nations create plans that meet their particular needs).
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Development Goals,5 7 the official U.N. targets for aid announced by Secretary

General Kofi Annan in 1999, centers around social spending. Donors and aid
organization have shifted their attention firmly to social spending, rather than
infrastructural spending.58 Since the 1990's, development aid seems to be driven
more by notions of human capital investment and human freedom rather than
economic development. 59 In contrast, trade policy seeks to spur economic
development, and thereby reduce poverty, primarily through trade liberalization
and exports, not social assistance. From the aid side, aid applications and reports
rarely mention trade. 6° On the trade side, trade experts and theorists do not
consider aid because its volume is so small compared to the volume of trade.
Moreover, the economic theory underlying trade, favoring free market mechanisms
over governmental intervention and planning, is somewhat at odds with aid. To
compound the divide, aid officials and trade ministers tend to work separately,
occasionally at cross purposes.61 Similarly, the literatures on trade and aid
respectively rarely cross-fertilize.62 This section gives a flavor of the major
strands of potential conflict between aid and trade in order to highlight what the
two fields have to learn from each other. Each of these conflicts is chosen both for
their import in terms of policy setting as well as for their value in interdisciplinary
cross-fertilization of ideas.
Trade scholars need to understand the underlying architecture of the new aid
thinking to ensure that their contributions to the future of aid for trade will be
thoughtful, well-informed, and grounded. Every new house needs to be built on a
solid foundation. Trade scholarship must be informed by the existing rich body of
aid scholarship and vice versa. It is time for the two disciplines to talk to each
other. Aid for trade provides the ideal forum for those conversations to take place.

57. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight goals to be achieved by 2015 that
respond to the main development challenges facing the developing world. They are (1) eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and
empower women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop a Global
Partnership for Development. See United Nations Development Programme, Millennium Development
Goals, http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
58. David Booth, Is the New Aid Agenda Anti-Trade? in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS OR RIVALS
INDEVELOPMENT POLICY? at 41-42 (Sheila Page ed., 2006) (arguing that big infrastructure became less
important than social sector spending in mainstream aid thinking in the 1990's due to both ideological
and practical reasons).
59. See Amartya Sen, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (proposing a model of economic
development focused on the flourishing of human potential and freedom).
60. Sheila Page, Bringing Aid and Trade Together, in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS OR RIVALS IN
DEVELOPMENT POLICY? 11, I1 (Sheila Page ed., 2006) (stating that early Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers, country studies that were required for World Bank assistance, mostly did not consider the role
of trade).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 30. One of the reasons this article has relatively few footnotes is because there are
so few (virtually none) articles that discuss aid for trade in a systematic way, much less draw from both
the aid and trade literatures.
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A. High Levels ofAid Makes Trade Harder
Ironically, aid inflows can make trade more difficult for a developing country.
Aid is a cash influx, usually of foreign currency, which affects a country's balance
of payments. The increase in the available pool of foreign currency (supply)
inevitably leads to a decrease in price (demand). Specifically, in order to cope
with the increase in the supply of foreign currency, there is an upward pressure on
the value of the domestic currency.63 Higher domestic currency valuations render
that country's exports more expensive, and therefore less competitive. Exporting
and trading becomes more difficult. Moreover, for exporters (or for domestic
producers competing with imports, which are now a little bit cheaper), the change
in the exchange rate reduces the profit they can expect, measured in terms of
domestic currency. For large, diversified, and multinational exporters, the effect
might be de minimus, but that is not so for small-scale and localized firms who do
not have the means to hedge against currency fluctuations. Therefore, aid can not
only make trading more difficult, but also, in some cases, less profitable.
Aid can also distort the local economy in other ways. In addition to the
currency distortions discussed above, economists have identified "Dutch Disease"
as a particularly harmful risk.64 Dutch Disease refers to the adjustment costs in an
economy in which the inflow of finds is temporary. It was first used to describe
the effects of the discovery of natural gas resources in the Netherlands.65 When
the inflow of capital is temporary, it becomes more difficult to set a long-term
development plan. As with permanent capital inflows (derived from changes in
trade, say, new exports), the economy has to restructure itself in order to
accommodate the new flow of capital, by shifting away from the existing pattern of
production to the new one (involving exports). There may be some difficult
adjustment costs, including potential social displacement, but at least it should
occur only once. However, when the change is not permanent (as in aid), both the
public and private adjustment mechanisms become more uncertain and costly. The
economy must accommodate the new flow of capital in the same way. But, it must
do so again once the flow stops, shifting to yet another pattern of production.
Likewise, the public policy challenges are greater as well, as decision-makers have

63. This assumes that the domestic currency is strong relative to the foreign currency transferred
via aid. More realistically for many developing countries, the result is not so much an increase in the
valuation of the domestic currency, but rather an evening out, such that the domestic currency falls less
relative to the foreign currency than it otherwise would. The result, however, on the cost of exports, is
still the same. Trading becomes a little harder.
64. The term "Dutch Disease" originated during the 1960s in reference to the natural gas
discoveries in the North Sea which led to an appreciation of Dutch real exchange rates and subsequent
adverse effects on Dutch manufacturing. See W.M. Corden, Booming Sector and Dutch Disease
Economics: Survey and Consolidation, 36 Oxford Economic Papers No. 3, at 359 (1984); Christine
Ebrahim-zadeh, Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely, 40 FIN. AND DEV.No. 1 (2003).
65. Even though the name is derived from the Dutch experience with natural gas, the Dutch
example is less temporary than most examples. While natural gas exploitation is in fact temporary, in
the sense that it is a non-renewable, finite resource, one that the Netherlands, a small country, will
eventually run out of, it is nonetheless less temporary than aid inflows, which could end more abruptly
and unpredictably.
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to grapple with the social costs of the adjustment multiple times. The setting of
long-term development agenda becomes more difficult due to uncertainty in the
flow of funds and inability to predict the social costs once aid stops. Even though
policy-makers try their best to maximize the benefits of the aid without incurring
unnecessary costs of adjustment, they may not be able do so effectively.
However, one should not exaggerate the effects of Dutch Disease. If aid
flows are temporary in the medium rather than the short term, and if the economy
needed to be jolted out of its existing patterns of production in order to develop,
then the increase in costs of adjustments may not be that significant.66 Even if aid
flows are one-time payments, the benefits of aid that spurs economic development
or leads to a reduction in poverty may ultimately outweigh the costs of
adjustments, unless all the aid is squandered. Dutch disease67may be in fact less a
disease than a "Discount: the benefits from aid are reduced.,
Trade experts and scholars can learn much from the experience of aid
specialists with exchange rate fluctuation and Dutch Disease. I think there are
clear prescriptions for structuring aid for trade to minimize or avoid both problems.
With respect to Dutch Disease, any aid for trade project should explicitly
incorporate a discount rate for effectiveness to account for the adjustment costs of
the aid. Making the discount explicit is important for the proper calibration of
donor expectations.
Donors, both private and governmental, can become
discouraged and lower their aid commitments if they do not see the results they
hope to achieve. Setting more realistic expectations about the effects of aid may
help keep donors in the game and attract more donors. It may also enhance public
acceptance of aid as a longer term endeavor.
Aid literature has also shown that the impact of Dutch Disease is greatest
where aid is temporary, and much less severe if medium to long term. This
suggests that where possible, aid for trade endeavors should be structured for the
medium to longer term. Obviously, this is not possible for all projects, such as
technical assistance to bring a developing country into compliance with WTO rules
within the deadline negotiated in that country's accession agreement. Such
projects are time-sensitive and should not be spread out. Others can, and should,
be treated differently. For example, infrastructural projects could be "packaged"
together and disbursed over time with the input of the receiving country. Thus, a
donor might pledge $50 million over a period of five years for the construction of
roads. The recipient, with the assistance of the donor and the disbursing agency,
would decide how and when to spend the money, focusing on strategic needs
(build near ports and transport hubs first), social needs (build in the poorest regions
first), or economic needs (build closest to the area with a critical mass of
manufactured goods suitable for exports first) as determined by the recipient
country. Giving the recipient country the ability to make spending decisions is
critical because it removes some of the uncertainty and unpredictability problems
described above. By being able to allocate resources over a period of time to meet
66. See Page, supra note 60, at 23.
67. Id.
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local strategic, social, or economic needs, the recipient is better able to make
longer term development plans as well.
The solution for the exchange rate/balance of payments problem is much
thornier. There is no simple solution - the best prescription is to be attentive to the
effects in setting policy, setting aside a portion of aid to deal with the currency
evaluation fluctuation effects. One way to do this is to set aside a portion of aid to
use to counter-act such costs, essentially the equivalent of adjustment assistance
for workers maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor. 6 8
B. The Role of the State
Anther tension is trade-targeted aid is that donors want to control how their
money is spent (only for trade related capacity building projects, for example).
However, too much donor control may be counter-productive. The aid literature
seems to be unanimous in the view that the role of the aid recipient state is critical
to development success. 69 For instances, studies of the success of the newly
industrial countries in Asia (Korea and Thailand in particular) show that those
governments played a critical role in setting policies that promoted economic
growth through efficient administration and boosted efficiency in domestic
production.7 ° In contrast, the failure of many African countries to develop in 7a
similar fashion is at least partially attributable to failures in government policy. '
As a result, aid scholarship shares a common thread that recipient "country
ownership" is essential for the success of any aid program.72 How country
ownership might look in the aid for trade context is explored infra in the roadmap
section.
C. Distributionand Targeting
Aid is targeted, trade is not. While aid can be used to specifically target a
problem (e.g., prenatal health or building rural roads), the benefits/costs of trade
are much more diffuse. Aid can be structured, at least on paper, in order to deliver
benefits to a specific group (e.g., mothers and infants or rural farmers). Generally,
delivery of such benefits is overseen by the public sector. Trade works quite
differently. Even though the government initially sets trade policy, perhaps in
response to supra-national norms imposed by the WTO, it is ultimately up to the
private sector to respond to the trade policy by changing its behavior. If firms
change their behavior and exports increase, the distribution of any benefits (or
losses) would also be primarily be based on market forces. The public sector may
play a limited role, through taxation for example. In large part, the distribution of
68. See generally MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, MARSHA CHANDLER & ROBERT HOWSE, TRADE AND
TRANSITIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 104 (1999); Harold Bratt, Issues
in Worker Certification and Questions of Future Direction in the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program, 14 LAW & POL'Y. INT'L. BuS. 819, 823 (1982-1983).
69. See Booth, supra note 58 at 45 (describing the need for the recipient country to play a strong
role in the coordination, prioritization, and sequencing of aid investments as a critical component of
country ownership).
70. Id. at 40-41.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 45.
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trade gains will be determined based on both objective factors (costs of materials,
production, and transport) and bargaining (expressions of power relations among
the relevant actors). To put it another way, governments can exercise more control
over the use of funds from aid than they do over trade. This usually means that
governments are more eager to use aid for targeted policies than trade, which is
more diffuse in its effect. The problem inherent in the distribution versus targeting
conflict is that some governments may be resistant to aid for trade, preferring nontargeted aid that would go directly into its general operating budget instead. The
best way to ensure aid for trade is welcomed by recipient countries is to ensure it
does not diminish the levels of other more general aid.
D. Balanceof Power Issues between Donors and Recipients
Aid creates an inherent power imbalance between donors and aid recipients.
The donor exercises virtually complete discretion over whether or not to give, how
much to give, and, to a lesser but nonetheless significant extent, how aid funds are
to be spent.
Donors, and the multilateral agencies responsible for aid
disbursement, are also largely in charge of assessing the outcomes of aid. The
recipient, on the other hand, may complain (perhaps loudly enough to shame the
donor into action)7 3 if aid is diminished or cut off, but is helpless to do much
beyond that. Certainly, the recipient can not rely on any enforcement mechanisms
to restore or guarantee aid. The international trade regime only exacerbates this
"beggars can't be choosers" problem.
Aid beneficiaries must negotiate with their benefactors at the WTO level for
trade concessions. The result is that many developing nations heavily reliant on
aid, such as many of the poorest least developed countries, must take antagonistic
negotiation positions against their most generous benefactors, such as the U.S.,
U.K., E.U., and Japan, who are also often the most active players in the WTO.
That can be at best awkward and at worst incapacitating.
In some cases, the level of aid can hinder a developing country's development
through trade. This is true for the most economically vulnerable countries like
Malawi, for example, in which aid comprises from 20 percent to 27 percent of
gross national income in the 1990s to 2002 and Uganda, in which aid accounted
for in between 11 percent to 16 percent of gross national income in the same
period. 7 Even more starkly, in both Malawi and Uganda, the inflows of aid have
been equal to or greater than the value of their total exports in goods and services,
so that dependence on aid is just like the dependency of a country on its principal
export. 75 As one scholar has noted:

73. See e.g., C. Cora True-Frost, The Security Council and Norm Consumption, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 115, 172 (2007) (describing the naming and shaming tactics of the U.N. Security Council
with respect to the recruitment of children in armed conflict); Annette Burkeen, Private Orderingand
Institutional Choice: Defining the Role of Multinational Corporations in Promoting Global Labor
Standards, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 205, 237-38 (2007) (discussing the use of shaming in

urging governments to enforce international labor standards).
74. See Page, supra note 60, at 25.

75. Id. at 24.
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This problem has not been sufficiently recognised by those who advise
countries to develop through trade, and then try to assist them to do so
through aid, partly because it is a new problem... .This was not true of
Asian or Latin American countries when they were major aid recipients,
so that any such effect was much less significant, although countries
such as Bangladesh approached this level of dependency; aid was
greater than its exports in the late 1970s and in some years up to the
early 1990s; it is now 10 per cent. For India, however, the highest level
was under 15 per cent, and it is now below 2 per cent. In contrast, for
Malawi the figure was almost 80 per cent in 1990; for Uganda it was
over 90 per cent; and it remains high in these countries.76
Countries dependent on aid are prima facie weak. They lack political and
economic power, which translates into a weak negotiating position. Countries like
Malawi and Uganda are even worse off because their heavy reliance on aid over
trade renders any bargaining power they might possess over trade issues virtually
meaningless. Ironically, the pragmatic strategy of representative participation and
coalition building that developing countries have engaged in recent years may
disenfranchise aid-dependent nations even more. The strategy, which has been
successful in enabling developing countries to play a more active role in
multilateral negotiations than in the past, involves heavy brokering of national
interests among developing nations before advancing a unified negotiating position
to the larger WTO membership. These representative negotiation positions are
often offered under the auspices of coalitions like the G-20 and the G-90." The
smallest and most vulnerable developing countries in these coalitions are subject to
tremendous pressure to subjugate their national interests to the greater goals of the
coalition. The overlap between those with little political power among the G-90
and those most heavily dependent on foreign aid further dilutes the bargaining
positions of the weakest.
Despite these power asymmetries, it is critical that developing nations seeking
to develop through trade do participate in trade negotiations and learn about the
workings of WTO institutions so that they can leverage what power they do
possess to their advantage. Developed nations committed to the same goal have
pledged large amounts of technical assistance aid in order to make it happen. A
significant part of aid for trade enables developing nations' participation in
negotiations. Some of such aid is indirect, such as conferences, seminars, and
retreats to familiarize officials with WTO rules and institutions, usually organized
at the regional level.
However, some aid is directly aimed at enabling
participation, such as salaries for staff at ministerial conferences, costs of travel,
and the costs of representation or maintenance of a mission in Geneva, the WTO's
headquarters. However, as necessary and laudable as such assistance might be, it
must be difficult for a negotiator, whose office, salary, and travel is paid for by a
76. Id.
77. The G-90 is composed of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, LDCs Group, and
the Africa Group - three overlapping representative groups which are in turn comprised of smaller
associations and regional integration coalitions such as Caricom and the Pacific Island Forum.
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donor/trading partner, to put the forms of support out of her
negotiations. The important point is simply that trade officials and
be mindful of these power asymmetries created by aid in structuring
aid for trade. I will make specific prescriptions in the next section,
for how the WTO can structure technical assistance aid for trade to
effects of the problem on the most vulnerable economies.
V. A ROADMAP
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Aid for trade has tremendous potential. If done right, it can help to bring
developing nations out of poverty, legitimize and democratize the WTO, and
provide the basis for a fertile intellectual exchange between two divergent
disciplines. Such is the potential. But there are also many pitfalls, as this article
has pointed out. This section provides a roadmap to ensure that aid for trade does
live up to its promise. The roadmap is a call to action to four contingencies, the
WTO, developing nations, donors, and the legal community, encompassing both
academia and trade lawyers. Each of the four subsections in this section provides
prescriptions for each of the four contingencies.
A. What the WTO Can Do
1. Bring Doha to a Successful Conclusion
The most important thing the WTO can do is bring the Doha Round to a
successful conclusion. Even though the outlook is grim, the WTO's Director
General and Secretariat must continue to push for the talks to resume and work
tirelessly for the round to end in agreements that meaningfully address the core
concerns of developing countries. As useful as aid for trade might be, it can be no
substitute for a successful Doha Round. The long-term goals of developing
countries can only be addressed at the level of multilateral negotiations, not
through aid for trade. Even though this point has been acknowledged by the WTO,
it is so important that it must be constantly and clearly kept in mind.
2. Assist Developing Countries in Actively Participating in Doha Round and
Subsequent Negotiations
A corollary to the first point is that the WTO must take a lead in giving
developing nations the assistance they need to play an active role in the Doha
Round and subsequent rounds of negotiations. The WTO can take several concrete
steps to do so now. In general, developing countries need help in implementation
of WTO rules, negotiation support and training for meaningful participation in
multilateral rounds, integration into the day to day mechanisms of the WTO's
work, and dispute settlement.78
Three of the proposals considered in this

78. The WTO has implemented a series of online courses available for all interested parties, not
just developing nations. In May 2007, the WTO began its eTraining program, which currently offers
online courses providing a spectrum of information to participants ranging from basic introductory
information regarding the WTO generally to an in-depth understanding of technical aspects of specific
WTO agreements. In addition, the program offers both thematic and special courses addressing the
DSU. Since the program started less than a year ago, thousands of individuals have participated in the
courses. During each course, WTO experts provide participants with tutoring and live chats online. See
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subsection address the first three needs. The last area, dispute settlement support,
is discussed in conjunction with what the legal profession can do. In brief, the
WTO should focus aid for trade resources on (a) improving the effectiveness of
technical assistance to developing nations by making it more demand-driven, (b)
providing all developing nations who are members of the WTO with missions in
Geneva, and (c) enhancing the transparency of the overall trade regime. Each of
the proposals shall be discussed in turn.
a. Demand-Driven Technical Assistance
A core part of aid for trade is for trade-related technical assistance and
capacity building ("TRTA/CB") initiatives to enhance developing countries'
access to the WTO system and their effective participation in trade negotiations.
One of the little-acknowledged accomplishments of the Doha Development
Agenda has been to focus attention and resources on the need for such initiatives.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration of December 2001 explicitly affirmed:
[T]hat technical cooperation and capacity building are core elements of
the development dimension of the multilateral trading system.... The
delivery of WTO technical assistance shall be designed to assist
developing and least-developed countries and low-income countries in
transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines, implement obligations
and exercise the rights of membership, including drawing on the
benefits of an open, rules-based multilateral trading system. Priority
shall also be accorded to small, vulnerable, and transition economies, as
well as to members and observers without representation in Geneva. 79
There is widespread agreement that TRTA/CB efforts are a critical part of the
Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and that much hinge on their success. This is
because TRTA/CB measures are a necessary first step towards full participation by
developing nations in the WTO. In other words, TRTA/CB initiatives must work
in order for there to be progress in the negotiations of the Doha Development
Agenda. Therefore, since 2001, donor countries have committed large amounts of
money to TRTA/CB initiatives, and the WTO has spear-headed a number of
TRTA/CB projects. 80 All of these efforts are laudable as first steps. However, the
results overall have been rather disappointing. The consensus, with respect to the
impact of these initiatives, and the DDA in general, seems to be that "we are not
8
where we wanted to be... progress has been slow - much too slow."'
The WTO's first Global Review of Aid for Trade in late 2007 was in part a
response to the frustratingly slow progress of the DDA. As part of the Global
WTO launches online training courses for 2008, available at
http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/news08_e/etraining-feb08 _e.htm (last visited May 8, 2008).
79. World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 38, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1
[hereinafter
Doha
Ministerial
Declaration],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/ministe/min0 l -e/mindecl-e.htm.
80. See Kathy-Ann Brown, Can Donors Help Countries to Negotiate and Maintain their Rights
Under Trade Agreements?, in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS OR RIVALS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY? 245,
246-49 (Sheila Page ed., 2006).
81. Id. at 246.
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Review, donors and agencies, led by the OECD, have embarked on comprehensive
review of their TRTA/CB programs. The results of these reviews have just been
made available by the WTO and the OECD. The time is ripe for some
comprehensive reforms.
One of most striking themes to emerge from the OECD and donor selfassessment reports is that there is no agreement on what constitutes a "successful"
technical assistance or trade-capacity building result. 82 This is so despite the fact
that there does seem to be agreement about what criteria to use to assess
programs. 83 No one seems to be able to tell if the programs are working or not.
Trade experts can learn from aid experts here. As discussed in the previous
section, modem aid is more demand-driven and state-centered than ever before.
Aid experts and scholars understand that aid is more effective when a country (a)
actually requests it for a specific purpose and (b) takes "ownership" of it in terms
of allocation, policy setting, and accountability. It seems to me that these
principles should apply with equal force to trade-related technical and capacitybuilding aid. The implications are straight-forward distribute and prioritize
TRTA-CB aid in accordance with requests from developing countries and give
them autonomy in its usage (including the freedom to pool funds from different
donor sources for an articulated goal), coupled with accountability to donors as
well as domestic constituencies. To the extent attempts to impose TRTA-CB
programs from the top-down has not worked, it may be time to try a bottom-up,
demand-driven approach.
First, the WTO should establish an office, headed by the Aid for Trade
Secretary, whose primary job is to serve as a coordinator between aid beneficiaries,
disbursing agencies, the WTO, other multilateral and regional agencies, and aid
organizations. The Aid for Trade Secretary would become a clearinghouse of
sorts, solely responsible for dissemination of aid for trade preferences to the
relevant donors and organizations. The office of the Aid for Trade Secretary need
not be very large, four or five staff members should suffice, because its main job is
coordinate and maximize the efficiency of the work of the primary aid institutions
by centralizing all aid for trade preferences and methodologies.
Having a centralized office to coordinate all aid for trade projects would be
lead to much greater policy coherence and ultimately more effective projects,
especially in the TRTA/CB arena. It would be a vast improvement over the
current approach, in which "trade-related assistance has frequently been delivered
randomly, indiscriminately, and more often than not, on a stand-alone basis. 84
The WTO is the logical institution to house the Aid for Trade office because of its
expertise on trade capacity building aid and technical assistance to comply with
WTO rules and disciplines. It already provides some direct training on these

82. Id.
83. Most agencies evaluate programs on the basis of five agreed upon criteria relevance,
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability and/or institutional development.
84. Susan Prowse, Mega-Coherence: The Integrated Framework, in TRADE AND AID: PARTNERS
OR RIVALS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICy? 77, 82 (Sheila Page ed., 2006).
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issues, and can help other deliver such assistance more effectively. Moreover, in
the current climate of uncertainty over the fate of the Doha Round, there is strong
political will among many developed nations to promote measures to assist
developing countries. The political climate has resulted already in increases in aid
giving among developed nations, the U.K. most notably. Donors should be quite
amendable to pledging assistance towards a cause that not only benefits developing
nations now but may also ultimately result in a successful Doha Round.86
Therefore, the WTO should be able to divert some of the aid for trade pledges
towards the defraying the costs of the Aid for Trade office. Should the WTO not
establish the office, perhaps because it does not want to take on the work
traditionally associated with development and aid agencies, then the office should
be housed within the World Bank, UNCTAD, or UNDP. However, the WTO is a
better forum.
Let's look at how such an approach might work. Viet Nam became a member
of the WTO in 2007.87 Soon after joining the WTO, it received over seventy
projects related to its accession from over twenty donors, both bilateral and
multilateral. 88 Most of the projects were offered as stand-alone programs, without
any regard to overlap, duplication, or horizontal integration. Not only is such aid
inefficient, it actually creates coordination and administrative headaches for Viet
Nam. As a result, authorities in Viet Nam have lamented the lack of a more
coordinated approach from its donors. 89 It is possible to deliver aid for trade in a
more integrated manner. Assume that Viet Nam has three main areas in which it
needs assistance - overhauling its investment regulations to comply with TRIMS, 90

85. Mark Landler, Britain Overtakes U.S. as Top World Bank Donor,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007,
at World, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/world/15worldbank.htm (stating that the
World Bank had raised $25.1 billion in aid for the world's poorest countries, a record sum that includes
donations by China and Egypt, nations that were once recipients of such aid and that for the first time,
the U.K. overtook the U.S. as the biggest donor with its pledge of $4.2 billion).
86. A successful Doha Round would also yield significant advantages for developed nations.
Altruism need not be the only motivation for bringing Doha to a successful close. For example, just on
the question of market access for agricultural products, developed nations have a lot to gain from
improved access to export markets in developing nations, especially for meat products, which are in
greater demand as a country becomes more affluent. See comments of Representative Cal Dooley, in
Occasional Papers, Dean Rusk Center, University of Georgia School of Law, No. 4 Agriculture and the
WTO: Subsidies in the Cross Hairs at 38 (2005) ( "As incomes rise in the developing world, a
significant portion of the increase will be spent on improved diets, which invariably means increased
meat consumption.").
87. The General Council approved Viet Nam's accession package on November 7, 2006. Viet
Nam became the WTO's 150th member on January 11, 2007. All legal documents, including
commitments on tariffs, services, investment, pertaining to Viet Nam's membership are available at the
World Trade Organization's site.
World Trade Organization, Accession Status: Viet Nam,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/acc e/al VietName.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
88. Prowse, supra note 84, at 82.
89. Id.
90. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs"), negotiated during the
Uruguay Round, applies only to measures that affect trade in goods. Recognizing that certain
investment measures can have trade-restrictive and distorting effects, it states that no member shall
apply a measure that is prohibited by the provisions of GATT Article III (national treatment) or Article
XI (quantitative restrictions). Examples of inconsistent measures, as spelled out in the Annex's
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implementing the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 91 (SPS Agreement)
domestically, and maximizing exports in its burgeoning clothing and textile
industries. Assume that Viet Nam has a number of other accession related issues
that are of lesser urgency. Under my proposal, Viet Nam would be able to make
its priorities known to the relevant donors, simply by apprising the Aid for Trade
Secretary in the WTO, who would in turn make the information available through
the Integrated Framework to donors, other multilateral agencies, NGO's and other
interested parties. Viet Nam would then able to examine all the incoming project
proposals to ascertain fit with its three priorities. It would then work with the
office of the Aid for Trade Secretary to pool the various projects, combining donor
resources where possible, putting off or slow-tracking projects of secondary
importance, and coordinate reporting/accountability mechanisms within the
various projects.
b. Improve Developing Countries' Presence and Participation
The WTO is a completely state-centered system. As such, one might expect
that all 151 of its members maintain a presence at its headquarters in Geneva, so
that members might be able to monitor the day to day developments in the WTO
and advance their national interests in negotiations. Unfortunately, that is not the
93
92
case. Twenty WTO members (and ten observers) have no mission in Geneva.
Illustrative List, include local content or trade balancing requirements. The agreement contains
transitional arrangements allowing members to maintain notified TRIMs for a limited time following
the entry into force of the WTO (two years in the case of developed country members, five years for
developing country members, and seven years for least-developed country members). The agreement
also establishes a Committee on TRIMs to monitor the operation and implementation of these
commitments.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay
Round, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/I 8-trimse.htm.
91. The SPS Agreement deals with food safety and animal and plant health standards and includes
provisions on control, inspection and approval procedures. Governments must provide advance notice
of new or changed sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, and establish a national enquiry point to
provide information. The agreement complements the agreements on technical barriers to trade.
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay
Round, availableat http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/15 sps_01 _e.htm.
92. The Observers are Bahamas, Equatorial Guinea, Montenegro, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe,
Seychelles, Tajikistan, Tonga, and Vanuatu. See World Trade Org., WTO Organizes "Geneva Weeks"
for Non-Resident Delegations, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/genwk-e.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2008) (providing a list of participating WTO members and observers).
93. See id. African countries without permanent representation to the WTO are Central African
Republic, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Equatorial Guinea, Lao Malawi, Maldives, Niger, Sierra
Leone, and Togo. The Pacific WTO members without missions are Fiji, Papua New Guinea and
Solomon Islands. The Caribbean Nations without representation are Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, the
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines. Even those developing nations that do have permanent representation in Geneva suffer
human resources constraints that make it hard for them to attend even the most critical meetings and
negotiations. The extended negotiation process in the WTO is so demanding that it seriously overextends the capacity of many developing nations. Even though the problem is somewhat endemic to
all developing nations, one of the goals of the TRTA/CB measures discussed above in subsection 2A is
to improve the quality of their involvement in WTO processes, which is at least useful in optimizing the
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This means that a staggering 16 percent of the WTO membership lacks the ability
to participate in the WTO at the most basic level. In addition, many LDCS and
smaller countries maintain missions in Geneva with fewer than five professional
staff, who are heavily over-burdened with tracking not only issues related to the
94
WTO, but also the activities of all international organizations located in Geneva.
Of course, these countries are still better off than those without permanent
representation, who can't perform their WTO functions at all.
The WTO must improve its efforts to integrate the non-resident members of
the WTO. To be sure, all the non-resident members are developing or vulnerable
countries with small economies, and are never going to be major players in the
WTO system like Brazil, China, or India, whose sizes and economies dwarf the
non-resident members. Nonetheless, these countries should not be left out for a
number of reasons. First, even though their economies are small, in the aggregate
they are not insignificant. In terms of population affected, they represent large
numbers of the poorest in the world. As such, these countries have the most to
gain from development and therefore have an important stake in making the WTO
system responsive to their needs. Third, and most importantly, the fact that 16
percent of the membership is excluded from the day to day business of the WTO is
a sad indictment of a system that claims to be open, transparent, and democratic.
The WTO has recognized the importance of enhancing the participation of
non-residents. Prior to the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, it launched an
effort, together with twelve other international organizations, to involve
representatives from non-resident members by assisting them with preparing for
the Seattle Conference and apprising them of technical assistance available to them
from the WTO and other agencies. Subsequent
to 1999, the practice became
' 95
institutionalized and is known as "Geneva Week. ,
Geneva Week currently occurs twice a year. It brings together permanent
WTO officers and senior officials from the twenty WTO members and ten
Observers without representation as well as representatives from specialized
organizations who work with them. 9 6 Participants in the program learn about
recent developments in the WTO. Through seminars, they receive detailed
briefings on the progress of the Doha Round agenda items, known as the Doha
Work Program. They also receive reports on development issues in general, such
as the work of the WTO Sub-Committee on Least Developed Countries on special
human resources developing nations do possess. With respect to the countries without missions in
Geneva, such TRTA/CB measures can be of no help at all. They need help of a different character.
94. See Brown, supra note 80, at 264.
95. Funding for the program was permanently secured by the General Council in 2002, pursuant
to the Ministerial Declaration. The General Council approved the funding from the regular budget for
Geneva Week. See World Trade Org., supra note 79, 40, 43; see also Committee on Trade and
Development, Note by the Secretariat: Annual Report on Training and Technical Cooperation (1
January to 31 December 2004), WT/COMTD/W/139 (Apr. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=64342.
96. See World Trade Org., supra note 92 ("The Geneva Week events benefit from regular
contributions in the form of seminars organized by the Agency for International Trade Information and
Cooperation (AITIC) and occasionally from the Commonwealth Secretariat.").
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challenges facing small economies. In addition, participants attend some regularly
scheduled meetings of the WTO.
97
Participants seem to find the programs offered during Geneva Week helpful,
but most believe more needs to be done. Once again, this is an area in which
responding directly to the requests of developing countries is necessary. Some
participants have asked that the WTO organize more than two Geneva Weeks per
year. 98 They believe it would be helpful to organize regional briefing sessions in
addition to the Geneva-based programs. 99 One commentator has observed that:
An objective assessment would seem to suggest that Geneva Week
heightens the awareness of Non-Residents of the fact that they are on
the sidelines of a process that will have consequences for them, but it is
a full
questionable whether it has been successful in providing
00
appreciation of the importance of effective participation. 1
I don't think there is any reason to believe that WTO members without
representation in Geneva do not appreciate the importance of effective
participation. Developing nations are generally quite savvy about the importance
of the Geneva process and acutely aware of their stake in the world trading
Rather, the limited success of the Geneva Week experience is more
regime.''
likely reflective of the fact that two yearly sessions are far from adequate. One of
the highest priorities of the WTO's aid for trade agenda must be the establishment
of permanent missions for members without representation. In order to minimize
costs, each of the twenty non-resident nations need not necessarily have their own
missions. As the non-residents can be grouped into African, Caribbean, and
Pacific Islands, even three permanent representative missions would be highly
beneficial.
There is already is successful model for such a representative mission. In
2001, the European Union funded a non-resident facility operated by the Pacific
Islands Forum, 0 2 which provides representation to fourteen Pacific Countries. 103
The Pacific Island Forum facility has had a positive impact, giving voice to a
group of nations seldom heard at WTO proceedings. In 2005, the Forum
appointed a joint Ambassador to represent its members in the WTO. 1°4 The
representative mission model can be replicated with success for the African and
Caribbean groups as well, although it is likely that the African representative
mission may need to be split into two in order to reflect the divergent goals

97. Brown, supranote 80, at 267.
98. See id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. See e.g., Inaamul Haque, Doha Development Agenda: Recapturing the Momentum of
Multilateralismand Developing Countries, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1097, 1110(2002).
102. Brown, supra note 80, at 268.
103. Id. (listing the fourteen countries as Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, Samoa,
Tonga and Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru,
Niue, Palau, and Tuvalu).
104. Id.
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relevant to that more diverse group. In conclusion, aid for trade cannot be said to
have gotten off the ground if it does not address the appalling problem of members
without representation. Only when these small and vulnerable economies have
representation in Geneva can they begin to participate in the process and play a
role in defining new rules to adequately address their interests.
c. Enhance Transparency and Democracy in the Multilateral Trading System
The WTO has been progressively moving towards greater openness and
transparency in its operations. Until recently multilateral negotiations and dispute
settlement proceedings were not open to the public. For example, even the
practice of accepting amicus curiae briefs has been hotly contested and
controversial. 10 5 However, the tide seems to be turning. Two pivotal events
signaled the sea-change. First, the WTO invited NGOs to attend its Ministerial
Conferences beginning in 1996 at the Singapore conference, when 108 NGOs
attended. 106 Prior to this, only member state representatives were invited to the
By the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial
Ministerial Conferences.
Conference, over 800 NGOs attended.'° 7 Opening up the ministerial proceedings
to NGOs as observers marks quite a stride in the direction of greater transparency.
It also enables NGOs to have access to WTO negotiations in real time so that they
are able to respond, comment on and possibly affect policy outcomes.lO0 Second,
on January 8, 2008, at the request of the U.S. and the European Communities, the
two parties in the dispute, arguments in front of the dispute settlement panel 109 will
105. See generally Cai supra note 29, at 475-489 (discussing the progress the WTO had made
towards greater transparency).
106. See
World Trade
Org., List of NGO's Who Attended in Singapore,
http://www.wto.org/english/forums -e/ngoe/ngosin e.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
107. Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizationsand InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
348, 372 (2006) (discussing NGO attendance in footnote 148).
108. As part of Pascal Lamy's recent initiatives on greater transparency and an enhanced dialogue
with NGOs, the list of NGO Position Papers received by the Secretariat is circulated for the information
of members and members and the public may view all the position papers submitted. See
World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/ngo-e/pospap-e.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2008) (providing a complete list of position papers related to WTO issues submitted by NGOs to the
WTO Secretariat). See e.g., Chamovitz, supra note 107, at 369 (arguing that NGOs exert relatively
weak influence on the WTO although that may be changing with respect to high-profile trade issues,
such as maintaining access to pharmaceuticals and reducing trade-distorting agricultural subsidies);
Steve Chamovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 299, 353 (2002) (arguing that the
WTO needs the input and support of NGOs and citizens groups); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation
of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2005) (arguing that non-state actors can and do influence
the WTO political process even without a formal say or vote in WTO decision-making process); On the
other hand, some commentators argue that NGOs must push for more formal ways to provide input to
the WTO, see e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizationsat the World Trade Organization:
Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 123, 131 (1998); Gabrielle Marceau &
Peter N. Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent?,33 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 44-45 (1999).
109. For the first decade of GATT, dispute settlement relied primarily on diplomatic means to stop
violations of the substantive agreements. In the 1950s, it became the practice to use panels for dispute
settlements. At the end of a dispute settlement a GATT panel would issue a report, which had to be
adopted by a positive consensus among all GATT members. Effectively, this meant the losing party
could always block adoption of a panel report by voting against it. During the Tokyo Round of trade
negotiations (1973-1979), the GATT established codes of conduct for panels, discussed non-tariff
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be open to the public. " 0 The case is "United States - Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology" (DS350). The panel will start its meeting
with the parties on January 29, 2008 with a session open to public viewing at the
WTO headquarters in Geneva. Public viewing will take place via a real time
closed-circuit television broadcast.
A second public session may follow,
depending on the discretion of the panel. The parties will make their oral
arguments during these public sessions.
These efforts at enhancing greater openness and transparency in the WTO
need to be encouraged. As another step towards addressing the democratic deficit
problem, the WTO must take full advantage of the opportunities aid for trade
offers for reaching out to both the U.N. and civil society actors. The WTO should
cooperate more closely with the World Bank, the IMF, the U.N. General
Assembly, and NGOs. Please see infra subsection III.A for a fuller description of
each of the concrete proposals, particularly with regards to the U.N. and NGOs.
B. What DevelopingNations can Do
Aid for trade can provide an invaluable training ground for the type of role
developing nations ought to play. There are several ways developing nations can
leverage the opportunities opened by aid for trade to advance their agenda. First,
barriers, and accorded preferential treatment for developing countries. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS

OF

INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

RELATIONS CASES,

MATERIALS AND

TEXT

ON THE

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 200, 257

(4th ed. 2002). The next round of trade talks, the so-called Uruguay Round (1986-1994), aimed at the
further development of trade law, led to the idea of creating an umbrella WTO. The round saw the need
for a more adjudicative process for dispute settlement, a reformation of trade in textiles and agriculture,
and an expansion of the trade agreements to include intellectual property and trade in services. On April
15, 1994, 123 participating countries signed the agreement for the formation of the WTO. Under the
WTO, the GATT still serves as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods. See generally World
Trade
Organization,
The
Uruguay
Round,
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). Under the
new WTO system, legitimization of panels' decisions no longer depended on the whim of a single
nation that could block adoption of the panel report. Rather, decisions are effectively valid upon
issuance and take on the force of law unless all member-nations affirmatively act to reject adoption,
which is unlikely, and at any rate, difficult. Such reverse consensus eliminates many of the delays in
adoption and subsequent non-compliance that plagued the old dispute resolution process. Panel reports
are also subject to review by an Appellate Body with power to overturn the legal findings and
conclusions of law made by panels. Commentators who have given a generally positive assessment of
the WTO dispute settlement system include: William J. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System: The
First Ten Years, 8 J. INTL'L ECON. L. 17 (2005); Thomas A. Zimmerman, WTO Dispute Settlement at
Ten: Evolution, Experiences, and Evaluation, 60 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT - THE SWISS REVIEW OF INT'L
ECON. REL. 27 (2005); John H. Jackson, The Changing Fundamentals of International Law and Ten
Years of the WTO, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2005). For an economic assessment that presents mixed
findings, see Monika BiOtler, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an
Economic Perspective, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 503 (2000). Other commentators who give a mixed to
negative review of the first decade of the DSU include: Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of
InternationalDispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 109 (2002) and John Ragosta, Navin Joneja, & Mikhail Zeldovich, WTO Dispute
Settlement: The System is Flawed and Must be Fixed, 37 INT'L L. 697 (2003).
110. See World Trade Org., WTO Hearings on Zeroing Dispute opened to the Public, Jan. 8, 2008,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news08_e/dispute350_e.htm.
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they need to see aid for trade as a chance to gather the empirical evidence that
would convince developed countries of the need for policy changes. No one, no
matter how pre-disposed or sympathetic, will change their positions on important
issues without compelling evidence. Of course, developing nations have been
quite sophisticated in presenting and arguing their cases at Ministerial
Conferences. However, those tactics have not worked to date.
Right now, developing nations have two choices. They can opt out of the
Doha Round, perhaps placing the blame for the stalling of the Doha Round on
developed nations captive to powerful protectionist lobbies, which is at least
partially correct. Or, they can choose to focus instead on strategies for success in
the next phase of the negotiations. To do so, they must take the monitoring efforts
of the Task Force on Aid for Trade seriously, by submitting frank and detailed
recipient country assessments. They must also act proactively, by coordinating
among themselves to scrutinize all aid for trade projects for patterns and broad
themes, which can then become the rallying points for policy change. Each aid for
trade project reveals a weakness in the current trading system. Together, the
wisdom amassed from all projects can play a major role in reforming the system to
make it work better for developing nations.
Organizations like the Cairns Group,"'l an alliance of agricultural producers
from both developed and developing countries, should take a lead in the type of
information gathering, analysis, and policy setting described above. They may be
better positioned to accomplish these tasks than the OECD, the World Bank or the
WTO (all of whom already play a role) for several reasons. First, requests from
the Cairns Group will not be perceived as top-down orders from powerful elites, as
a request from the OECD or the World Bank might. Second, aid recipient
countries may provide better and more detailed information to the Cairns Group
because the group is seen not only an ally of developing nations, but more
importantly, as an entity that is not coercive or evaluative. For example, in
situations where aid for trade projects failed, aborted, abandoned, curtailed, or
unfinished, a country may refrain from submitting a self-assessment report
altogether or submit only a partial one fearing that lack of positive results to report
to the World Bank may lead to a decrease in aid funds. Countries may also
withhold or distort negative data for fear that it may lead to a net decrease in aid
dollars donors will give. Such fears, reasonable in the context of giving feedback
to the World Bank, are greatly diminished when the Cairns Group or a similar
organization is the intended recipient. Other benefits can accrue as well. The
I 11. The Cairns Group, which now has 18 members, is a powerful alliance of some of the world's
largest agricultural producers that has played a very active role in pushing for greater liberalization in
agricultural products. The Cairns Group itself operates through ministers and officials at a government
to government level. Farmer organizations in the individual countries are closely consulted by their
governments to frame Cairns Group policies and positions. The great majority of Cairns Group
members are developing nations. Current members are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, The
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. See Cairns Group Farm Leaders, What is the Cairns
Group of Farm Leaders?, http://www.cairnsgroupfanners.org/cairnsgrp'html (last visited Feb. 19,
2008).
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Cairns Group may be able to amalgamate country assessments so as to identify
systemic failures (such as lack of administrative support for new institutions put in
place through aid for trade) in ways that an individual country can not. Thus, I
envision a two-tiered process whereby country assessments are performed by aidrecipients, but then given to the Cairns or a similar representative for secondary
processing, resulting in the issuance of a supplementary report by such
organization focusing on regional trends and containing policy proposals. The
results of the supplementary report and the individual assessments would be made
available to the applicable multilateral organization.
However, the results of such due diligence and policy setting must also make
their way to the membership of the WTO at large. Fortunately, developing nations
have already proven themselves quite adept at this aspect of the multilateral trade
process, through the G-20, a coalition of leading developing nations that has very
proactive during WTO negotiations in recent years. 112 There is no doubt that the
G-20 will continue to play an important role in future negotiations. The G-20 is
ideally situated to translate the facts and recommendations gathered through aid for
trade analysis into policy positions at multilateral negotiations. Aid for trade
provides a similar opportunity for the G-20 to play a leadership role in information
gather, policy setting, and advocacy.
C. What the Trade Legal Community can Do
1. Joint Research with Aid Experts
The legal community must also play a role in making aid for trade a success.
Critically, trade academics, practitioners, and other experts must engage in a
greater dialogue with their aid counterparts. The two fields have thus far
developed completely independently of each other, often with a sense of
"ignorance and mistrust," 1 13 but that needs to change. As I demonstrated in
subsection III.C above, trade experts have much to learn from the experience and
accumulated knowledge of aid experts. No doubt the inverse is also true, although
that is a topic beyond the reach of this article. Aid for trade is an obvious starting
point for joint research between trade and aid specialists. The field is very undertheorized and researched. In the current literature, there has been only one article
that gives serious treatment to WTO technical assistance and capacity building
programs, and the article was written before the WTO announced its aid for trade
initiative. 114 On the aid side, there is one laudable monograph, which I relied upon
extensively, that discusses aid for trade in great depth," 5 but almost exclusively
from a non-legal perspective. If this article accomplishes nothing beyond inspiring

112. See Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165, 170-72 (2007)
(describing the strong role played by the G-20 on agricultural negotiations at the Cancun Ministerial
Conference).
113. Page, supranote 60, at 31.
114. Gregory Shaffer, Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing
Countries? 23 WIS. INT'L L. J. 643 (2005).
115. See generally Page, supra note 60. See also Dominic Coppens, Trade and Aid: Partners or
Rivals in Development Policy?, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 413 (2007) (providing a review of Page's book).
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one trade expert to undertake empirical or theoretical joint project on aid for trade
with an aid specialist, it would have served its purpose.
2. Expand Private Sector Pro Bono Legal Assistance
One area in which developing nations need aid for trade assistance is
accessing the dispute settlement system of the WTO. For a variety of reasons,
many developing countries do not make use of the dispute settlement mechanism
at all or do so infrequently.1 16 There are a variety of explanations, from lack of
experience, lack of familiarity with the system, lack of human resources to pursue
lengthy litigation, a sense that the system does not provide meaningful remedies to
developing nations with small economies, etc. However, there is no doubt that
developing nations face a serious lack of financial resources and legal expertise
that may inhibit their ability to make full use of the dispute settlement system.
Trade law is a highly specialized field of practice. The number of competent
law firms with a well-established trade law practice is limited. 117 Most of these
firms charge high private sector hourly rates, rates which are largely driven by the8
dominant consumers of their services such as the U.S., E.U., Canada, and Japan"

116. See e.g., Douglas lerley, Defining the Factorsthat Influence Developing Country Compliance
with and Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the Dispute over
Bananas, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 615, 616 (2002) (presenting the five principal factors cited by
diplomats as influencing developing country participation in and compliance with WTO panel and
Appellate Body decisions as: (1) the dramatic influence of the political and economic strength of
developed countries on the dispute settlement process; (2) the effectiveness, at least in principle, of the
dispute settlement system in resolving disputes between countries of diverging political and economic
power; (3) the non-compliance of developed countries with WTO decisions; (4) the lack of recourse to
retaliation; and (5) the lack of financial resources and technical capacity available to developing
countries in order to file and defend against complaints). Conventional wisdom holds that it is a waste
of time for developing nations to pursue complaints against industrial nations because the remedies
available to them are inadequate. Commentators who have weighed in on this question include Robert
E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies for Developing Country Complainants,
in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 81, 81 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
While Hudec concedes that this conventional wisdom has "a great deal of truth to it," his paper is
devoted to showing the complexity of the issues involved. Id. See also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt,
Developing Countries and GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade OrganizationDispute
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003) (arguing that developing countries are no better served
under the WTO than they were under GATT); Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute
Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Resource Paper No. 5, Mar. 2003,
availableat http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsdseries/resourcepapers/DSU_2003.pdf.
117. Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation Documents, Reports on
Meetings, Improving Developing Country Access to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO
(Feb.
25,
2000)
[hereinafter
AITIC
Documents],
available
at
http://www.acici.org/aitic/documents/reports/reports5-eng.html
(stating that lawyers and consultants
specializing in WTO dispute settlement cases are found in three main locations: Geneva, Washington
and Brussels).
118. The countries that make the most frequent use of the WTO's dispute settlement system as
complainants during the period of January 1, 1995 to September 30, 2004 are the United States,
Canada, Mexico, European Union, Japan, Korea, India, Thailand, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. See
WTO Secretariat, Statistical Information on Recourse to WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures,
Background Note Preparedfor the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, JOB(03)/225/Rev. I
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and are therefore out of reach for many developing nations. 119 American lawyers
have an ethical obligation to the profession to give pro bono legal assistance. 120 A
similar obligation is imposed on lawyers in other countries as well. 121 While pro
bono work is usually conceived in terms of assistance to low-income individuals or
non-profit organizations, it behooves trade lawyers to think beyond these narrow
conceptions to include needy countries as well. In fact, it is smart for law firms
and individual practitioners to seek out the opportunity to advise or represent
developing countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 122 With some rare
exceptions,123 most WTO dispute settlement proceeding are generally closed to the
(Oct. 22, 04). The list of the most frequent respondents in WTO cases is identical except for the
exclusion of Thailand.
119. See AITIC Documents, supra note 117. According to the AITIC Documents, hourly rates for
trade lawyers range from $200 to $450 per hour, depending on the seniority and experience of the staff
member. In addition all incidental costs (e.g. telephone calls, postage), travel costs (business class) and
hotels are billable.
120. The first quantified goal articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) was included in
the 1993 version of the Model Rules, when the ABA encouraged attorneys to "aspire to render at least
fifty hours of pro bono public legal services per year." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1
(1993). Finally, in 2002, the ABA revised Model Rule 6.1 to its current version, including a sentence
that focuses on the idea that lawyers have a "professional responsibility to provide legal services to
those unable to pay." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2003). In addition, nearly every state
bar has a statement in its ethics rules emphasizing the need for pro bono service. Forty-seven states
have adopted Model Rule 6.1 in its original form, 1993 revised form, the 2002 revised form, or a
similar form. See American Bar Association, State-by-State Pro Bono Service Rules,
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/stateethicsrules.html#appendix-b (last updated April 26,
2007).
121. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND

THE PROFESSIONS, 100-24 (2005) (providing an excellent comparative review of the pro bono
requirements and recommendations in other countries).
122. A number of law firms and individuals have registered their availability with the Advisory
Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) to provide their services to least developing nations and other ACWL
members where the ACWL cannot provide representation due to a conflict of interest. The ACWL was
founded in 2001 with the goal of enhancing the participation of developing nations in the WTO. An
independent agency from the WTO, the ACWL provides free advice on WTO law to its developing
country members and to all Least Developed Nations (LDCs) that are Members of the WTO or are in
the process of accession. It defends these countries' interests in WTO dispute settlement proceedings at
very modest fees and offers their officials free training in WTO law through courses, seminars and
internships. Since its establishment in July 2001, the ACWL has prepared over 300 legal opinions,
provided support in 25 WTO dispute settlement proceedings (or about 20% of all such proceedings
initiated in the WTO during that time) and has conducted six-month courses on WTO law every year
since 2002. The ACWL has become an organization that pools the collective experience of its
developing country Members and LDCs in WTO legal matters and makes it available to each of these
countries. The ACWL has 37 members: 10 developed country members, and 27 members entitled to the
services of the ACWL. Two countries, Costa Rica and Georgia, are currently in the process of acceding
to the Agreement Establishing the ACWL. The 42 countries that are classified as LDCs and are
members of the WTO or in the process of acceding to the WTO that have been designated by the United
Nations as LDCs are entitled to the services of the ACWL without becoming ACWL Members.
Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Introduction, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about-e.aspx (last visited
Feb. 25, 2008).
123. See World Trade Org., WTO Hearings on Zeroing Dispute opened to the Public, supra note
110 and accompanying text (describing the opening of WTO dispute settlement proceedings to the
public via closed-circuit cameras).
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public. Representing developing nations, even as interested third parties and not
the primary litigants, affords private law firms and lawyers a valuable opportunity
to gain access to and valuable litigation experience in WTO proceedings.
Relationships with developing countries are worth establishing because, if things
go well, their economies will grow and they may resort more frequently to the
dispute settlement system. Moreover, as developing nations continue to coalesce
their interests in the ways described in this article, the result should be greater
cooperation and pooling of litigation efforts as well, a trend which has already
begun with Brazil in the United States - Upland Cotton case. 124 Private law firms
and lawyers would gain much in the long term by cultivating relationships with
developing nations now. Providing pro bono assistance is a form of privately
driven aid for trade that merits closer attention by the profession.
D. What Donors can Do
What donors should do in order to make aid for trade a success fall into two
broad categories. The first, the most obvious, is to continue to contribute aid
funds. When the WTO reports that it has secured funds for its Aid for Trade
initiative from various donors, it is often unclear if those funds are actually
additional to existing Official Development Assistance ("ODA") pledges or
merely an allocation of a portion of ODA pledges to aid for trade projects. 125 In
order for live up to its full promise, as illustrated in Part III of this article, donors
must continue to be generous and give aid for trade funds on top of its existing
general aid pledges. 126 Donors must also take into account the effects of Dutch

124. See generally Appellate Body Report, United States Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R
(Mar.
3,
2005),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu..e/267abr-e.pdf (discussing Brazil's victorious case against
the United States cotton subsidies, and how it was joined by many other nations as interested parties,
many of them developing nations. Brazil was joined by Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chad,
China, European Communities, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Taiwan and Venezuela).
125. For instance, on January 11, 2008, Finland announced a donation of CHF 620,000 (EUR
375,000) to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund (DDAGTF). Since 2000, Finland's
contributions have reached CHF 4.9 million. The press release described the donation as focused on
technical assistance: "This donation will finance technical assistance programmes and training
activities for least developed countries. The aim is to better adapt their practices and laws to WTO rules
and disciplines, improve the implementation of their obligations and enhance the exercise of their
membership rights." As Finland has traditionally been a strong donor in all areas of development
assistance both within and without the WTO, it is not clear from the press release if this donation was
on top of its existing pledges. For example, it is not clear if the pledge to the DDAGTF resulted from a
reallocation from other aid projects, such as poverty-reduction programs. World Trade Org., Finland
Offers CHF 620,000 to the WTO Training Programmefor the Benefit of Developing Countries,Jan. 11,
2008, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres08_e/pr504_e.htm.
126. Sometimes it is quite clear that a nation's aid for trade donation is in fact on top of existing
pledges. One of the more heartening trends in the recent WTO aid for trade initiative is that it is
bringing in a new generation of donors, many of them developing nations. For example, on January 14,
2008, Romania donated EUR 100,000 to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund
("DDAGTF"), the first contribution of Romania to the DDAGTF. World Trade Org., Romania Offers
EUR
100,000
to
the
WTO
Training
Programme,
Jan.14,
2008,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres08 e/pr505_e.htm.
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Disease 127 in creating monitoring and assessment structures. Therefore, where
possible, donors should spread-put aid for trade in the medium to long term in
order to offset the effects of Dutch Disease.
The second category of donor contributions is a corollary to the country
ownership points made above in subsections IV.A (with respect to the WTO) and
IV.B (with respect to developing nations). Donors must also acknowledge the
conventional wisdom in the aid literature that aid is most effective when it is
country-driven. Doing so has a number of clear implications for how donors
should structure their aid for trade giving. First, recipient nations should have a
central role in the aid for trade decision process, a country-driven process that
welcomes the participation of civil society organizations and local businesses in
determining priorities. This means that aid for trade programs must be structured
from the premise of local ownership, knowledge, and participation so that trade
strategies are rooted in locally-designed programs and reflective of local
development priorities. The logical corollary of a country-driven aid for trade
regime is that donors must be willing at times to place their interests second. For
example, this might mean allowing a developing country to focus on accessing the
dispute settlement system (perhaps not a primary goal of the donor) rather than the
full implementation of WTO investment rules (which might be of great interest to
the donor). In order for aid for trade to be truly country-driven, the structures for
diagnostic, delivery, and monitoring should ensure that developing nations are free
to use aid for trade funds to enhance the capabilities most critical to them.
Accountability should also begin at the national level. This means that public
oversight of national plans and priorities should be assured through the submission
of such plans to the national parliament or congress for final approval.
Country-driven aid for trade has some other negative implications for donor
behavior as well. First, donors should not attach damaging conditions to the
receipt of aid for trade. This may mean not forcing recipient nations to give up
other social policy goals in favor of trade-capacity building, as discussed above.
But it also extends to forbearing from the imposition of economic policy changes
(such as currency devaluation or reducing deficient spending) that would be
harmful to those living in poverty. Second, aid for trade should be untied from any
requirement that the recipient country purchase donor country products or services,
including consultation services in assessment or monitoring. Third, aid for trade
must be given as aid, and not in the guise of complex financial arrangements that
may result in greater debt for developing countries. Trade-oriented projects are
often expected to "pay for itself' through the generation of export revenues. As
such, there is a temptation to structure them as a mixture of aid and loans. This
can lead to unwarranted increases in debt burdens for developing countries that are
already crippled by their debt burdens. It is particularly important to avoid
imposing more debt service payments on the most vulnerable economies in
Africa.' 2 8 Fourth, aid for trade should be de-coupled from trade negotiation results

127. See supranotes 63-68 and accompanying text.
128. See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Summer has Ended and We are not Saved!
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and not given as a quid pro quo in Doha or future negotiations. Developing
nations are already disadvantaged enough in terms of negotiation positions, and at
any rate, they are already acutely aware of the dual roles donors/negotiators play,
that an explicit linkage between aid and negotiation results is both unnecessary and
heavy-handed. Lastly, monitoring and assessment of aid for trade projects should
not be conducted by donor countries or donor-driven bodies, but rather by
independent civil society or governmental entities.
Donors should also allow developing nations to have some say in determining
how much of a share aid for trade should account for as a share of the total aid it
would receive. This is particularly critical if aid for trade giving is not on top of
existing Official Development Assistance pledges. In such cases, the recipient
nation must be allowed to choose to sacrifice funding for other programs (such as
poverty-reduction, employment generation, or health care) in order to privilege aid
for trade programs. Donors should never make such decisions for them.
This means that the WTO's current system of bundling donations into its
general Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund ("DDAGTF")12 9 may not
be optimally responsive to the needs of developing nations. The DDAGTF has
two foci: (1) technical assistance to build capacity for developing countries to
participate in the multilateral trading system, advance their interests, conclude
agreements and implement them and (2) financial and technical assistance to help
developing countries participate in the current round of Doha negotiations. Within
these two broad areas, it does not differentiate among the different priorities
important to developing countries (such as negotiation versus implementation
versus dispute settlement). Moreover, it is a completely top-down system that
incorporates no mechanisms for recipient country input or direction. Also, there is
little transparency about the impact of DDAGTF giving on overall development
assistance.
Donors would be well-advised to recall the success of the Multilateral Fund
established under the Montreal Protocol discussed above in subsection II.C of this
article. 130 Donors and the WTO can solve the lack of country-ownership problem
within the DDAGTF in one simple way - create a Executive Committee for the
DDAGTF modeled on that of the Multilateral Fund. Recall that all decisions as to
fund dispersals and project approvals under the Multilateral Fund were made by an
Executive Committee comprised equally of developed and developing nations. All
decision making occurs by consensus and a double-majority rule (two-thirds
overall, plus a majority of both developed and developing nations) was imposed on
any decisions taken by vote. This solution is both elegant and effective.

Towards a TransformativeAgenda for Africa's Development, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 5, 18-19 (2005)
(describing the external debt burdens of African countries as a "sword of Damocles").
129. "The Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund ("DDAGTF") was created following the
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, in November 2001, which launched a new round of
negotiations.'" World Trade Org., Denmark to Donate an Extra 600,000 Swiss Francs to WTO
TechnicalAssistance, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres03-e/pr369_e.htm,
130. See discussion supra Parts II.C.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Aid for trade has tremendous potential. It is an area that merits all the
attention it has recently receiving from the leadership of the WTO. Opportunities
abound in the shaping of aid for trade to benefit many constituencies, including the
WTO, developing nations, donors, and the aid and trade legal communities. The
international trading system has much to gain from the effective use of aid for
trade as a tool for fulfilling the promise of the Doha Development Agenda,
alleviating global poverty, and giving developing nations a well-deserved placed at
the table in the global trade regime. However, each group must also do its share in
making aid for trade a success. The roadmap provided in this article will hopefully
push all relevant players on the right path to making aid for trade a model a reality
and a success.

EFFECT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE PATTERN OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD:

A POSSIBLE REVERSAL OF TREND
WENDY DUONG*

Speech delivering her paperat the Sutton Colloquium,
University ofDenver Sturm College ofLaw,
March 11, 2007
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

My paper presents a hypothesis about the future trends of outbound foreign
direct investment (FDI) to Third World countries, brought about by large-scaled
industrial applications of optimum Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the 21 st century.
To many, the term Al may suggest a vision of the future. If it is, then the topic
is indeed an ambitious venture for any international business transactions (IBT)
lawyer who chooses to branch out of her specialty to deal with technology, applied
mathematics, and economics in exploring the impact of Al. Some may think that I
have boldly chosen to turn myself into a futurist.
Yet, I do not view my paper as being overly futuristic. I want to clarify that
this is not a scientific or economic paper. The paper is written for a general
audience of lawyers, and the language that I use is that of a lawyer, not of an
economist or a scientist. FDI and the pattern of global economic development are
my core specialties and the concentration of my scholarship interests.
The hypothesis I present here is based on past and present events and data:
First, AI is not something new. It has been used in military and commercial
applications since the time of the two World Wars. Then, during war-time, it was
called "Operational Research."
Second, AI has also frequently been used in past and present industrial
applications to change factory outputs and production system designs, with
substantial macroeconomic impact already felt by society. What I look at now is

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Professor Duong's speech
was based on her Work-in-Progress regarding the effect of artificial intelligence on foreign direct
investment in Third World societies. Because this is a speech, side headings have been inserted to
enhance readability.
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the role and impact of optimum Al in the New Economy - an economy where
Information and Knowledge are considered production factors.
Third, as of the beginning of the millennium, there have already been changes
in FDI patterns, as well as in corporate behaviors, which lend support to this
paper's hypothesis. I will explore this evidence in the later part of my
presentation.
IL. THE THESIS

Let me first summarize my thesis:
My paper predicts that AI can stop the outbound flow of FDI from the
developed world to the Third World by changing investor behaviors and
eliminating the Third World's comparative advantages. I use the term "Third
World" for convenience only, to refer to the least and/or lesser developed Asia, the
Americas, and Africa collectively, without indulging in any value system that rates
these cultures prejudicially. Quite to the contrary, I consider myself an advocate
for Third World inhabitants because their voice is often not heard.
Contradictory to the common belief and conventional wisdom that high tech
will better humankind and create new jobs and skills, large-scaled industrial
applications of optimum Al can do just the opposite - Al can "ghetto" the already
disadvantaged Third World workers and make Third World countries poorer,
turning them into producers of cheap raw materials and agricultural products,
while eliminating them from the "Information or Knowledge-Based Society" that
characterizes market competition in the 21 st century. Thus, in this modem age, AI
can facilitate and bring about the return of 19 th century colonialism, all over again.
The vision I see may be counter-intuitive to the traditional legal thinking by
international trade and FDI experts.
III. EXPLORING

THE THESIS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The topic came to me when I read an article by the Science editor of MSNBC
on the internet this past month (March 2007): "Someday you could be taking
ordersfrom a robot, but in a nice way... " The article talked about human-robot
interaction and the work of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science. The article also discussed the work of an MIT scientist on robotic
technology. Robotic technology is but one application of AL.
The article also mentioned 'fear" as a factor in this new robot-assisted
society. So, my vision today - the impact of Al on the Third World - may sound an
alarm, foretelling a rather gloomy picture for tomorrow's unskilled workers: that
Al can "ghetto" them.
The problem is not confined to the Third World. The "ghettoing" of unskilled
workers can also take place in a developed economy like America. That adds to the
notion of "fear."
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To begin with, based on the data released by UNCTAD (United Nations
1
Conference on Trade and Development), you can see that US-based
multinationals dominate the FDI scene - their foreign assets, foreign affiliates, and
foreign employees, both in Financial Services and Manufacturing and Production
of Consumer Products. For example, a diversified giant like GE appears under both
categories of the UNCTAD report. The picture is obvious: big American
businesses bring their capital and technology abroad. They are the businesses most
financially capable to fund and develop Al.
But what is Al? Here is an IBT lawyer's simplified definition: it's the
simulation of the human brain by a computer. In AI research, scientific efforts are
made to identify those superior functions of the brain that can be simulated - for
example, what an engineer will do to come up with the system design for factory
production. Then, mathematical models, especially algorithm, are used to express,
memorialize, and document these human brain functions. The models are then fed
into a computer, such that when a standardized instruction or an inquiry is given,
the computer will generate the result exactly like the work product of the engineer.
This enables the computer software to replace the engineer.
Thus, Al is the modelization of the human brain and its various functions.
For example, one of the most spectacular results in Al research has been the
"recognition of form," i.e., the capture of visual information by an artificial retina.
But one thing remains, or at least I believe and hope that you agree: AI cannot
replace human aesthetic and moral expressions and choices, or decisions that
require emotions, passion, imagination, the judgmental process of weighing
consequences, or the human wisdom of predicting the future with nuances. Al
cannot and should not compete with Homer or Shakespeare; nor should it replace
the decision by the White House on whether, or where, to drop a bomb.
Al is just one aspect of an information-based civilization. We are in an era
where, as the clich6 goes, information, or knowledge, is power. Information
becomes the "added value." Take an example, the computer chip. In my
layperson's understanding, it is a piece of Silicium-the scientific name for a piece
of sand. Sand is a very common and worthless material. What gives it meaning
and value is the information that the chip contains. With the information imbedded
in it, the piece of sand - the computer chip - is no longer worthless. Instead, it now
has tremendous added value. Economic value.
Our modem information-based society is no longer the industrialization
model of the 19 th century that motivated colonialism. In the 2 0 th century, big
businesses and consumer commodities producers took their manufacturing to the
developing economies for cost savings, including cheap labor and the exploitation
of raw materials at the source. Added to this bundle of advantages was the
convenience of a transitional, developing, and therefore a flexible frontier system

'See The Top 50 Financial TNCs, Ranked by the UNCTAD Spread Index, 2004, 16/10/06
(WIR/2006/TNCs), http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-dir/docs/wir2006top5Ospreadindex-en.pdf
(last visited May 7, 2008).
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of commerce and national law (or lack thereof). This has been the motivation
behind multinationals' predictable patterns of business conduct in the Third World.
Activists have critically called this phenomenon or trend "neo-colonialism."
Now this thing called Al - how can it potentially reverse, if at all, this pattern
of conduct?
IV. THE

EMBLEMATIC CASE

Let's take a case study involving a Western European business that
manufactures a product quite suitable for Al application: ready-made, selfassembled, do-it-yourself furniture that comes in a box, made out of cheap wood
but of functional design, sold inexpensively in low-priced department stores, made
in places like China, Vietnam, India, Romania, etc. I built this hypothetical case
based on real-life confidential data by interviewing business executives and startup high-tech professionals.
For several years, this business has steadily experienced an annual increase in
turnover of 15%. So, expansion in manufacturing is a natural course. But, because
of the high costs of increasing manufacturing capabilities in Western Europe,
without Al, the business would have considered taking manufacturing to, for
example, Asia, for raw supplies, cheaper labor, plus lesser regulation.
Now, with AI: this shift to Asia is no longer a must for this business. To
summarize the confidential business and technical data I gathered from my
interviews: now the business can staff a "digitalfactory" in its home country with
only about five employees trained in the operation of Al system design (as opposed
to 800 employees in a factory environment without optimum AI).
In summary, without Al, home-country manufacturing can be too high a cost
for a growing business. Therefore, it must go abroad to Third World manufacturing
sites where costs are lower, even if those places offer high political risks and no
consumer market potential.
Now, with Al, the business does not have to go abroad, unless going abroad is
where the highest profit and the most business advantages can be found: lowest
costs in total, highest savings for highest quality and quantity of production, which
ultimately lead to the lowest price to attract the largest consumer base.
So, optimum Al can stop the existing trend and pattern of bringing
manufacturing (and hence technology transfer plus management training) to the
Third World, unless the developing economies can offer multinationals other
competitive advantages like additional savings in distribution/transportation, and a
huge and eager national and/or regional consumer market.
Hence, this furniture manufacturer may still want go to Asia for
manufacturing, with the Al technology and only five employees, because of the
other competitive advantages that the developing economies of Asia may have to
offer. For example, with the availability of Al technology, the products can still be
inexpensively manufactured in Asia, to be sold cheaply into the huge consumer
markets of China and India, with additional savings in regional distribution,
delivery, and transportation.
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In this case study, in an optimum Al environment where the software has
replaced humans, the education and skill sophistication of the native workforce
will no longer matter. At optimum capacity, Al technology can result in mass
production of self-assembled furniture boxes at the simple pushing of a button, no
more no less than the instantaneous production of thousands and thousands of...
sausages!
What happens to the potential cheaper labor workforce of Asia in such an
optimum AI environment, then? In the new Al-assisted system design, human
labor can be reduced to the bottom level of the skill sophistication ladder - only
those trivial support tasks that require no to little training, technology transfer, or
higher wages are now performed by humans.
Al can literally eliminate the "middle level" of native labor where training
and technology transfer once typically occurred - those mid-level supervisors who
used to handle machineries and make the system run by exercising and
implementing human decisions. Now, Al will be doing their job. The foreign
investor (i.e., the multinational) can now limit knowledge of the AI system design
to the "privileged few" in the native population who can receive the knowledgebase crucial to Al - only those "privileged few" can afford and are given the
opportunity to join the information-based global society.
Thus, AI can
tremendously increase the gap between these few ruling elites and the massive
bottom-level workforce, bringing the scenario back to the 19 th century model of
production, despite the high-tech sophistication of the "digital factory" work
environment.
Now the danger has fully emerged: AI, in optimum form, can "ghetto" Third
World workers to that bottom level of wage-earning skills by eliminating their
upward mobility to the middle level. AI thus pushes the uneducated native
workforce to the lowest echelon - the ghetto, and creates a very small native ruling
class having access to information.
I believe this is the concern held by more and more experts including the
former chief economist of the World Bank and a Nobel price winner in economics.
Concerns for the lowest level of the global workforce living at poverty without
education thus necessitate a new system of global regulation for the informational
civilization - the information society must be regulated in order to balance out the
imbalance of access to information and education.
So, in such a vision, what good does it do for a Third World country to join
the WTO? Free trade will only enable such Third World country to keep on
exporting raw materials and agricultural products to feed the world, a world ruled
by the high-tech producers.
The "ghetto'ed" Third World will be doomed to the task of supplying cheap
raw material products for the rest of the world - while becoming consumers of
high-tech products, totally dependent on the technological innovation of the
superpowers. The pattern that we have seen and will be seeing is something like
this: the developing nations sell raw material; the industrialized nations sell high
tech. The industrialized nations control, and the developing nations are controlled.
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Al can perpetuate this imbalance.
As I will point out before ending, there is no easy or immediate solution. In a
world still divided by national laws and physical borders, legal solutions are
especially slow-coming.
Therefore, it's about time that the developing nations realize their dilemma
and immediately devise very wise policies (such as the experience of South Korea
and Taiwan, in some analysts' views). One primary policy should be to invest
immediately in the education of the workforce and to give them the "gray matter"
- the added value needed in any "exchange" or negotiation with the multinationals
and superpower governments.
The solution thus lies in structural changes to the political and economic
system of the Third World countries, something that can be brought about only by
the ruling elites. If these governments invest in the education and freedom of
information for their people - the entire workforce and not just the "privileged
few," the Third World may come out ahead in the global informational society. If
not, that bright future for an AI civilization that should better serve all humans can
just be more of a doomed fate for the poor and uneducated Third World worker.
This is not just a Third World issue. This gloomy picture of ghettoing certain
segments of the population can also occur in the developed nations: certain labor
segments of the developed economies such as women, disadvantaged minorities,
and undocumented aliens can also be denied full opportunities or access to valueadded information.
V. Now, A REALITY CHECK
Recent and current business and corporate behaviors already show signs that
The following examples, based on the
lend support to my hypothesis.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data, and the
experiences of Vietnam and France, demonstrate the point.
First, the transformation of our modem society into the New Economy is
evident. OECD statistics released in 2000 showed that as of 1999 (just before the
current millennium), private investment in equipment and software in the
Information and Communications Technology sector (ICT) totaled approximately
900 billion dollars. Since 1990, approximately one-fourth of corporate investments
have been devoted to the production or purchasing of knowledge. Yet, there has
also been a recent drop in global FDI, signifying changes in FDI patterns that
appropriately call for closer scrutiny of global production chains. Meanwhile, data
of past decades show that where possible, transnational corporations have always
resisted technology transfer to the Third World, even if the transfer was in the form
of intra-firm transactions. Multinationals were attracted to the building of Research
& Development (R&D) facilities in the developing nations only in exceptional
cases where adequate infrastructure and high-quality local personnel existed. The
bulk of R&D facilities has always remained within the industrialized countries.
Overall, although world trade has soared, the expansion has remained unevenly
distributed, and the "Least Developed Countries" (LDCs) have sustained a
proportional decline in their share of global markets, despite free trade. One can
reasonably conclude that strong pressures exist to privatize scientific knowledge
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and technology, but only within the investors' borders or within the developed
world.
Second, there has been a dire need and willingness for multinationals to
absorb foreign Information Technology (IT) workers (from the developing
economies such as China and India) to serve corporate demand for technology
invention and production. Statistics show that multinational firms have gone
overseas to acquire and exploit labor skills for the IT market. The largest net loss
of engineers appeared to be in non-OECD countries, and both India and Israel have
been home to software development centers for Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, and
Microsoft. At the same time, again, for cost savings, transnational businesses have
also outsourced routine technology-related work, or menial, repetitive service tasks
supporting computerized operations to the developing nations.
Third, FDI flow from the developed nations may no longer just reflect the
type of human labor considerations that render the Third World attractive. A
substantial portion of outbound FDI has been poured into the wealthy developed
nations, where labor is much more expensive. FDI statistics show that today,
perhaps big businesses may not be as motivated to take their FDI to the developing
nations as they tended to do decades ago. For example, FDI into OECD countries
in 2006 reached its highest level since 2000, led by the U.S. and followed by
France. The OECD report on Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct
Investment forecasts inflow of FDI to its 30 member countries to increase by 20%
in 2007. This suggests that perhaps the reversal of FDI pattern envisioned in my
paper may already have happened.
Let's look at FDI in France as another example. Recent statistics shows that
as of 2006, on France's stock market index CAC40 (the French equivalent of Dow
Jones), aggregately 46.2% of French corporate ownership is non-resident.
Similarly, in order to service all of Europe, Toyota has recently set up
manufacturing in France (rather than the choice of the developing Eastern Europe).
These facts indicate that major investors from the developed nations are no longer
deterred by (i) the high costs of living and doing business in France, or (ii) other
complex workforce or labor issues unique to France (e.g., the history of France's
organized yet turmoiled union system, plus the extraordinary high tax paid by
It follows, therefore, that big
workers to fund France's social benefits).
businesses' decisions to invest in France must have been prompted by
considerations other than costs of labor or costs of doing business in a foreign
country. The considerations may include the attractiveness of doing business in
France: excellent infrastructure, high productivity and skill levels of researchers,
technocrats and management personnel (i.e., the kind of workers least likely to be
pushed down into the ghetto in the AI revolution), and, last but not least, excellent
quality of life - in France, workers enjoy a 35-hour work week, five weeks'
annual vacation, hefty government-secured social benefits, trendy, first-class
cultural lifestyle, healthy sports such as bicycling and soccer, gourmet food,
beautiful sceneries, and easy access to the cultural centers and world-class tourist
attractions and resorts of Europe.
Take another example: the apparel fashion industry in France. What happens
there may also confirm the beginning of FDI trend reversal. This type of industry,
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for which France is world-famous, is known to have applied Al effectively to the
manufacturing side of the business, thereby freeing the human brain for more
aesthetic design innovation. A look at this industry suggests that not all French
producers have been too keen on shifting manufacturing to the Third World. One
plausible explanation is the possibility that advanced technology (such as AI) has
kept costs sufficiently down for French producers to retain production (and the
accompanying know-hows) within their home country.
Fourth, nowadays, technology exporters also look at other advantages offered
by the host country such as the local and regional potential consumer market. The
example of Intel Corp.'s 2005 plan to invest in an assembly plant in Asia for its
personal computer manufacturing demonstrates this trend in corporate thinking.
The semiconductor giant went to South and Southeast Asia for cost savings.
Vietnam was considered because of its demonstrated consumer potential - Internet
usage has soared in the communist country, which has emerged as the fastest
growing personal computer market of all ASEAN nations.
Fifth, the case of FDI into Vietnam may also demonstrate the emerging
changing pattern in FDI. Complex, multi-layered FDI considerations no longer
depend solely on the cost of labor or initial capital outlay or overhead. For
example, both Intel and Proctor-Gamble considered manufacturing in Vietnam.
Yet, Intel went ahead with the plan, while Proctor-Gamble reportedly suffered
from large losses and abandoned the project. Apparently, the cheaper labor and
low cost of doing business in Vietnam do not provide sufficient incentives for
Proctor Gamble to further its investment plan there. In contrast, Intel's decision to
establish manufacturing in Vietnam could result from, inter alia, (i) Intel's
assessment of Vietnam as the potential consumer market for personal computers;
and (ii) the success that Intel has had with the hiring of Vietnamese IT personnel an indication of the "gray matter" potential of Vietnam, at cheaper costs.
Obviously, the local "gray matter" potential is more essential to Intel's technology
business, compared to Proctor-Gamble.
Last, the case of China will also offer evidence that supports the hypothesis
expounded in my paper. For example, experts describe technology trades to and
from China as "triangular" - parts for electrical devices produced by Japan and
other newly industrialized Asian nations are exported to China (as well as other
ASEAN countries) for assembly, and then the finished products are exported to
Europe and North America, among which are intra-firm re-exports. Thus, China
(as well as other ASEAN countries with cheap labor as their comparative
advantage) has been a huge assembly hub and production site for low-tech goods.
This triangle has been an important channel for technology transfer, and has
accounted for China's claim of rapid improvement of the high-tech content of its
foreign trade. Yet, according to World Bank studies, the technology upgrades of
China (and other ASEAN countries) remain circumscribed to the production and
export network of foreign firms and, therefore, dependent on the multinationals'
foreign affiliates. This presents an impediment to the widespread dissemination of
technological know-hows, although these high-tech imports have been used in
substitute for local R&D commitments.
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These signs show that the developed nations' technology producers will
continue to look at the developing world for cost-savings, and for skilled or
unskilled labor supply either via (i) outsourcing or shifting menial production, lowtech production, hardware assembly, or trivial service tasks to the developing
nations, and/or (ii) importing migrant technology workers or foreign "gray matter"
to the developed countries and purchase this "brain migration" at much lower
costs. At the same time, technology producers will always be looking at the
developing world as potential consumer markets.
The futuristic optimum
application of Al will broaden and lend more meaningful nuances to investors'
FDI choices, but those same AI-driven choices may ultimately hurt the native
workforce and jeopardize the national interest of the developing host countries.
VI.

SUMMARY AND SOLUTIONS

My paper points out the need for systematic, coordinated transnational
regulation. The paper argues for global regulation in all relevant areas of the law.
To enable global regulatory solutions, nations must develop a global mechanism
that consists of transnational bodies with real enforcement powers to perform the
following tasks:
1) Global labor law and policies must be developed, beyond the current
schemes offered by the WTO, ILO, and/or NAFTA frameworks.
2)

Global intellectual property law and policies must be reviewed,
developed, and integrated, beyond the current regime of TRIPS.
3) Global anti-trust laws and policies must also be developed.
4)

Global technology licensing laws, policies, and formalized norms are
critically needed.

5) Concepts of sovereignty and national laws' extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdictional power must also be reassessed toward
universalization, with regional and world peace and antiterrorism
measures as shared goals.
6) Likewise, national laws and policies on technology export control,
immigration, and communication must also be reassessed.
The review, development, and reassessment in the areas of law identified
above must be done with a view to prevent and equalize the knowledge gap and
the new division of labor envisioned in my paper.
To explore the future of global regulation, the paper presents a bird's eye
view and performs a cursory evaluation of the current legal system in those same
relevant areas of law (intellectual property, antitrust, labor, licensing and
technology transfer, and intemet/digital communication). The paper demonstrates
that historically, the universalization of law in these areas has not completely been
successful, and that law has always lagged behind economic events and other
societal changes. Law becomes the confirmation and documentation of changes,
rather than the initiation of changes, which typically rests with political and social
movements that precede law. The drawbacks of the current legal system,
therefore, lie in the clear fact that efforts at forming global technology transfer
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codes have failed. The paper concludes that the existing bedrock of sovereign
powers has immobilized or slowed down the prospect of successful integrated
global regulation.
Rather than mapping out detailed legal solutions in a utopian manner, the
paper chooses instead a "design notes" approach. It suggests a general policy
framework for any future integrated transnational regulatory scheme. For
example, the paper argues that certain fundamental economic concepts underlying
the New Economy should be transported into law, and proposes a new definition
for "Knowledge" to be used as a law- and policy-making framework in the New
Economy. The paper argues that global regulation should aim at Knowledge as a
new production factor under the philosophy of Sustainable Development (as that
concept is extended to international law and global economic development, rather
than remaining purely as an environmental law concept). The new definition of
Knowledge can necessitate a broad, systematic, and drastic change to the current
legal system of patentability or copyright protection for intellectual property.
Because the global legal project has not been realized and law is generally
behind political and economic realities, the practical and more immediate
solutions, therefore, must be sought in the domain of education and politics. This
means that Third World governments must devise and implement fast-tracked
policies that help their workforce become technologically independent. Yet, for
these policies to take place, there must be structural changes and political reforms
in many countries of the Third World.
This final point can be viewed as a bold statement for the 21" t century: the
only real solution that can effectively protect the global workforce must lie in a
revolutionary framework that can somehow transcend, or even abolish, the existing
sovereign structure in order to achieve universal, transnational democracy.

THE DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
KEVIN C. KENNEDY*

For the past seven years the international trade community's attention has
been fixed on the issue of agricultural subsidies, both at the on-going Doha Round
negotiations and in recent World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement
proceedings. But the issue of agricultural subsidies is not strictly speaking just a
trade issue. Reform of agricultural subsidies in developed countries embraces the
broader issue of economic development in developing countries and a
humanitarian concern for the poorest countries in the world, especially those in
sub-Saharan Africa.
I would like to discuss the specific issue of cotton subsidies. What is the
likelihood of a commodity-specific agreement on cotton and cotton subsidies as
part of the Doha Round negotiations? If the Doha Round fails, will litigation
replace negotiation as the default mechanism for reforming farm subsidies? My
short answer to the first question is that a commodity-specific agreement on cotton
is out of the question unless WTO reforms are achieved within the agricultural
sector as a whole. My short answer to the second question is that in the absence of
such WTO reforms, WTO dispute settlement proceedings could end up replacing
negotiation as the mechanism for reforming government subsidies to the farm
sector.
Let me begin by briefly reviewing the critical role that agriculture, in
particular cotton production, plays in the economies of a large group of leastdeveloped countries located in sub-Saharan Africa. Thirty-four of the world's fifty
poorest countries, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), are located in subSaharan Africa.' Farming plays a leading role in the work force and the overall
economies of LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with the balance primarily in the
extractive industries of mining and oil.2 With the exceptions of Cape Verde and
Lesotho, agriculture employs at a minimum more than 50 percent of the total labor
. Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Professor Kennedy can be
contacted at
kennel 1 @law.msu.edu.
1. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
LIST OF LDCs, LLDCs AND SIDS BY REGIONS, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ohrlls/allcountries-

regions.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
2. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOCSOC], Overcoming Poverty Through Productive
Employment and Decent Work for Income Generation in Least Developed Countries, 2, (July 3, 2007),
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LDC%20Documents/ECOSOC2007/ECOSOC%202007ILO%20paper.pdf.
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force in all SSA LDCs. 3 One of the most important crops grown in sub-Saharan
Africa is cotton. 4 As a percentage of total world merchandise trade, raw cotton's
share is miniscule (approximately one-tenth of one percent). Nevertheless, cotton
is one of the most important textile fibers in the world, accounting for over 40
percent of total world fiber production. 6 While some eighty countries produce
cotton, cotton production is concentrated in a handful of countries (see Table 1).
Table 1. World Cotton Production, 2001/02-2006/07 Marketing Years
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country

2001/02 2002/03

China
United

5,313
4,421

States

I_

003/04 2004/05

005/06 2006/07

(forecast)
,855
,975

2,308
1,698
847
1,002
1910

3,048
1,687
1,310
893
1893

6,314
5,062

5,704
5,201

5,987
4,507

II

k,355
2,286
1,197
1,110
904
7
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service

India
Pakistan
Brazil
Uzbekistan
Turkey

2,678
1,807
766
1,067
865

4,921
3,747

4,137
2,426
1,285
1,132
904

,137
2,145
1,023
1,241
773

The world's four largest producing and consuming countries are China, the
United States, India, and Pakistan, with the United States, China, and India
together providing over half the world's cotton. As Table 2 illustrates, the world's
largest importer is China, consuming 40 percent of the world's total production.

3. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 2004, The Least Developed Countries Report
2004: Linking International Trade with Poverty Reduction, 349, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2004
(2004).
4. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favourof Cotton, 2-3, TN/AG/GEN/4
at
available
2003),
16,
(May
http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/CottonSubmissionWTO.pdf.
5. See John Baffes, Cotton: Market Setting. Trade Policies, and Issues v (World Bank Policy
at
http://wwwPaper
3218
2004),
available
Research
Working
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/03/000009486-20040603091724/R
endered/PDF/wps3218cotton.pdf.
6. See id. at 29.
7. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV.,

U.S.

DEP'T AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE,

CIRCULAR SERIES, 7 tbl. 1 (June 2006), http://www. fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2006/07/table0l.pdf.
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Table 2. World Cotton Imports, 2001/02-2006/07 Marketing Years
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country

2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
(forecast)

China
Turkey
Indonesia
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Thailand
Russia

98
648
513
218
261
410
392

681
1,923
1,390 4,137
4,355
493
516
742
751
555
485
468
479
479
479
185
403
730
370
370
348
370
403
446
468
423
365
497
435
468
359
321
316
327
327
8
Service
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural

The world's largest exporter of cotton is the United States, which ranks
second to China in cotton production, accounting for 40 percent of global trade in
raw cotton (see Table 3). In fact, 70 percent of cotton grown in the United States is
for export.
Table 3. World Cotton Exports, 2001/02-2006/07 Marketing Years
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country

2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
-forecast)

United
States
Uzbekistan
Australia
Greece
Brazil
Burkina
Faso
India

2,395

2,591

2,995

3,137

3,658

3,658

762
681
218
147
142

740
578
250
106
158

675
470
267
210
207

860
436
255
339
212

1,045
675
294
446
294

991
610
316
327
305

13

12

152

144

544

827

Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service 9

Table 4 lists the ten largest producers of cotton in sub-Saharan Africa for
2003/04-2006/07. In the West and Central African (WCA) countries of Benin,
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo (the Cotton Four), cotton production accounts
8. Id.
9. Id.
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for up to 10 percent of gross domestic product. I° Over 90 percent of the cotton
produced in the WCA countries is for export."i Exports from these WCA countries
are dominated by cotton, which represents approximately 30 percent of total export
2
earnings and over 60 percent of earnings from agricultural exports. 1
Table 4. Cotton Production in Sub-Saharan Africa,
2003/04-2006/07 Marketing Years (Top 10 Producers)
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
(Forecast)
Burkina 210
200
218
294
Faso
Mali
1261
233
218
239
Zimbabwe 100
114
76
114
Benin
149
147
131
109
Cameroon 109
109
94
109
C6te
87
105
124
109
d'Ivoire
Sudan
76
87
93
87
Togo
71
72
69
50
Tanzania 51
71
103
65
3
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service '
Collectively, the WCA countries are the seventh largest global producer of
cotton after China, the United States, India, Pakistan, Brazil, and Uzbekistan. With
approximately a 15-percent share of global exports, the WCA countries
collectively are the second largest exporter after the United States. 14 Although
cotton plays only a minor role in the economic activities of industrialized
countries, it is of vital importance in many WCA countries. Over 10 million
people in the region - where people earn less than a dollar a day - depend directly
on cotton production, making it possible to improve the physical and social
infrastructure in cotton-producing regions, including roads, schools, and health
centers. 15 Cotton occupies a strategic position in the development policies and
poverty reduction programs of the WCA countries. Cotton accounts for 5-10

10. World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 1.
11. Id.
at 4
12. Id. at 1.
13. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE

CIRCULAR SERIES FC 07-04,
13-17 tbls. 5a & 6a (July 2004), available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2004/07/CottonWMT.pdf; FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T
AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE, CIRCULAR SERIES FC 06-06, 13-18 tbls. 5a & 6a
(June 2006), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2006/06/CottonWMT.pdf.
14. World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 2.
15. Idat 1-4.
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percent of GDP in Burkina Faso and Benin, but less than 0.1 percent in the United
States. 16

With at least a dozen countries around the world subsidizing their cotton
producers, including China and the United States which subsidize their cotton
growers up to 20 percent and 50 percent of world prices, respectively, world prices
7
for cotton have been suppressed due to overproduction. 1 In an attempt to correct
this situation, a joint proposal was submitted by the four West and Central African
nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali at the 2003 WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancin, Mdxico, requesting that all subsidies on cotton be
18
Their proposal, commonly known as the Cotton
eliminated immediately.
countries have undertaken internal market reforms
WCA
Initiative, contends that
cotton sectors more competitive globally, but that
respective
in order to make their
nullified by the subsidies given by other WTO
virtually
these reforms have been
members to cotton farmers.1 9 The Cotton Initiative proponents argue that if these
domestic and export subsidies were eliminated, "cotton production in WCA
act as an important catalyst for
countries would be highly profitable and could
' 20
poverty reduction in the countries concerned.

The joint proponents of the Cotton Initiative (popularly known as the "Cotton
Four") have called for a "'complete phase-out of support measures for the
production and export of cotton.", 2 1 Countries that subsidize their cotton growers
were expected to agree to a total elimination of domestic and export subsidies
"immediately" and independent of any other commitments from other WTO
members on other agricultural issues. 2 Until such time as cotton subsidies are
completely eliminated, the Cotton Initiative requests that cotton growers in LDCs
23
receive compensation offsetting income lost as a result of such subsidies.
In July 2004, a group of ninety developing countries championed the Cotton
Four's cause by insisting that cotton subsidies be dealt with as a stand-alone issue
24
and outside the agriculture negotiations. The G90's position was met with stiff
resistance from former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, who was
adamant that the issue of cotton subsidies be negotiated within the broader context

16. CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, THE AFRICAN COTTON INITIATIVE AND WTO AGRICULTURE
NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2004), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/04Jan/RS21712.pdf.
17. See World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 4;see INT'L COTTON ADVISORY COMM.,
PRODUCTION AND TRADE POLICIES AFFECTING THE COTTON INDUSTRY 1-3 (Sept. 2006), available at
http://www.icac.org/govt-measures/documents/govt measures06.pdf.
18. See World Trade Organization, supranote 4, at 2.
19. See id. at 3.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 2.
22. See id. at 6.
23. Id. at 7.
24. World Trade Organization, ACP Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Work Programme,
Communicationfrom Trinidadand Tobago, WT/L/578, at 6, (July 26, 2004) ("Cotton continues to be a
vital issue for ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] States and requires an urgent solution. In this
regard, the ACP States underscore that it should be treated as a stand-alone issue and not as a part of the
overall negotiations on agriculture.").
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of the agriculture negotiations. 25 The European Union and the WTO DirectorGeneral supported Zoellick's position.2 6 In the end, perhaps knowing that Brazil
would keep pressure on the United States on the issue of cotton subsidies, the G90
and the Cotton Four backed off from their demand that cotton be dealt with as a
stand-alone item.27
Following weeks of intense negotiations, preceded by months of stalemate,
the WTO General Council reached an eleventh-hour framework agreement on
agricultural negotiations in late July 2004 that included a compromise reached
between the United States and the Cotton Four. 8 The cotton provision of the WTO
General Council's August 2004 Doha work program provides that (1) cotton will
be addressed "ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically" as part of the Doha
Round agriculture negotiations; (2) a subcommittee on cotton will be created that
will meet periodically with the WTO Committee on Agriculture ensuring
"appropriate prioritization of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral
initiatives;" and (3) the WTO Director General is to work with international
organizations to direct additional resources towards development of economies
where cotton has vital importance.29
The Cotton Initiative languished thereafter for more than a year. At the
December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference language was included in the
Ministerial Declaration that reiterates that reform of trade-distorting cotton
subsidies is to go farther and faster than reforms on subsidies for other agricultural
commodities. 30 The Ministerial Declaration provides that:
o All forms of export subsidies for cotton be eliminated by developed
countries in 2006.
o On market access, developed countries give duty and quota free access for
cotton exports from least-developed countries (LDCs) from the
commencement of the implementation period.
o Trade distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production be reduced more
ambitiously than under whatever general formula is agreed and that it
25. Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep., Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the G-90 Trade
Ministers
Meeting
(July
12,
2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2004/July/Section-Index.html.
26. Danuta Huibner, E.U. Comm'r, Address at the G-90 Ministerial Meeting Plenary Opening
Session, 2 (July 12, 2004), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc1 18016.pdf, Supachai
Panitchpakdi, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Statement Distributed to G-90 Ministers (July 12, 2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news04 e/stat dgmauritiusjuly04_e.htm.
27. Trade Observatory, Africa Softens Stand on Cotton Subsidies (July 26, 2004),
http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/headlines.cfm?reflD=3685 1.
28. See Elizabeth Becker, Geneva Talks Move Towards Farm Pact, N. Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004, §
W.
29. World Trade Organization, Decision Adopted by the General Council 1 August 2004,
WT/L/579
at I
1(b),
Annex
A
at
4,
(Aug.
2,
2004),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda e/draft-textgc dg_3 july04_e.htm.
30. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18 December 2005,
at
at
3,
11
(Dec.
22,
2005),
available
WT/MIN(05)/DEC,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05_e/final-text-e.htm.
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should be implemented over a shorter period of time than generally
applicable.... 31
In connection with the third point, in an attempt to make concrete the phrase "more
ambitiously," the Cotton Four proposed a formula in March 2006 that called for
deeper subsidies cuts for cotton if reductions for other commodities are modest,
and a timetable for making such reductions that are one-third the time for
agriculture as a whole.32 Their proposal received a warm reception from China and
the EU, but the United States was more reserved in its response.33 In July 2007 the
chairman of the WTO committee responsible for agriculture negotiations,
Crawford Falconer, issued a draft paper that contained the following provisions on
cotton subsidies:
*

Cut amber box support for cotton - the most trade-distorting of all
domestic subsidies -- by 82.2%.
* Cut blue box support for cotton to a level that is one-third that for other
crops (blue box subsidies are production-limiting subsidies).
• Reduce trade-distorting domestic support on cotton over a period that is
one third of the implementation period for other crops.
* Eliminate export subsidies on cotton by the start of the implementation
period (as opposed to 2013 for export subsidies on other agricultural
commodities that are provided by developed countries).34
Whether the WCA cotton producers actually will receive special
consideration in the Doha Round agriculture negotiations remains doubtful.
Predictably, the U.S.-based National Cotton Council and some members of
Congress are opposed to any special agreement in the WTO that singles out cotton
and cotton subsidies.
What impact have agricultural subsidies had on cotton growers in subSaharan Africa? That question was indirectly answered in the 2004 WTO dispute
settlement proceeding brought by Brazil against the United States. Brazil was
ultimately successful in proving that U.S. domestic subsidies to cotton producers
have a price suppressing effect on world prices for cotton, thus causing serious
prejudice to Brazil in world cotton markets.35 In a similar vein, SSA cotton

31. Id.
32. See Sub-Committee on Cotton, Communication from the Co-Sponsors of the Sectoral
Initiativein Favor of Cotton, TN/AG/SCC/GEN/4, at 2, 4 (Mar. 1, 2006); see also Press Release, WTO
Cotton Sub-Committee, Members Mull New Details in "Cotton Four" Proposal (Mar. 2, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news06 e/cotton 2march06_e.htm.
33. See Press Release, WTO Cotton Sub-Committee, Members Mull New Details in "Cotton
Four" Proposal (Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news06 e/cotton 2march06 e.htm.
34. See WTO Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities for
Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4, at 9, 24 (Aug. 1, 2007).
35. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
763,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Upland Cotton]. In its 2008 report on the whether the
United States had complied with the Appellate Body's 2005 report, the Appellate Body once again
confirmed that U.S. cotton subsidies violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008).

VOL. 36:3/4

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

growers maintain that they have to contend with artificially low prices for cotton
on world markets as a result of being forced to compete with subsidized cotton in
those markets.36 Let me briefly summarize the argument that subsidies suppress
the price of cotton in third-country and world markets.
At least a dozen countries provide direct support to cotton production: the
United States, China, India, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Uzbekistan,
Colombia, Benin, and Egypt. 37 Subsidies that are tied to the price of a commodity
encourage production, which in turn encourage overproduction even when market
forces are signaling that production should be decreased. By encouraging
overproduction, these subsidies prevent the price of cotton on world markets from
naturally rising as they would in a market of steady demand and declining supplies.
In a report published in April 2007, the Congressional Research Service estimated
that subsidies to U.S. cotton growers over the ten-year period 1996-2005 averaged
$2.47 billion annually.38 In 2003/04 the amount of support was over $5 billion.39
The adjusted world price for cotton in 2004 was nearly $.56 per pound, the highest
it has been in seven seasons. 40 In 2006/07, the average international price for
cotton rose to $.60 per pound. 41 But these prices are still down from their 19941995 high of over $.76 per pound.42
Although the United States Trade Representative's office and U.S. cotton
farmers contend that the most important determinant of world cotton prices is
Chinese production and Chinese import levels, various studies conclude that world
cotton prices are also affected by U.S. subsidies.43 An agriculture economist with

36. See Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Brazil: WTO Cotton Victory Against U.S.
Reaffirmed,

BRIDGES:

WEEKLY

TRADE

NEWS

DIGEST,

Mar.

9,

2005,

available at

http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-09/storyl .htm; see also World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at
2.
37. See INT'L COTTON ADVISORY COMM., supra note 17, at 1-3; see also JOHN BAFFES ET. AL.,
COTTON: MARKET STRUCTURE, POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 2-3, 6, 7 (2004),

http://www.worldbank.org/prospects (follow "Resources: Cotton" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 19,
2008).
38. RANDY SCHNEPF & JASPER WOMACH, POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. FARM SUBSIDIES IN

THE WTO 24 (2007), availableat http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33697.pdf
39. Id. at 28.
40. See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE,

at:
24
tbl.
8
(Feb.
2008),
available
CIRCULAR
SERIES
FOP
08-02,
see also Kevin C. Kennedy,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2008/February/cotton0208.pdf,
The Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade and Development Policy for Sub-SaharanAfrica: Sowing the
Seeds of False Hopefor Sub-SaharanAfrica's Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 307, 315
(2005).
41. See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., supra note 40, at 24 tbl. 8. See also Karen Halverson Cross, King
Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'PeaceClause': The WTO's U.S. Cotton Subsidies Decision, 9 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 149, 183 n. 206 (2006) (explaining the WTO Appellate Body's decision to uphold the

finding that the Cotlook Index-A reflected the world market price for cotton).
42. See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., supranote 40, at 24 tbl. 8.
43. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., DISPELLING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SUPPORT TO COTTON
(2004),
3-4
FARMERS

; see
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2004/asset-upload-file784-6153.pdf
also Ron Smith, The China Syndrome Dictates U.S. Cotton Prices, Sw. FARM PRESS, Nov. 19, 2004,
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the University of California concludes that the elimination of U.S. cotton subsidies
44
would increase world prices by about 10 percent. Other studies have shown an
impact as high as 30 percent, while others, including one by the International
45
Monetary Fund, find an impact of 2-3 percent. A number of factors affect these
findings, including the base year used for counting U.S. payments, which are often
linked to prices and rise when prices fall, and to production in other countries.
While findings range from a 30-percent impact to a 2-percent impact, the real
impact is probably somewhere in between.
Putting to one side the question of what impact subsidies have on the world
price of cotton, from the standpoint of comparative advantage, should either subSaharan Africa or the United States be growing cotton? By international
standards, the WCA countries produce high-quality cotton with production costs
among the lowest in the world, clearly lower than those of the United States and
the European Union. According to a 2002 World Bank working paper, cotton is
"an economically viable crop" in West and Central Africa "that has had a
significant and positive impact on exports, economic growth, and rural
development., 46 The region produces high-quality cotton and high average crop
yields by international standards, and does so using farming techniques that are
labor intensive (in contrast to mechanized cotton farming in the United States) and
on small, one-to-three acre farms. 47 U.S. cotton growers, on the other hand, are not
low-cost producers of cotton. On the contrary, statistics from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture estimate that the average cost of producing a pound of raw cotton in
the United States is $.73 per pound, compared to an average cost of production in
Burkina Faso of $.21 per pound. 48 According to the Congressional Research
49
Service, 37 percent of U.S. cotton growers' total costs are covered by subsidies.
In other words, U.S. cotton farmers' revenue covers only 63 percent of their total
costs. As noted by the Congressional Research Service, "These comparisons

http://southwestfarnpress.com/news/041119-china-cotton-prices/
44. Daniel A. Sumner, A Quantitative Simulation Analysis of the Impacts of U.S. Cotton
Subsidies on Cotton Prices and Quantities, 1 (reproduced in Brazil's Further Submission of Sept. 9,
at
available
1),
Annex
2003,
http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/ministerio/sitios-secretaria/cgc/analisequantitativa.pdf.
45. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Afr., Economic Report on Africa 2004: Unlocking Africa's Trade
at
available
(2004),
E.04.II.K.12
Sales
No.
34,
U.N.
at
Potential
http://www.uneca.org/era2004/chapl.pdf; Stephen Tokarick, Trade Issues in the Doha Round:
Dispelling Some Misconceptions, IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/06/4, at 15 (2006), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/pdp/2006/pdp04.pdf.
46. Ousmane Badiane, Dhaneshwar Ghura, Louis Goreux, & Paul Masson, Cotton Sector
Strategiesin West ond CentralAfrica 9 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2867, 2002),
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=636229.
47. Id.; see also Gdrald Estur, Int'l Cotton Advisory Comm., Speech Presented to the Beltwide
Cotton Economics and Marketing Conference: Is West African Cotton Competitive with the U.S. on the
2005),
7,
4
(Jan.
1-2,
at
Market?,
Cotton
World
http://www.icac.org/cotton-info/speeches/estur/2005/beltwide 05.pdf.
48. KEVIN WATKINS, CULTIVATING POVERTY: THE IMPACT OF US COTTON SUBSIDIES ON AFRICA

1l(Oxfam Briefing Paper 30, 2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/ag/resources/Oxfaml.pdf
49. SCHNEPF & WOMACH, supra note 38, at 26.
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suggest that it is only with the aid of subsidies that a substantial portion of U.S.
[cotton] production is made economically sustainable. 5 °
Sub-Saharan Africa faces many complex problems, and complex problems
generally call for complex solutions. However, in the case of cotton, the answer to
the question of how to help the region's cotton producers seems to call for an
economically simple solution, but unfortunately one that is politically difficult:
eliminate government subsidies to cotton producers and create an interim
mechanism to compensate SSA cotton producers for lost income until all
government subsidies to cotton producers are phased out. A recent World Bank
working paper supports the view that subsidies reform in developed countries
would be beneficial to West African cotton producers. 5'
What are the prospects for subsidies reform by the world's major cotton
producers? The U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Agriculture Secretary stated in
2005 that if a Doha Round agreement on agriculture is not concluded, then it
would be very difficult to address the African demands on cotton.52 The complete
elimination of both domestic and export subsidies seems unlikely, although WTO
members have pledged to eliminate export subsidies on all agricultural products by
"by a credible end date," which is probably 2013. 53 Because export subsidies are
deemed to be per se trade distorting, they have been prohibited on all nonagricultural trade since 1995.54 Extending this prohibition to agricultural trade has
been agreed to in principle; the next step is to agree on a phase-out period.
With regard to the thornier issue of domestic subsidies, perhaps the best nearterm solution for WCA cotton producers is for subsidizing nations to move to a
system of fully decoupled support (that is, support that is not tied to production in
any respect) rather than price support.55 In order for decoupled support to work in
a less market distorting way than it currently does, such support must have the
following features.
First, to ensure that production is not encouraged, decoupled support has to be
the only form of farm support. The 2008 farm bill that was enacted over President
Bush's veto moves in that direction, but only slightly.56 Likewise, the condition
that land stay in agriculture as a condition for receipt of decoupled support should
be eliminated because it only serves to encourage production. The amber box and
blue box categories of farm support that are tied either to price or production, as

50. Id. at 25.
51. See Kym Anderson & Ernesto Valenzuela, The World Trade Organization'sDoha Cotton
Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues 7, 17-18 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3918, 2006),
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=917489.
52. See Bruce Odessey, U.S. Waits for Substantial Agriculture Offers from Others at WTO, U.S.
DEP'T OF ST., Oct. 11, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2005/Oct/l 1-41521 1.html.
53. World Trade Organization, supra note 29, at 17.
54. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 3.1-3.2, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter SCM].
55. See Baffes, supra note 5, at 32.
56. See Food, Energy, and Conservation Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (2008).
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well as exempted de minimis subsidies of up to 5 percent of a country's total
agricultural production, must be eliminated. Second, just as import quotas on
textile and clothing were gradually phased out over a ten-year period under the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, so too all export subsidies and domestic
57
subsidies in the form of decoupled support should be progressively phased out.
Turning to internal reforms within sub-Saharan Africa, room exists for greater
market reforms within WCA cotton-producing countries. 58 In addition, only 10
percent of African trade is with other African nations, leaving a fragmented market
that cannot achieve economies of scale, making the region less attractive as a
destination for foreign investment. 59 Underscoring this point, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) observes that "the full
potential of intra-African trade has yet to be fully exploited through greater
coordination of efforts aimed at harmonizing customs procedures and reducing
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and at improving transport and communications links
through greater investment in developing regional infrastructure." 60 For this
reason, it has been suggested that the key to sub-Saharan Africa becoming a
significant player in the global economy is for SSA countries to form a regional
trading bloc. 61 However, the record of existing SSA free trade areas and customs
unions in integrating the economies of their member states is at best mixed. Based
on the region's choppy experience with free trade areas and customs unions, I find
the suggestion to create a pan-SSA trading bloc, whether in the form of a free trade
area or a customs union, to be extremely problematic.
UNCTAD has also suggested that phasing out agricultural support should
with increased international financial and technical assistance to
agriculture in the LDCs to promote agricultural productivity growth and
commercialization.6 2 In 2001 government payments to farmers in Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries were actually seven
times the level of total official development assistance (ODA) to the LDCs. 63 In
2001, net flows of ODA to LDCs would have doubled if just 14 percent of the
2001 value of government payments to OECD agricultural producers had been
redirected in aid to the LDCs. 64 There is thus an opportunity for major poverty
coincide

57. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (terminated Jan. 1, 2005).
58. See Ben Shepherd & Claire Delpeuch, Subsidies and Regulatory Reform in West African
Cotton: What Are the Development Stakes? (Groupe d'Economie Mondiale, MPRA Paper No. 2289,
2007), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-meunchen.de/2289/.
59. See Gumisai Mutume, How to Boost Trade within Africa: Lower Barriers and Diversify
Production, 16 AFRICA RECOVERY 20 (2002).
60. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 2003, Economic Development in Africa:
Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence 54, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2003/1
(2003).
61. See id. at 53-54.
62. See id. at 55-60.
63. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, The Least Developed Countries Report
2004: Improving the Trade-Poverty Relationship through the InternationalTrade Regime, 229, U.N.
Doc UNCTAD/LDC/2004 (2004).
64. Id.
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reduction benefits not only through phasing out agricultural support but also by
increasing international assistance to promote agricultural development in the
LDCs. With regard to UNCTAD's suggestion of providing aid to SSA cotton
producers during the transition period, it is time for the European Union and the
United States to agree to a coordinated, collaborative trade and development
program for sub-Saharan Africa. As the region's first and second largest trading
partners, accounting for nearly 60 percent of all trade with the region, the
European Union and the United States are perfectly placed to influence the
economic course of sub-Saharan Africa through a coordinated trade, aid, and
development program for the region. It is time to join forces for the good of the
world's poorest nations.
Considering the heavy dependency of sub-Saharan Africa on agriculture, U.S.
agricultural policy appears to be unintentionally punishing SSA cotton growers and
working at cross purposes with the U.S. trade preference and development
program for the region, the African Growth and Opportunity Act. SSA cotton
producers, who are internationally competitive, are hobbled when it comes to fully
competing in international markets largely due to a single, but formidable,
exogenous factor: a subsidies-distorted international market for cotton. Elimination
of cotton subsidies in China, the European Union, and the United States especially in China and the United States, the world's two largest producers, and,
in the case of the United States, the world's top exporter with a 40-percent share of
total world exports - would lead to a reallocation of production to lower cost
producers, including those in West and Central Africa. The latter in turn would
experience increased income and a reduction in poverty in what is the poorest
region of the world. At the same time, however, internal reforms within the SSA
cotton sector need to be vigorously pursued, including reform of inefficient
monopsonies within the region and greater vertical integration of cotton
production. In addition, if the region is to be weaned from its overdependence on
agriculture, then sending signals in the form of increased prices to current cotton
farmers to stay in cotton production, and to potential cotton farmers to grow
cotton, has to be anticipated and planned for.
With the Doha Round negotiations on reducing agricultural subsidies and
improving market access deadlocked, which in turn has led to stalemate in the
overall negotiations, the hurdle of eliminating cotton subsidies is clearly
insurmountable in the absence of forward movement on agriculture negotiations as
a whole. The 2002 U.S. Farm Act has been replaced with the 2008 Farm Bill that
essentially maintains the status quo. The same subsidy programs for U.S. farmers
that were part of the 2002 Farm Bill are continued at approximately the same rates
of payment. 65 Even ifthe Doha Round negotiations can be revived soon, it might
be impossible to achieve meaningful reform of agricultural subsidies.
In the meantime, as Brazil has successfully defended its 2005 victory at the
WTO in the 2008 Appellate Body report in the Upland Cotton case,66 African
65. See Food, Energy, and Conservation Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (2008).
66. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008). See also RANDY SCHNEPF, BRAZIL'S
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countries are themselves threatening to bring a WTO complaint unless meaningful
progress is achieved soon on the Cotton Initiative. 67 With the expiration of the
"peace clause" in the Agreement on Agriculture in 2003, 68 other U.S. crops
besides cotton might also be vulnerable to litigation, not only at the WTO, but also
from domestic producers in countries that import U.S. agricultural commodities
who could file countervailing duty petitions with their national investigating
authorities. Earlier this year, Canada filed a WTO complaint against the United
States challenging U.S. subsidies to corn producers. 69 I don't want to leave you
with the false impression that the United States is a subsidies sinner in a world of
free-market saints. On the contrary, the world's largest subsidizer is the EU,
followed by the United States, with Japan a distant third.70 However, when stated
as a percentage of total agricultural production, all three provide subsidies that
amount to roughly 37 percent of the total value of their respective agricultural
production. 71 Having said that, as Table 5 shows, U.S. subsidies on corn, soybeans,
sorghum, and wheat are huge.
Table 5. U.S. Commodity-Specific Program Support and Insurance, Subsidy
Payments, Yearly Average, FY1996-2005
Av.Subsidy Payments
Commodity
Rice
Upland Cotton
Sorghum
'Wheat
Ba.ley
Corn
Oats
Sunflower Seed
Canola

CCC'

Total

Subsidy Paymnxt
Period
Period
Mm
Max
Millions
450
1,786
736
6,522
188
991
1 374
5,418
86
414
1.120
10,149
9
64
0
178
0
60

Cash Receipts
Subsidy
Total
Share of
Value Total Value

9
247
63
288
18
88
4
29
10

$
990
2,458
439
2,312
190
4-478
23
76
27

5

1

6

0

21

49

5
73
1,362

1
31
120

6
104
1,481

0
0
0

36
332
3,520

49
909
14,772

981
2.221
376
2,024
171
4,390
19
47
18

Flaxseec
Dry Peas
Peanuts
Soybeans

Crop
Ins_4

1.379
4229
984
6,798
636
18.024
93
368
137

72%
58%
451%
34%
30%
25%
25.
21%
20-i

1391.
12%
11%
IM.

72
Source: Congressional Research Service
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18-20

(2007),

available

at

http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07OctRL32571 .pdf.
67. See id. at 20-22.
68. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A,art. 1(f), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
69. Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support
for Corn and Other AgriculturalProducts,WT/DS357/1 (Jan. 11, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Subsidies and
Other Domestic Support].
70. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICIES THAT
DISTORT WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE: PREVALENCE AND MAGNITUDE ix (2005), available at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6614/08-22-Doha.pdf.
71. Id. at xi.
72. SCHNEPF & WOMACH, supra note 37, at 23.
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These commodities also receive domestic subsidies under the same statutory
programs that the WTO Appellate Body found to be WTO-inconsistent in Upland
Cotton. 73 And as shown in Table 6, the United States has substantial world market
shares of corn, soybeans, sorghum, and wheat.
Table 6. U.S. Share of World Production and Trade for Selected Commodities, Yearly
Average, 2002-2005
Commodity
Corn

Farm

Farm

US. Exports:

Cash

Value

Shaze of U.S.

Receipts of Exports
$ Million
19,587
3.468

Production
Percent
18%

U.S. Share of

World

World

Production Exports
Percent
40%
61%

Soybeans

16,631

5,791

35%

38"/

44%

Wheat
Cotton
Rice
Sorghum
Peanuts

6,807
5,204
1,216
869
761

3,398
3,644
638
412
92

50%
70%
52%
47%
12%

9%
200/o
2%
18%
6%

25%
40%
13%
83%
11%

Source: Congressional Research Service
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Query whether those world market shares have been at the expense of
producers in other WTO member countries? Brazil demonstrated in Upland Cotton
that establishing a WTO violation is not an insurmountable obstacle in a WTO
dispute settlement proceeding. 75 Canada will press similar arguments in its recent
WTO complaint brought against U.S. subsidies to corn growers. 76 In short, U.S.
subsidies programs for agricultural commodities are vulnerable to legal challenge
at the WTO and possibly in countervailing duties actions brought by domestic
producers in other WTO member countries. With the collapse of the Doha Round
looming, litigation may unfortunately replace negotiation as the default mechanism
for forcing reforms.

73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 9-32; see Upland Cotton, supra note 35.
See SCHNEPF & WOMACH, supranote 38, at 31.
Upland Cotton, supranote 35.
See U.S. Subsidies and OtherDomestic Support, supranote 69.

FREE TRADE VERSUS FAIR TRADE
JOHN STENCEL*

I. INTRODUCTION

Time and time again American farmers have been told the key to economic
freedom and prosperity is the export market. Since the mid-1980's, agribusiness,
politicians, commodity groups, processors and some farm groups have been
successful in tying agriculture's current and future prosperity to the export market.
Along with glowing forecasts of a sustained export-driven prosperity for
agriculture, the United States adopted the free market philosophy for agriculture.
Exports are important to agriculture. However, farmers and ranchers are only
being told part of the trade story. National Farmers Union policy (compiled and
voted on by grassroots producers)' says that the World Trade Organization
framework will perpetuate a never ending race to the bottom in producer
commodity prices, pitting farmer against farmer and country against country for
the one commodity all humans must have: food.2
II. Is THE

FARMERS UNION OPPOSED TO FREE TRADE?

Farmers Union has always been a proponent of fair trade. As trade
agreements have been negotiated, and as federal farm policy has shifted to the
"free market" approach, Farmers Union has remained steadfast in its call for
fairness, accountability, and benchmarks for success in trade negotiations.
Farmers Union policy implies they support free trade, as long as it is fair trade.3
National Farmers Union supports a fair trade system that protects the
economic well-being, health and environmental concerns, working conditions and
4
labor rights of our country's producers as well as producers in all other countries.
In the race to become the world's least-cost producer, individual farmers and
ranchers are left to fend for themselves in global markets, while the processors and
consumers enjoy the benefits of cheap commodities.
*Past President of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. With deep gratitude to Dr. Daryll E. Ray,
Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, The University of Tennessee, and Dale Enerson, Agriculture
Economist, North Dakota Farmers Union, for their many contributions.
1. NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, 2007 POLICY OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 8 (March 2-5,

2007), http://www.nfu.org/wp-content/2007_nfupolicy.pdf.
2. National Farmers Union, Farmers Union Says WTO Negotiations Bound to Fail,NATIONAL
FARMERS UNION NEWSROOM, July 24, 2006, available at http://nfu.org/news/2006/07/24/farmersunion-says-wto-negotiations-bound-to-fail.html.
3. NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, supra note 1, at 41.
4. Id, at 115.
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After the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in
2003, 5 the United States' trade negotiators have instead tried to complete free trade
agreements with many other countries and regions in bilateral and multilateral
agreements, namely the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade
Agreement, 67the Australia Free Trade Agreement, 7 and the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. 8 While each of these may seem to be minor in overall scope,
collectively they could do great damage to our country's agricultural economy.
Many times in recent years, Farmers Union has been a lone voice in the
agriculture community, the only purveyor of reason and perspective when it came
to agricultural trade. Yet, the influence of the free trade ideology continued to
grow and pervade our public policy decisions.

III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization today leads much of the discussion of free
trade initiatives in the world. The United States and 150 other member countries
have joined together since 1995 in an effort to improve the trading climate and
opportunities in international markets. 9 The WTO replaced the GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) organization that had been working on trade
issues since the 1940s. 10
Since 1995, there have been major initiatives called "rounds" or "agendas" in
which member nations attempt to reach new trade agreements. There was the
Uruguay round of discussions in the 1990s, 11and in recent years, the Doha Agenda
has been driving talks between nations. 2 Periodically, "ministerial" conferences
are held throughout the world to negotiate specific initiatives or rules. One of the

5. David Livshiz, Public Participationin Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How
Much is Too Much-The Case for a Limited Right of Intervention, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 529,
530-31(2005) (discussing the importance of public participation in future free trade agreements).
6. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Central America-Dominican RepublicUnited States Free Trade Agreement Final Text, (Aug. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTADRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
7. Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-United States
at
available
1,
2005),
(Jan.
Agreement,
Free
Trade
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/usfta/final-text/index.htm [hereinafter A USFTA].
8. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Third Draft FTAA Agreement, (Nov. 21, 2003), availableat
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index e.asp [hereinafter FTAA].
at
available
Observers,
and
Members
Organization,
Trade
9. World
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm.
10. World Trade Organization, The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, availableat
The WTO is headquartered in Geneva,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/gattmem-e.htm.
Switzerland, and functions not only to foster trade between its member nations, but also acts as the
dispute settler or arbitrator when nations disagree on trading practices. Its primary goal is the
liberalization of all kinds of trade by all of its members. World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm.
11. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001,
12. World Trade Organization,
WT/MIN(0 1)/DEC/I, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
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most recent ministerial conferences was in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003,13
developing countries to reach any
but it ended in the failure of developed and
14
consensus on many agricultural trade issues.
Prior to the Cancun talks, and especially since the talks failed, the United
States has also been negotiating with specific countries trying to achieve bilateral
15
trade agreements. The United States has negotiated agreements with Chile and
16
and proposed agreements with Panama, Peru and other South
Singapore,
American countries. 17 The U.S. Trade Representative, appointed by the President
and working within the Commerce Department, primarily leads trade
negotiations. 18 However, most of our trade representatives have not had an
agricultural background, and have usually not understood the uniqueness of
agricultural commodity markets.
Very recently, twenty-one Asia-Pacific trade ministers discussed the Doha
round of trade liberalization negotiations in Cairns, Australia.1 9 There, the effort
focused on reviving the Doha round, which some have said is on its deathbed. 0
Ultimately, the United States trade representative stated that the Doha round would
never meet its development promise "unless and until there is sufficient new
market access in agriculture and manufacturing and services.'
IV. AREN'T EXPORTS

THE KEY To AGRICULTURE'S SUCCESS?

For years, agri-businesses, processors, politicians, commodity groups and
some farm groups have perpetuated the belief that farmers and ranchers could
export their way to prosperity by allowing the free market, not government, to
negotiate agriculture and trade. American farmers and ranchers were told the key
to economic freedom is the export market.22 Many believed, and many still do,
that free and expanding trade through NAFTA and WTO, along with Fast Track

13. World Trade Organization, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min03_e/min03_e.htm.
14. Ramesh Jaura, "Mixed Feelings" About the Debacle, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 15, 2003,
available
at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2003/0915mixedfeelings.htm
(discussing the failure to resolve difference between rich and poor nations).
15. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, Temp. State Dep't No.
04-35,
KAV
6375,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-lndex.html
(last
visited Mar 1, 2008).
16. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/ftalSingapore/final/2004-01 -15-final.pdf.
17. CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, MINIMAL 'FIXES' TO BuSH'S PROPOSED 'FREE TRADE'
AGREEMENTS, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FTAsminimalfixesfmal.pdf
18. Negotiating and Other Authority, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2171(b)(l)-(c)(1)(C) (1988).
19. FarmPolicy.com,
Doha:
Lula
Speaks
Out,
available
at
http://www.farmpolicy.com/?p=382#more-382.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Neil Hamilton, Feeding Out Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72
NEB. L. REV. 210, 216 (1993).
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Authority (now called Trade Promotion Authority 23 ) and even "Freedom to
Farm,, 24 would liberate farmers to reap the rewards of the unfettered global market
place.
However, it was not the absence of good farm policy or the presence of bad
trade deals that were blamed for hurting farmers and ranchers. Rather, the
explanation was always an unforeseen aberration in the export market that
could be
25
fixed with more free trade agreements and less government interference.
The most frequently touted solution for an ailing agricultural sector is
expanding trade for U.S. agricultural products.26 However, many times the export
problems we identify, and the free trade answers we seek, simply do not reflect the
realities of global trade or address the fundamental problems faced by American
agriculture. In addition, whenever we have negotiated fewer trade barriers in
foreign countries, we have usually opened the door to an even larger amount of
imports to compete with our production. Since many countries have lower
environmental standards and far lower wages for workers, we end up exporting
jobs and importing greater amounts of foreign products.
Let us beware of falling exports.
One of the most persistent myths
surrounding "Freedom to Farm's" failure was that a collapse in the export market
undermined the farm bill's ability to work the way it was intended. 27 After the socalled "collapse", commodity groups and politicians scurried about looking for
scapegoats. They wagged their fingers at state trading enterprises, decried not
using export enhancement programs, and called for further trade liberalization to
make up for losses suffered in the export crash.
The question is whether the export markets really collapsed. The answer
depends on how exports are defined. There seems to be some confusion between
export value, which is the dollar value of exports, and export volume, which
represents the quantity or amount of commodity exported. 28 The difference
between the two is important.
Export values experienced a spike in 1996 due to higher commodity prices
around the time "Freedom to Farm" was enacted. 29 Export values then dropped in

23. Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track:
Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name Change, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 1 (2003).

24. Emergency Farm Financial Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-228, 112 Stat. 1516 (codified as
amended at 7 §§ 7201 note, 7212 (1998)).
25. See Daryll E. Ray, 1996 Farm Bill: A Patternfor Future Legislation or FailedExperiment. U.
OF TENN., AGRIC. POL'Y ANALYSIS CTR. [hereinafter APAC], Oct. 29-30, 2001, available at
http://www.agpolicy.org/ppap/pdf/01/nd.pdf.

26. Id.
at 10.
27. Daryll E. Ray, Freedom toFarm: The Root of Current Farm-RelatedProblems, APAC, Dec.
3, 2005, available at http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/281 .html.
28. See Ray, 1996 Farm Bill,
supra note 25, at 2, 6.
29. Thomas A. Fogarty, Freedom to Farm? Not Likely, USA TODAY, Jan. 1, 2002, at lB.
"Freedom to Farm" is the common name for the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996.
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the latter part of the 1990s. 3° However, one should not confuse export values with
export volumes, which have remained relatively constant. Export volumes have, in
fact, remained flat for nearly two decades compared to the volatility of export
values. 3"

However, even the spike and subsequent fall in export value that occurred
around the time of "Freedom to Farm" was really no more dramatic than
fluctuations in other years. In other words, the value "crash" that occurred was not
an unprecedented or even unforeseeable event.32 It was a market fluctuation, not a
cataclysmic fall. Therefore, a collapse in the export market did not cause the
failure of "Freedom to Farm."
Is the difference between value and volume significant? Distinguishing
between export values and volume challenges the U.S. trade mindset. Our current
agriculture and trade policy is built around opportunities in export values, but it is
also based on unrealistic expectations of future growth in export volume. We have
been talking apples when we should have been talking oranges. In simple terms, a
change in the value of our exports does not necessarily mean there has been a
change in the amount exported. Values may go up and down, but the quantity
traded may stay about the same. 33
Export volumes were relatively flat even during the early days of "Freedom to
Farm.",34 When there was a spike in the value of exports, volume remained
constant.35 This is a significant point because it dramatically undermines the
current public policy mindset. Despite export volumes remaining flat for nearly
two decades, compared to the volatility of export values, 36 the United States has
highlighted opportunities in export values to build an agriculture and trade policy
based on an unrealistic expectation of future growth in export volume.
If the intent of our agriculture and trade policy is to increase export volumes
in order to reduce U.S. stocks, policymakers should take note of an interesting fact,
brought to light by economist Daryll Ray. Dr. Ray points out that the United
States has only experienced three periods of dramatically high export volumedriven prosperity in the last century, after both world wars and once during the late
seventies.37 Exports remained strong into the early eighties, but have remained flat
ever since.38 Unfortunately, we have been waiting for over two decades for export
30. See Ray, supra note 25.
31. Id. at2.
32. See Daryll E. Ray, Year in Review: Dollars Drive Farm Bill Debate, APAC, Jan. 11, 2002,
availableat http://agpolicy.org/articles02.html.
33. See Daryll E. Ray, Daniel G. DelaTorre Ugarto & Kelly J. Tiller, Rethinking U.S. Agriculture
Policy: Changing Course to Secure Farmer Livelihoods Worldwide, 17 fig.6, APAC, Sep. 12, 2003,
available at http://agpolicy.org/blueprint.html.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Daryll E. Ray, Corn ProjectionsHave Been Too Optimistic, SOUTHWEST FARM PRESS, Nov.
16,2000.
38. See Daryll E. Ray, Farm Policy for Farmers Around the Globe: Are Subsidies the Cause or
Result of Low Crop Prices?, 16 fig.7, APAC, 2003.
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markets to rebound. In the meantime, the United States has based agriculture and
trade policy on events that occurred only three times in the last century.
Did exports slump due to a drop in demand caused by the Asian flu? No. It is
a myth that there was a "crash" of export markets caused by the accompanying
financial crisis. The commonly held belief is that demand dropped off in countries
affected by the epidemic, creating a domino effect that led to dramatically reduced
world demand, which, in turn, devastated our agricultural export markets. The fact
is that there was no39drop-off in demand. World demand actually increased during
the Asian flu crisis.
Information gathered by Dr. Ray charts the rate of growth in domestic
demand for agricultural products during the Asian flu crisis. 40 Dr. Ray's
information shows that during this period of financial instability demand increased,
not decreased, in both the eight Asian countries experiencing crisis and the rest of
the world.4'
What is the difference when there are drops in demand and surges in supply?
Grain markets were in distress during the years of the Asian flu crisis, but it was
not a slump in demand caused by the epidemic. Dr. Ray suggests it was a supply
surge that caused market disruption,42 a different problem altogether.
Differentiating between market disruptions caused by increased supply rather
than decreased demand is significant. They are very different problems. Dr. Ray
explains that a slump in demand is short term and the market will return when the
economy recovers. 43 When the economically troubled countries begin to recover,
they will once again be able to purchase agricultural products.
However, if the problem is a supply surge like that which the United States
experienced during the same period as the Asian flu crisis, it is a longer-term
problem. The market will not recover quickly because excess supply will not clear
quickly from the market, even when prices fall. The resulting circumstance is that
supplies overhang the market for prolonged periods, regardless of the economic
health of importing nations.
There is a problem with "over supply." Supply surges and increased
production can be problems for American farmers because they usually mean less
export opportunities for the U.S. 44 This problem impacts both U.S. customers and
competitors. If the United States' export customers increase their domestic
production, they will have less need to buy U.S. products. If, at the same time, the

39. See Daryll E. Ray, Year in Review: The Asian Crisis Was Not the Culprit in Farm
Price/IncomeProblems, APAC, Dec. 21, 2001, availableat http://agpolicy.org/weekpdf/075.pdf.
40. See Daryll E. Ray, News Flash: World Demandfor Grain Increased During the Years of
Asian Crisis, APAC, May 18, 2001, available at http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/045.html.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See generally Daryll E. Ray, The Importance of InternationalSupply Growth, APAC, July 13,
2001, availableat http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/052.html.
44. See Ray, supra note 39.
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export competitors increase their production, especially those that carry minimal
stocks or use export subsidies, they will capture an even greater U.S. market share.
During the years of the Freedom to Farm Act and the 2002 Farm Bill, free
trade ideologues frequently identified overproduction as a key problem and cited
the need to "increase" exports as a way to deal with depressed prices. 45 They
argued that free markets would eventually reduce supply by forcing the least
productive land out of production. 46 However, free markets do not reduce supply
sufficiently to raise price in a timely fashion.
Citing "overproduction" as a problem in agriculture is an oversimplification.
This characterization is unfortunate because it places the burden on the farmer
rather than on the public policies that have driven producers to seek maximum
production levels in the first place. It is domestic farm policy and trade
agreements that create the problem, not farmers producing their crop. United
States farmers produce their crops, perhaps, better than any farmer anywhere in the
world does. They should not be penalized for being good at what they do.
Given the current structure of markets and distribution, farmers need an
inventory control mechanism. This not only keeps stocks from flooding the
market in times of low prices, but also allows them to have stock on hand to sell
when prices are high. Domestic farm policy has resisted this concept because
supply management is considered an anathema to the free trade marketplace.
Changing the prevailing free trade mentality about stock control mechanisms
is a challenge because of negative perceptions abound. Arguments against such
mechanisms claim that stock control programs that prevent farmers from
benefiting from high prices are too expensive, are useless because private trade
will hold stocks anyway, and that farmers cannot store their way to prosperity.48
Statistical information indicates that when prices are high, yields are often
low. 49 Without a reserve, farmers are unable to benefit from high prices because

they do not have anything to sell. Their entire product has been pushed onto the
open market, where U.S. stocks overhang the world market and put the U.S. in the
unfortunate position of being a residual supplier. 0
The pendulum now seems to be swinging back and inventory management
options, formerly called supply management, are again being considered in public
policy circles. In a 2002 statement by President George W. Bush regarding the
implementation of steel tariffs, which have been subsequently ruled illegal by the
WTO and discontinued, he laid the groundwork for future inventory management
programs: he called for restoring market forces to world steel markets by initiating
an international discussion to encourage the reduction of excess global steel
45. See Ray et al, Rethinking U.S. Agriculture Policy, supranote 33, at 15-19.
46. Id. at 16, 36.
47. Id. at 6, 44.
48. See generally Daryll E. Ray, Colloquia, Farm Policy's Historical Roots and Modern
Influences, APAC, Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://agpolicy.org/present07.html.
49. See Ray, Rethinking U.S. Agriculture Policy, supranote 33, at 18.
50. Id. at 24.
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capacity. 51 That sounds very much like a concession to farm policy advocates like
Farmers 2 Union, who have called for farmer-owned inventory management
5
options.
As we write the new Farm Bill, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union urges future
farm programs to include an income support mechanism 53that includes an inventory
management system to bolster farm prices for producers.
V. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO SELL EXCESS COMMODITIES TO THE WORLD, COULD WE
PRODUCE ENERGY INSTEAD?

In the past several years, a growing share of agricultural production has been
diverted into energy production through ethanol, biodiesel, and other renewable
fuels. At one time in our agricultural history, a large portion of production on a
form of feed grains and hay) raised for
typical farm was energy crops (in the
54
feeding horses and other draft animals.
While these energy crops are very positive for American agricultural markets
and certainly have the benefit of reducing our country's dependence on foreign oil,
it is important to note that they are not exports using supplies of commodities, but
rather creative economic development encouraging further domestic demand. In
addition, further economic benefits could be realized by increasing livestock
enterprises using the high quality by-products of energy production. After making
ethanol from a bushel of corn, you still are left with nearly a bushel of feed as a byproduct.
Passage of a federal energy bill with a significant renewable fuels standard
would create a much more consistent demand for agricultural commodities than
the export market. Expensive energy prices, while a concern for both consumers
and agricultural producers alike, will enhance demand for renewable fuels
produced from our agricultural commodities. 55
One of the concerns of the energy industry is: if we become more dependent
on ethanol and biodiesel, will the necessary supplies of feedstocks be available
when weather or other production problems occur? A system of farmer owned
"energy reserves" may help alleviate concerns about a steady supply, and would
help avoid the boom and bust cycles. 56

51. See Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Announces Temporary Safeguards
at
2002)
available
(Mar.
5,
for
Steel
Industry
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020305-6.html.
52. See 2007 Policy of the National Farmers Union, 105th ANNIVERSARY DELEGATE
CONVENTION, Fla., Mar. 2007, at 13.
53. Kent Peppler, President, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, Statement at the U.S. Senate Agric.
Comm., Concerning U.S. Food & Farm Policy and Development of 2007 Farm and Food Policy
(Mar. 12, 2007).
54. See VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY IN WORLD HISTORY, 71-73, Westview Press (2003).

55. See generally Daniel G. De La Torre Ugarte, Marie E. Walsh, Hosein Shapouri, & Stephen P.
Slinsky, The Economic Impacts of Bioenergy Crop Productionon US Agriculture,APAC (2003).
56. See Peppler, supra note 53.
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The new Farm Bill also gives us an opportunity to look at farmer-owned
energy reserves through a community-based strategic biofuels program. The
establishment of a farmer-owned commodity loan would give farmers a tool to
empower themselves, on a voluntary basis, and could help them influence market
prices and protect against years of poor crop production.57
VI.

WHY WON'T AGRICULTURAL MARKETS SELF-CORRECT?

Simple economics instructs that markets will self-correct. However,
agricultural markets are "inelastic" and not as responsive as other industries. In
other words, the market will not find a price low enough to clear excess
production.
In non-agricultural markets, oversupply will generally cause prices to fall.
Falling prices simultaneously increase the quantity demanded and reduce
production until supply diminishes. Reduced supply, in turn, eventually spurs an
increase in prices once again. Agricultural markets, however, do not work the same
way. 58 Excess supply is not cleared from the market in a timely manner.
So why does it not work in agriculture? Under a purely academic model,
production and supply drop in times of low prices. 5 9 If agriculture worked like
other economic models, low prices would mean that producers would stop
producing. However, in the real world that is not what happens. A farmer is going
to produce when prices are high because he can make a profit, but he will also
produce when prices are low in order to spread his high fixed costs over as many
bushels as possible in an attempt to break even.
Low prices, according to the academic model, should also stimulate
demand .60 But, again, agriculture is unique. In most sectors of the economy,
consumers take advantage of low prices and deplete inventories. For example, if
there are too many TV's in the supply pipeline and prices fall, consumers will
likely take advantage of the lower prices and buy an additional TV for the family
room or kitchen, thereby reducing the stock. However, with food, demand stays
relatively flat. Consumers may shift their diets to different foods depending on the
price, but they probably will not eat more. In other words, if the price of food
declines, people may switch from hot dogs to steak, but they will not start eating
six meals a day instead of three.
Because agriculture is a unique economic enterprise, it is also a unique policy
challenge. If agricultural policy is confined to economic models and free market
ideology rather than the reality of the agriculture market, then independent
producers will continue to struggle. Those who survive one crisis will most likely
fall victim to the next crisis.
57. See id.
58. See Ray, Farm Policy's HistoricalRoots and Modern Influences, supra note 48, at 27 fig.7
(2003).
59. Robert Schenk, The Supply Curve, OVERVIEW: MODEL OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND, (2007),
available at http://www.ingrimayne.com/econ/DemandSupply/Supply3.html; NetMBA, Supply and
Demand, ECONOMICs (2007), available at http://www.netmba.com/econ/micro/supply-demand/.
60. Id.
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MEAN HIGHER COMMODITY PRICES?

Not necessarily. Despite the commonly held belief that greater exports
translate into higher prices paid to our farmers, reality tells a different story. For
example, our government cites increases in U.S. corn exports to Mexico as proof
of NAFTA success. 61 In addition, the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
reports, "[s]ince NAFTA was approved in 1993, United States agricultural exports
to Mexico have nearly doubled. Mexico import[ed] $6.5 billion of United States
agricultural products [in 2000], making it our third largest agricultural market." 62
USTR also points out that sales of U.S. corn to Mexico have increased eighteenfold under NAFTA.63 Thus, if the purpose of expanding trade and increasing U.S.
exports is to benefit U.S. producers, one could safely assume that such dramatic
success in corn exports to Mexico under NAFTA would translate into higher prices
paid to U.S. farmers.
In fact, corn prices have dropped since NAFTA went into effect even though
corn exports to Mexico have increased eighteen-fold. 64 Reduced production from
2003, and competition from higher priced oilseeds in 2004, has been the main
reasons for increased corn prices.65 In addition, since 2004, corn prices have
increased due to greater ethanol production in this country.66 Farmers and
ranchers should be asking why the dramatic success in corn exports to Mexico
under NAFTA have not translated into higher prices paid to U.S. farmers.
Farmers and ranchers have learned that our export competitors are as adamant
about keeping their export markets as we are, and if we want to increase our sales
abroad, we usually have to lower the U.S. commodity price to do so. It has been
this drive for lower market clearing prices that has made the export market
profitable for exporting companies but not necessarily for agricultural producers.
Do free trade agreements provide increased opportunities in developing
nations? Proponents of new trade agreements and expanded trade often cite
developing nations, where almost all income growth is spent on food, as an
opportunity for U.S. export growth.67 It is supposed that domestic demand grows
faster in developing nations and that there is less growth in domestic agricultural
61. U.S. Dep't. of State, Bureau of Int'l Info. Programs, NAFTA Agricultural Trade an
Unqualified Success, U.S. Official Says: Agreement serves as building block for all trade liberalization
(Apr.
20,
2004)
available
at
http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2004/April/20040420172550ASrelliM0.3547937.html.
62. U. S. TRADE REP., NAFTA GOOD FOR FARMERS, GOOD FOR AMERICA (June 6, 2001),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2001/NAFTA_Good-forFarmers,-Goodfor-A
merica.html.
63. Id.
64. Daryll E. Ray, Mexico and Corn, APAC, Sept. 5, 2003, available at
http://agpolicy.org/weekco/l61. html.
65. Andrew Tanzer, Something's Up Down on the Farm, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FINANCE, vol.
61, No. 11,Nov. 2007, at 57-58.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REP., CAFTA FACTS: MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE REGION'S RURAL
POOR: CAFTA RECOGNIZES SENSITIVITIES AND EXPANDS NEW OPPORTUNITIES (May 2005).
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production than in developed countries.68 However, developing nations do not
show a lot of promise as a source of export growth because they often experience
less domestic demand than developed countries. 69 In fact, the average annual rate
of growth in domestic demand for grains and seeds is decreasing in developing
countries and domestic production is increasing at a faster rate than demand. 70 It is
actually developed nations whose domestic demand is growing. 7'
Recently, developing nations of the world accused the U.S. of "exporting
poverty ' 72 because we no longer manage our supply and have no effective floor
price under commodity prices. In fact, the United States and Europe can sell large
quantities of cheap products into world markets, and rely on government programs
to absorb some of the economic loss to producers.
In April, 2004, the WTO issued a preliminary finding that shows the U.S.
cotton support mechanisms, including direct payments, counter-cyclical payments,
crop insurance subsidies, and incentive payments made to cotton end users to
73
encourage the use of U.S. produced cotton, are illegal under current trading rules.
The complaint was filed by Brazil, and while the United States will likely appeal
the final ruling, it is an indication that the rest of the world, particularly developing
countries, 7 views
the 2002 Farm Bill and some of its supports as being trade
4
distorting.

While this new WTO ruling applies only to cotton, there are many other
commodity support programs for other products that may be challenged in the
future. In fact, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lulada Silva recently stated that "a
U.S. offer to limit agricultural subsidies to US $17 billion was 'absurd'," and
added that, "Brazil's decision.. .to drop out of preliminary talks in the World Trade
Organization's Doha round of negotiations symbolized the end of Brazilian
subservience' to the industrial countries. 75

68. Id.
69. See Daryll E. Ray et al, Rethinking US. Agricultural Policy: Changing Course to Secure
Farmer

Livelihoods

Worldwide,

APAC,

27-30,

Sept.

12,

2003,

available

at

http://www.agpolicy.org/pub03.html.
70. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (FAO) ECON. & SOCIAL DEP'T, FAO REPORT: ENOUGH FOOD
IN THE FUTURE- WITHOUT GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS §2 & §9 (Apr. 2000).

71. Stacey Rosen & Shahla Shapouri, Rising Food Prices Intensify Food Insecurity in Developing
Countries,

AMBERWAVES,

Feb.

2008,

available

at

http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/February08/Features/RisingFood.htm.
72. See Daryll E. Ray, InternationalProducer Groups Offer a Competing Proposalfor WTO Ag
Negotiations, APAC, June 27, 2003, available at http://www.agpolicy.org/weekco/1I 51 html.
73. See Daryll E. Ray, Cotton Trade Dispute Ruling Released: U.S. Must Make Changes,
SOUTHWEST
FARM
PRESS,
Dec.
http://southwestfarmpress.conmag/farming-cotton-tmde

2,
2004,
dispute_2/,

available

at

74. William Krist, Trade Policy and the Farm Bill, WOODROW WILSON CENTER, presented on
July 16, 2007.
75. Keith Good, DOHA: Lula Speaks Out, FARMPOLICY.COM, July 3, 2007, available at
http://www.farmpolicy.com/?p=382#more-382.
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OUR FARM PROGRAMS CAUSE POVERTY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD?

Since the U.S. government no longer has any control over the amount of
agricultural production through acreage constraints or inventory management,
some countries of the world have accused us of "exporting poverty" to the rest of
the world. 76
According to Dr. Ray, the U.S. has historically had both apolicy ofplenty and
a policy of managing plenty. 77 Our policy of plenty includes ongoing public
support to expand agricultural productive capacity through research, extension
programs, and other means to encourage more production. 78 We also have ample
evidence that our yields have increased as well as our costs.
In the past, our policy of managing plenty included mechanisms to manage
capacity and to compensate farmers for consumers' accrued benefits of
productivity gains.79 We have dropped the "managing plenty" part of our farm
programs, mostly since 1996, with no floor under commodity prices (marketing
loans and loan deficiency payments); no effective control of crop mix and acreage
(planting flexibility and no acreage set-asides); no price stabilization to producers
(no reserves or long-term loans). 80
Economic theory should then dictate that, as producers (both in the U.S. and
in the rest of the world), no longer finding it profitable to produce commodities at
the resulting low prices (without subsidies) should either raise different crops
(likely also in surplus) or go out of business. The operating assumption behind
such logic is that if subsidies were eliminated, production would decrease, and then
farmers worldwide would benefit from improved commodity prices.
The key question then is "will freeing up trade rules and eliminating farm
subsidies result in better prices?" A World Bank Report titled 2004 Global
Economic Prospects: Realizing the Promise of the Doha Agenda prescribes the
81
nearly total elimination of supports in the European Union and the United States.
In a related study of the possible effects of this scenario, the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates that corn prices worldwide would
increase a whopping 2.9% after twenty years and that wheat prices would "soar"
up by 0.8%. 82

These predictions assume that the European Union countries would reduce
their production of wheat, oilseeds, and other grains by 63%, as the comparative

76. See TIM JOSLING ET AL., THE 2007 US FARM BILL: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, INTERNATIONAL FOOD AND AGRIC. TRADE POL'Y COUNCIL 3-4 (Sept. 2007).
77. See Ray et al., Rethinking U.S. AgriculturalPolicy,supra note 69, at 15-16 & 54 (App. A).
78. Id. at 54 (App. A).
79. See Id. at 15 & 54 (App. A).
80. See Id. at 16-17.
81. See CARLOS A. PRIMO BRAGA, 2004 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: REALIZING THE
PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA, WORLD BANK REPORT 48 (Nov. 11, 2004).
82. Diaz-Bonilla Eugenio et al., Food Security and the World Trade Organization:A Typology of
Countries, AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA
333-360 (Marcos S. Jank ed., Inter-American Development Bank 2005).
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advantage would be for other countries with lower costs to raise these
commodities. Agricultural markets do not always respond the way other markets
do, nor the way economists or trade negotiators think they will. It is highly
unlikely that much land would be left idle and that these European countries,
which have lived through previous famines, would choose to be dependent on
other countries for vital foodstuffs. Likewise, history has shown that in the U.S.,
farmland is always used to produce something, and producers will not choose to let
major acreage remain idle even at fairly low prices.
So, it would seem that just eliminating trade barriers and eliminating subsidies
would not result in significantly higher prices for farmers in developing countries
or anywhere else in the world. This may be a key point that our negotiators have
missed. The high subsidy levels in the U.S. and Europe are the result of low
prices, not the cause of low prices. Once we, and more importantly our trade
negotiators, understand this concept, it is not so easy to reach the conclusion that
the simple elimination of subsidies will bring better crop prices to all farmers of
the world.
IX. SHOULD WE RELY ON PROJECTIONS TO DEVELOP PUBLIC POLICY?

Overly ambitious projections are a problem when it comes to determining
agriculture and trade policy. In 1996, price projections showed farmers receiving
high commodity prices for years to come; however, those projections did not even
last the growing season. 84 Wheat closed at $7.16 in April 1996 when the FAIR
Act was signed. 85 Six weeks later, the price of wheat had fallen to $5.00.86 With
the exception of soybeans, which peaked in 1997, crop prices for eight major crops
reached their record highs before the first crop year governed by Freedom to
Farm. 87
Trade projections were also inflated. At the time The FAIR Act was under
consideration, projectionists generally held that more free international trade,
especially with China, would launch U.S. agriculture onto an export-driven path of
sustainable prosperity. 88 For example, in 1996 China was projected to import 260
million bushels of corn in the year 1999. However, in reality they exported over
400 million instead.89

83. See generally Daryll E. Ray, Is it as Simple As: EU Lowers Farm Tariffs, U.S. Benefits?,
APAC, Oct. 28, 2005 available at http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/273.html.
84. Ray, 1996 Farm Bill, supra note 25, at Introduction.
85. Daryll E. Ray, Impacts of the 1996 Farm Bill, Agric. Pol'y Analysis Center, APAC, at 9 (Feb.
2001), available at http://agpolicy.org/farmbill.html.
86. Id.
87. See Ray, 1996 Farm Bill, supra note 25.
88. See DOUG BANDOW, TRADE WITH CHINA: BUSINESS PROFITS OR HUMAN RIGHTS?, (Cato
Center for Trade Policy Studies 2000), available at http://www.freetrade.org/node/198.
89. See FRED GALE, SUBSIDIZING CORN EXPORTS HELP PRICES REBOUND 14 (Econ. Res.

Service/USDA,
DIANE
Publishing)
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/wrs012/wrs0l2e.pdf.

(2001),

available

at
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X. THAT MONOPOLY "UP NORTH"

In February 2002, North Dakota farmers received mixed results from their
lengthy battle for trade justice. The findings of the North Dakota Wheat
Commission's Section 301 case indicated that the Canadian Wheat Board was
engaged in trade distorting practices; however, the Canadian Wheat Board took no
action to remedy U.S. farmer's concems. 90 Since that first decision, a 14% tariff
has been imposed on incoming hard red spring wheat imports, but no tariff was
imposed on durum wheat. 91 Although one can attribute some of the differences to
currency rate changes,
the tariffs have slowed the flow of Canadian wheat and
92
durum dramatically.
It is interesting to note that while the North Dakota media reported a victory,
the Canadian media also reported victory, once again claiming vindication for the
much-maligned Canadian Wheat Board. 93 There are few greater examples of a
free trade whipping post for American wheat producers than the Canadian Wheat
Board. Critics maintain that as a state trading enterprise, it is an anathema to free
trade, and often blame it for the dismal situation in durum. 94 Indeed, the flood of
Canadian
durum has most likely contributed to driving down U.S. domestic
95
prices.
Politically, the Canadian Wheat Board is a popular and easy target for
disgruntled farmers and frustrated politicians. However, is it the Canadian Wheat
Board, or the trade agreements, that have put American farmers at a disadvantage?
It may seem like the simple answer, but eliminating the CWB probably will not
solve our problems and could even make them worse. Without individual western
Canadian farmers being required to sell their wheat to the Wheat Board, there
would be a flood of grain sold in the U.S. bordering states by individual producers
and local elevators instead of one state trading enterprise.
Do we need price transparency? Yes. Do we need to address currency
fluctuations? Absolutely. Do we need tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on Canadian
durum? Without a doubt. In fact, several trading partners use TRQs on U.S.
products, 96 highlighting its appropriateness. Our own government recently
90. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Chief Ag Negotiator to go to North Dakota
to Hear Concerns of Wheat Farmers Regarding Monopolistic Canadian Wheat Board (March 28, 2002).
91. RANDY SCHNEPF, U.S.-CANADA WHEAT TRADE DISPUTE,

CRS Report

for Congress,

RL32426, at 12 (2004), availableat www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32426.pdf.
92. North Dakota Union Farmer, Tariffs Imposed on Canadian Wheat", June Edition, 2002
[hereinafter North Dakota Union Farmer].
93. Press Release, Canadian Wheat Board, U.S. Wheat Tariff Comes Off, NAFTA Victory
Complete For Western Canadian Farmers (March 1, 2006) (on file with The DJILP).
94. See Wheat Board Elections Favour Pro-Monopoly Candidates, CANADIAN BROADCAST
CENTER, Dec. 12, 2006, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/saskatchewan/story/2006/12/l 1/wheatboard.html; see also JOHN HOEVEN, TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN HOEVEN PRESENTED AT

THE U.S.
INT'L TRADE
COMMISSION
1 (State
of N.D.
http://govemor.state.nd.us/media/news-releases/2003/09/docs/030904.pdf.
95. North Dakota Union Farmer, supranote 93, June Edition, 2002.

2003),

available

at

96. See DAVID W. SKULLY, ECONOMICS OF TARIFF-RATE QUOTA ADMINISTRATION, MARKET
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(Econ.

Res.

Service/USDA

2001),

available at
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implemented TRQs on steel and lumber when it determined that other countries
97
were using unfair trading practices to dump those products into the U.S. market.
TRQs could be an accepted and measured remedy to trade distorting practices.
However, the free trade agreements, not the Canadian Wheat Board, are at the
root of US/Canadian trade disputes. We need to go straight to the heart of the
problems in agriculture by addressing unfair trade agreements and market
concentration. We would be wise to direct our efforts toward the end rather than
chasing our tails about the Canadian Wheat Board.
XI. THE NAFTA SHUFFLE

U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico have grown under NAFTA, but imports
to the U.S. from Canada and Mexico have grown much faster. 98 Even though
USDA recognizes that imports have grown under NAFTA, our government
downplays their significance. During the NAFTA years, the U.S. NAFTA trade
surplus in agricultural products declined by 71%. 9 9 Before NAFTA, (1991 to
1994) the agricultural surplus with Canada and Mexico increased by $203
million. 100 During NAFTA, (1994 to 2000) the surplus fell by $1.5 billion.'0 '
The agricultural product-trade surplus with NAFTA countries has declined
more rapidly than the overall U.S. trade surpluses in agricultural products. It fell
from $1.6 billion in 1995 to $456 million in 2000 (a 70.7%) drop. 10 2 In fact, there
were two years of outright U.S. agriculture trade deficits with NAFTA countries in
1995 and 1999.103
In 1989, competitive imports (meaning those that replace crops grown in the
U.S.) "were 38% of U.S. export levels and 71% of all U.S. agricultural
imports."' 104 Based on 2000 data, "competitive imports were 60% of U.S. export
sales and represented 80% of all U.S. agricultural imports." 10 5 The increase in
competitive

http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tbl 893/.
97. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Outlines Process for Steel Safeguard
Exclusions
(July
3,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2002/July/US-Outlines-Process-for SteelSaf
eguard_Exclusions.html?ht-.
98. PARR RosSON & FLYNN ADCOCK, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT;
DEEPENING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND RESPONSE TO COMPETITION 2-3 (Center for N. Am. Stud.

2003), availableat http://cnas.tamu.edu/publications/WEAINAFCNAS.PDF.
99. MARK GEHLHAR ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC, GLOBAL GROWTH, MACROECONOMIC

CHANGE, AND THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE I (Econ. Res. Service, USDA, 2007), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err46/err46.pdf.
100. Elizabeth Henderson, Why the NationalCampaignfor SustainableAgriculture Should Take on
Free Trade Agreements, 10 COMMUNITY, FOOD, & AGRIC PROGRAM NEWS 1, 1 (2002), available at

http://media.cce.comell.edu/hosts/agfoodcommunity/fap/newsletter/CFAPfalI02.pdf.
101. ROSSON & ADCOCK, supranote 98, at 3.
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imports means that we are now in the unfortunate position of trying to export our
imports.
XII. TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA)
Early in his term, President George W. Bush signed a bill containing Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA), previously called Fast Track. 106 A major legislative
priority for President Bush, proponents touted the TPA as creating "more good
jobs for American workers, more exports for American farmers, and higher living
standards for American families." 10 7 TPA essentially allows the trade negotiators
and/or the administration to craft trade agreements knowing that Congress cannot
modify any provisions to the document, but can only vote to approve or disapprove
the document in its entirety.
Present and past administrations have maintained TPA was necessary because
other countries were not willing to seriously negotiate with the United States if
Congress could change agreements. 10 8 The Bush Administration argued that
because TPA (Fast Track) was not re-authorized in 1994, the U.S. had missed out
on many preferential trade agreements that other countries had negotiated without
us. 0 9 Specifically, the administration informed farmers and ranchers that without
TPA, the United States would be further excluded from trade, resulting in
0
agriculture losing out on numerous export opportunities.°"
Despite the fact that the U.S. has negotiated hundreds of trade deals without
TPA (in both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration, totaling
roughly 300 separate trade agreements without Fast Track),"' the trade
agreements negotiated under Fast Track, like NAFTA and CUSTA, have not been
favorable to U.S. agriculture. Implementing a procedure that will increase the
likelihood of more agreements like NAFTA does not seem prudent to Farmers
Union.
In recent years, proposed Free Trade Agreements have been negotiated with
Chile, Singapore, Thailand, Central American countries, the Dominican Republic
106. David Firestone, Senate Grants Bush Authority on Trade Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at
Al.
107. Press Release, The White House, President Signs Trade Act of 2002 (August 6, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020806-4.html.
108. BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT'L ENVTL. & Sci. AFF., TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY FACT
SHEET (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2002/12953.htm.
109. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Statement from U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick on House Passage of the Trade Promotion Authority Bill (July 7,2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Press_.Releases/2002/July/Statement fromUSTradeReprese
ntativeRobert B ZoellickonHousepassage of theTradePromotionAuthoritybill.html?ht=.
110. See Nat'l Coin Growers Ass'n, NCGA's Hume Speaks with Agriculture Secretary, Trade
Ambassador
on
TPA,
9
CORN
COMMENT.
24
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ncga.com/news/CC/volume9/ccVo19n24.html.
11. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Susan C.
Schwab regarding the Expiration and Renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (June 29, 2007), available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2007/June/Statement-by-US-Trade-Represent
ativeSusanCSchwabregardingtheexpiration renewal ofTradePromotionAuthority.html.
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(CAFTA), and Australia (AFTA).112 The U.S. is also attempting to negotiate a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 113 In most of these countries, the
demand for U.S. agricultural products is low, while the opportunity to sell foreign
agricultural goods into our markets is considerably higher. In most of these
agreements, trade negotiators often cite the demand in foreign countries for U.S.
services like banking, movie and television rights, technology products and other
products, but agricultural products are far down the priority list. Most often,
opening our borders for agricultural imports into the U.S. is the price we pay for
access to their consumer markets.
The U.S. has the largest and most powerful economy on earth. There is
tremendous incentive for countries to enter into trade agreements with us, not
necessarily because they want to buy from us, but because they want to sell to us.
We are the most consumptive society the world has ever known. Trade Promotion
Authority is not the deal breaker. Trade Promotion Authority is just one more in a
long list of items where farmers and ranchers are used to provide political cover for
other interests such as the elimination of estate taxes, vertical integration, and
biotechnology. The bottom line is that TPA is not the answer farmers and ranchers
are looking for.
XIII. WHO REALLY WINS WITH FREE TRADE?

Free trade conventional wisdom assumes that if farmers and ranchers operate
in the free market, the most "efficient" producers will prevail, while the "less
efficient" producers will finally fail when taken off the government dole. Of
course, the problem with this assumption is that it is simply not true. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, it is not the most efficient that will prevail, but rather those
with the deepest pockets who can afford to stay in the game the longest. Economic
theory that maintains countries quit producing agricultural commodities if prices
get low enough is flawed, primarily because other nations view food production as
a national security issue, and will produce food for their citizens regardless of the
price.
Economics assumes that trade takes place between equal entities. It ignores
the fact that the world is filled with those who are unequal in size and strength, and
it ignores that giant corporations are capable of dominating conditions of trade at
the expense of smaller businesses and individuals. That is exactly the case in
agriculture, and it is especially true in the global marketplace.
Eliminating trade barriers, globalizing markets and erasing borders simply
encourages dominant players to grow even larger. At the same time, trade
agreements strive to eliminate the few protections that farmers have left, such as

112. Implementation of Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2008); Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade, 19 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4111 (2008).
113. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, FTAA - Trade Negotiations Committee (Feb. 24,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/PressReleases/2005/February/asset-upload-fil8O4- 7 2
82.pdf.
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domestic safety net programs and marketing agencies. Trade agreements also
attempt to dismantle labor standards and environmental protections for all workers.
Fair trade is essential to American agriculture. However, liberalized trade is
not the cure for all of agriculture's woes. Markets fluctuate, currency values
change, trade balances shift, and supply and demand varies. That is the way
markets work. That is why farmers and ranchers need federal farm programs,
antitrust protections, and transparent trade agreements. The nature of the markets,
coupled with the current free market ideology and undue market influence of
international corporations, mean that the present situation in agriculture is not an
aberration but a chronic condition brought to bear upon farmers by our public
policy choices.
XIV. A SENSIBLE

ALTERNATIVE

Agriculture is unique. Agricultural markets do not work like other markets,
and food production is too important to be at the mercy of political whim and
corporate wealth building. Agriculture needs public policies and trade agreements
that recognize the realities of agricultural markets. World farmers need to
cooperate, not compete, by fostering new trade rules that:
1. Establish an international food reserve to assure supply when natural
disasters cut production. Exporting and importing nations should
share the cost of the reserve.
2.

Recognize that some of our world agricultural production could be
used for energy needs and establish a national or international energy
reserve of commodities that can be processed into energy in times of
lowered production.

3.

Attack world hunger and malnutrition: 800 million people in the
world are starving and have suffered with for dozens of years. In
addition, nearly one billion people in the world suffer from varying
levels of malnutrition. Hunger results in an unstable, insecure,
unhealthy and dangerous world.

4.

Recognize that agriculture is unique among industries, and that
changes in price do not necessarily change the levels of production.
Agricultural producers will continue to produce all of their acres in
times of low prices in an attempt to cover costs, and will continue to
produce on all of their acres in times of high prices in an attempt to
capitalize on good markets.

5.

Recognize that the usual way to grow the amount of export volumes
is to lower the price, and this "race to the bottom" decimates
producers.

6.

Recognize that U.S. and world output of agricultural commodities
will continue to outpace demand.

2008

FREE TRADE VERSUS FAIR TRADE

7.

Understand that we must view food and agriculture markets as they
are, and not how we want them to be. 114

Agricultural producers are in a global market that whipsaws food producers
into the fruitless quest to be the lowest cost producers. We need a global market
that rewards farmers for participating in the world's greatest occupation - growing
food.

114. See NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, supra note 1, at 41-47.

UNFCCC, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, AND THE WTO BREWING CONFLICTS OR ARE THEY MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE?

ANITA M. HALVORSSEN1

I. INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 2008 Al Gore together with the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) 2 received the Nobel Peace Prize. The Norwegian Nobel
Committee stated that it awarded the prize to promote peace and security:
Indications of changes in the earth's future climate must be treated with
the utmost seriousness, and with the precautionary principle uppermost
in our minds. Extensive climate changes may alter and threaten the
living conditions of much of mankind. They may induce large-scale
migration and lead to greater competition for the earth's resources. Such
changes will place particularly heavy burdens on the world's most
vulnerable countries. There may be increased danger of violent conflicts
3
and wars, within and between states.
In its fourth report published in February of 2007, the IPCC confirmed that
greenhouse gases (GHGs) from human activities have "very likely" (90%
probability) caused the increase in temperatures since 1750. 4 The IPCC's synthesis
report shows that the level of GHGs has already reached critical levels. 5 The likely

1. Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law; Lecturer, University of
Colorado, Political Science Department; Director, Global Legal Solutions, LLC (e-mail:
amhalvorss@aol.com). This paper is based on a presentation given at the ILSA conference at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law on October 12, 2007.
2. The IPCC, a UN body of 2,000 scientists, was established by the WMO and UNEP in 1988 to
build awareness on climate change and measures that need to be adopted. It played an important role in
establishing the committee that would negotiate the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC).
3. The Norwegian Nobel Committee, Announcement of the Awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize
for
2007
to
the
IPCC
and
Al
Gore,
Oct.
12,
2007,
http://nobelpeaceprize.org/englau announce2007.html.
4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

2007-

THE PHYSICAL

SCIENCE BASIS: IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT summary for policy makers (2007) available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl .htm [hereinafter IPCC FOURTH].
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: FOURTH
REPORT:
SYNTHESIS
REPORT,
AT
30
(2007)
available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter SYNTHESIS - IPCC FOURTH];
see also United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP and WMO Panel Puts Final Full Stop Behind
ASSESSMENT
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impacts of climate change include more frequent severe storms and droughts, sea
level rise, ice cap and glacier melt, large-scale species extinctions, spread of
disease carriers (of malaria, etc.) to more northemly latitudes, and 200 million
environmental "refugees" by 2050.6
Lack of natural resources, violent conflicts, and wars, together with other
effects of climate change will have major effects on the global economy. 7 As one
scholar described the situation, "[e]ven a 30C rise in global average temperature
would devastate the global environment, place human survival in grave danger,
and risk the collapse of the world economy.', 8 The global response to climate
change taken in the next 10-20 years could create risks of major disruption to
economic and social activity, on par with those associated with World War I
(WWI), World War II (WWII) and the Great Depression. 9 Nicholas Stem
projected that if action is not taken now, it may cost 5-20% of global GDP each
year from now to address climate change.' ° In his report, Stem states: "climate
change is a serious global threat, and it demands an urgent global response."" Just
as other financial institutions are addressing climate change, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) needs to be working on how it can address climate change
issues related to trade in a comprehensive manner.12 On the other hand, actions
taken under the climate treaties should focus on how such measures can take
advantage of trade liberalization 3 and avoid impediments to trade. This paper
examines the relationship between the WTO and the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with its Kyoto Protocol and indicates how it needs
to change in order to facilitate the urgent action needed to address climate change.
This paper then suggests that in the course of the Doha negotiations on trade and
environment, the WTO membership should negotiate and adopt an agreement on
the trade-related aspects of climate change law to promote emissions trading,
address labeling requirements for GHG emissions and other climate-related
process and production method (PPM)-based policy measures, and include the

Risks and Rewards of Combating Climate Change (Nov. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlD=521 &ArticlelD=5707&l=en;
see also IPCC Synthesis Report: Risks and Rewards of Combating Climate Change, Science Daily
(Nov. 20, 2007), availableat http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/071119122043.htm.
6. Id.; see also Climate.org, Climate Institute's Programs - Environmental Refugees,
http://www.climate.org/2002/programs/refugee.shtml (last visited Aug. 11, 2008).
7. Natalia Tamirisa, World Economic Outlook: Climate Change and the Global Economy, IMF
SURVEY
MAGAZINE:
IMF
RESEARCH,
Nov.
6,
2007,
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/RES] 026A.htm.
8. Erik B. Bluemel, Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive Entropy in
the Regulation of the Global Public Good, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1981, 1983 (2007).
9. NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.hm-

treasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/Summary-ofConclusions.pdf.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Steve Chamovitz, Trade & Climate: Potential Conflicts & Synergies, in BEYOND KYOTO:
ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE

164 (Pew Center on Climate

Change 2003), availableat http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Beyond%20Kyoto.pdf.
13. Id.
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14
terms of the proposed agreement on trade in climate friendly technology. In
addition, this paper also recommends the establishment of a Committee on Trade
and Climate Change to address all areas where climate issues intersect trade.

Part II gives an overview of the anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and how they are related to trade. Part III explains the goal,
structure and trade-related articles of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol,
especially Kyoto's flexible market mechanisms. Part IV provides a short overview
of the WTO's history, purpose, and dealings with environmental issues. Part V
analyzes the points of convergence between the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol and
the WTO rules. Finally, Part VI focuses on reforming the WTO rules in order to
accommodate trade measures used by the Parties to the UINFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol in their implementation of their treaty commitments.
II. BACKGROUND
The main reason for the increase in GHG emission beyond the natural
variability in climate change is human activity.' 5 This activity, usually classified as
economic development, has impacted the balance of carbon dioxide (C02) and
other GHGs in the atmosphere since the beginning of the industrial revolution, thus
increasing the existing greenhouse effect or thickening the blanket of gases in the
atmosphere. 16 The climate change issue can be categorized as a market failure on a
global scale.
At this point, the atmosphere is more like the last garbage dump on the planet
and, unfortunately, it is soon to be filled to capacity. Some of the GHGs such as
C02 can last at least a century in the atmosphere, so even if humans stop emitting
C02, there is still too much in the atmosphere.' 7 In order to address the problem
clearly, one must internalize the externalities; in other words, pay for the use of the
atmosphere as the natural resource that absorbs the GHGs.
One way of doing this is by using a cap-and-trade approach to gradually
reduce the C02 entering the atmosphere; another is by placing a tax on the C02.
Either approach places a cost on CO2. On the global level, the international
community adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, thus choosing the cap-

14. This paper suggests an agreement that would be more far-reaching than the proposed
agreement covering trade in climate friendly technology. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
OF U.S. AND EC PROPOSAL FOR LIBERALIZING TRADE
IN
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE WTO DDA NEGOTIATIONS (2007), available at
REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2o7/asset-upload-file479-13638.
pdf.
PPM can be defined as "any activity that is undertaken in the process of bringing a good to
market. JASON POTTS, THE LEGALITY OF PPMs UNDER THE GATT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR SUSTAINABLE TRADE POLICY, International Institute for Sustainable Development 1 (2008).
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ppms-gatt.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008).
15. IPCC FOURTH, supra note 4, at 100.
16. Id. at 95.
17. University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, Understanding Climate Change, Global
Warming Frequently Asked Questions, The Greenhouse Effect,
http://www.ucar.edu/news/features/climatechange/faqsjsp (last visited April 3, 2008).
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and-trade approach, although carbon taxes are used domestically by several
states. "
III. THE ROAD TO KYOTO

The UNFCCC was adopted in 199219 and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
in 1997.20 The JNFCCC stipulates in Article 2 the objective of the treaty in rather
vague terms:
[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerousanthropogenic interferencewith the
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame

sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to
to enable economic
ensure that food production is not threatened and
2
development to proceed in a sustainable manner. '
The UNFCCC did not stipulate what the level of "dangerous anthropogenic
interference" would be. The IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report determined the
goal should be to stabilize at 440-500ppt within the next 20-40 years in order to
avoid worsening the situation.22 Yet, in 1992 when the UNFCCC was adopted, it
did not mandate any emission cuts; it only "urged" Annex I (developed countries)
to reduce their GHGs to 1990 levels.23 The measures used demonstrated that
developed states were committed to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions.
Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries), however, were not given such an
"aim" to reduce GHGs. However, all Parties were required to fulfill binding
commitments to report on their national inventory of anthropogenic emissions and
measures taken to implement the UNFCCC.24 At the first Conference of the Parties
to the UJNFCCC (COP-1), the Parties adopted the Berlin Mandate where they
stated that more action needed to be taken to address climate change and that the
developed countries were to "take the lead.",25 The result of the process started in
Berlin was the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.

18. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for
signatureMay 29, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 24, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
19. Id. The Climate Convention has near universal participation with 192 Parties as of Jan 20,
Ratification,
Status
of
UNFCCC
Change
Secretariat,
Climate
See
2006.
http://unfccc.int/files/essential-background/convention/status-of ratification/application/pdf/unfcccsco
nvjrat.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
20. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. As of June
24, 2008, there were 182 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol, Status of Ratification,
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto-protocol/background/status-of ratification/application/pdf/kp-ratification.
pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
21. UNFCCC, supra note 18, Art. 2.
22. SYNTHESIS - IPCC FOURTH, supra note 5.
23. UNFCCC, supranote 18, Art. 4(2)(b).
24. Id.
25. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 28 - April
7, 1995, Report of the Conference of the Parties, 1/CP.1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6,
1995) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].
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The Kyoto Protocol was the first global treaty to introduce binding GHG
6
emission reduction targets for Annex I Parties. These targets are expressed in
terms of assigned amounts or allowed emission, which can be divided into
27
assigned amount units (AAUs) similar to pollution permits or allowances. In the
first commitment period, 2008-2012, the Annex I Parties are required reduce their
GHGs to an average of 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels as specified in Annex
B. 28 The idea is that these commitments will be made more stringent over time,
hence, reducing the GHG emissions even further. At the last Conference of the
Parties to the UNFCCC, COP-13 in Bali, the Parties agreed to negotiate an
agreement by 2009 to address how to include mitigation commitments or actions
for developing countries, especially the fast-growing ones such as China and India,
in addition to re-engaging the United States, and strengthen Kyoto's Annex I
commitments. 29
A. Kyoto's Flexible Market Mechanism
The Kyoto Protocol introduced three market-based mechanisms to facilitate
the implementation of the Annex I Parties' commitments, thus in effect setting the
stage for a cap-and-trade system. The three mechanisms are emissions trading,
joint implementation (RI), and the clean development mechanism (CDM). 30 These
mechanisms are considered a cost-effective way for Annex I Parties to meet their
binding emission reduction commitments. This allows Annex I Parties to make use
of lower-cost opportunities to reduce emissions, irrespective of the territory of the
Party in which those opportunities exist.
Emissions trading enables Annex I Parties (developed countries) or entities
within these Parties to trade allowances with other Annex I Parties. 31 Annex I
Parties acquire AAUs from other Annex I Parties and use them towards meeting
their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. If they are able to bring down
their own emissions below the commitment level, then Annex I Parties may
prepare to sell units they do not require for compliance. Annex I Parties are
required to hold a minimum level of units in its national registry to avoid
"overselling" units and subsequently being unable to meet their own emissions
targets. 3 2 In addition, emission trading "shall be supplemental to domestic
actions. 33
A cap and trade system needs a strictly enforced cap to make C02 credits
scarcer, and hence, more valuable. This would increase the incentive for businesses
to control their emissions. Clearly, this mechanism is taking advantage of the free
26. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, art. 3 and Annex B.
27. Id. See also MICHAEL B. GERRARD, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 43 (2007).
28. GERRARD at 42.
29. UNFCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention,
Revised Draft Decision -/CP.13, 3 - 4, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007L.7/Rev. I (Dec. 14, 2007) available
at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop- 3/application/pdf/cp baliactp.pdf.
30. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, arts. 26, 35, 38, 40.
31. Id. art. 17.
32. See GERRARD,supra note 27, at 43.
33. Id.
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market system. This would imply that the Kyoto Protocol would have nothing to
gain from a system where impediments were put in the way of trade liberalization.
The EU launched the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), the first
international emissions trading mechanism, on January 1, 2005. 34 The current price
for carbon is around E27/tCO2. 35 The carbon price is the price of an allowance to
emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide.36
The CDM is a very different type of flexible mechanism from emissions
trading. It enables Annex I Parties or private entities in the developed countries to
carry out projects that reduce GHG emissions in the territory of non-Annex I
countries in return for credits they can apply toward their own emission reduction
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.37 Once the project is certified, the Annex
I Parties are issued Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).3 8 These projects are
also required to promote sustainable development in the host state, the non-Annex
I Party. CERs were allowed to generate from CDMs starting from the year 2000.
This mechanism promotes foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries.
Just as with emissions trading and JI project, CDMs are to be supplemental to
measures taken domestically in Annex I Party countries. 39 Also the CDM projects,
just as the JI projects, are to be additional to the GHGs emission reduction that
would have occurred without the project. 40 Furthermore, 2% from the proceeds
from CDM projects (CERs) are levied to assist 4developing countries most
vulnerable to climate change to meet adaptation costs. '
Joint Implementation is structured to enable Annex I Parties to receive credits
emission reduction units (ERUs) they can use toward their own emission
reduction targets by implementing projects in the territory of another Annex I Party
that reduce emissions or increase removals by sinks.42 Most projects will likely
take place in states with economies in transition (EITs) where emissions can be cut
at a lower cost than in the OECD states. 43

34. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS) Insights and Opportunities, http://www.oebu.ch/oebu/downloads/eu-ets_0505.pdf (last
visited Apr. 16, 2008).
35. Pointcarbon.com,
(last visited
http://www.pointcarbon.com/Home/Carbon%20Market%20Daily/article6521-632.html
June 22, 2008) (daily updates on the price of carbon).
36. Press Release, euets.com, European Energy Auction and New Values merge their activities
into Climex, a leading spot C02 exchange for EUAs and CERs (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://euets.com/ index.php?page=news&newsid=65&1=1.
37. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, art.12.
38. Id. art. 12(3)(a).
39. Id. art. 12(2).
40. Id. art.12(5)(c).
41. Id. art.12(8).
42. Id. art. 6(1),
43. UNFCC: A GUIDE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND ITS KYOTO PROTOCOL 29
(2002), http://unfccc.int/resource/guideconvkp-p.pdf.
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IV. WTO BACKGROUND
The original global trade regime was planned toward the end of WWII to
prevent another world war. 44 Part of the reasoning was that protectionism was an
element in the conflict, so by establishing a system to promote free trade by
45
reducing trade barriers, similar conflicts would be avoided. In 1947, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was adopted. This agreement operated a
system of trade rules without having a formal organization because the
46
International Trade Organization was never established. Then, in 1995, the WTO
to administer the trade agreements, now under an umbrella
was established
47
agreement.
The goal of the WTO is to improve the welfare of peoples by, among other
things, "raising their standard of living" and "expanding the production of trade in
goods and services, while allowing for optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development seeking both to protect
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so...' The
effects of climate change will destroy the possibility of reaching that goal in the
long term. Strong measures need to be taken to address climate change by all
actors in society, at domestic and international levels, including the WTO.
In 1971, the GATT General Council established the Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade (EMIT Group) to deal with environment related
issues, however it was never convened. 49 The Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE) was established under the WTO in 1995 to take over from the
EMIT Group. 50 However, CTE can only make recommendations for changes in the
WTO rules. 5'
The first landmark case addressing trade and environment issues was the
Tuna Dolphin Case. 52 The United States acting under its Marine Mammal
Protection Act banned tuna from Mexico, Venezuela, and other nations whose
dolphin kill was over 1.25 times the dolphin kill of the United States.53 Mexico
challenged this ban stating it breached the WTO rules covering the prohibition on
44. Sandra Blanco & Enrique Carrasco, The Functions of the IMF and the World Bank, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 70 (1999)
"

45. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 127 ( 2 d ed. 2000); see

The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh,
also WTO, Understanding the WTO: Basics
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/fact4_e.htm.
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also WTO, Understanding the WTO: Basics - What is the World Trade
Agreement
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/factl-e.htm.
Organization?,
Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Organization Agreement], Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. GARY P. SAMPSON, THE WTO AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 18-19 (2005).

50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
versus
US:
'tuna-dolphin,'
4:
Mexico
Disputes
52. WTO,
Environment:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir e/edis04_e.htm [hereinafter Tuna-dolphin].
53. BHALA, supra note 45 at 1593.
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quantitative restrictions.54 The GATT panel ruled in favor of Mexico, determining
that a state could not discriminate between domestic and imported "like products"
based on the production method.55 However, the report was never adopted by the
GATT General
Council and the case was withdrawn by the United States and
56
Mexico.
The Shrimp Turtle Case is considered a breakthrough for environmental
protection. 57 It was the first case dealing with the environment to be decided by
the WTO Panel and Appellate Body.58 In this case, the United States banned
shrimp imported from states that did not use "turtle excluder devices" as specified
under the US Endangered Species Act.5 9 India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand
claimed the ban breached the WTO rules on the elimination of quantified
restrictions. The United States claimed the ban was legal under Article XX
exception of GATT 1994.61 The United States appealed the Panel's report ruling
against it. The Appellate Body decided the measure stipulated by the US law was
legitimate under the XX(g) exception. However, the Appellate Body concluded
that the exception was applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, hence,
the Appellate Body ruled against the United States. This ruling has opened the
door to the possibility of the WTO deciding future cases in favor of states utilizing
measures to address the PPMs, not just the products' attributes. In the context of
climate change, WTO member states can perhaps claim Art.XX(g) directly when
taking measures against other members' products produced using highly GHG
emitting energy sources. The argument would be that the PPM measures were used
for the protection of an exhaustive natural resource, specifically the climate system
which is being endangered by GHG emissions.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WTO AND THE CLIMATE TREATIES

In general, the WTO rules and the climate treaties are mutually supportive in
the quest for improving the welfare of humankind through greater economic
efficiency. 62 The trade-related measures included in the climate treaties address
market failures, for example, by phasing out subsidies in GHG emitting sectors,63
and hence removing trade restrictions. In their relationship with trade, the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both specifically address the issue. The
UNFCCC stipulates that the Parties are to support an open international economic
system and not use measures that constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
54. SAMPSON, supra note 49, at 98.

55. Id.; see also Tuna-dolphin, supra note 52.
56. BHALA, supra note 45, at 1593.
57. Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp
Products,
2,
WT/DS58/AB/R
(Oct.
12,
1998),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/58abr.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp-turtle].
58. SAMPSON, supra note 49, at 99.
59. Shrimp-turtle, supra note 57.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Id. at 10. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, 1994, Art. 1, 1867 U.N.T.S 187 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
62. See Charnovitz, supra note 12 at 143.
63. IPCC FOURTH, supra note 4.
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64
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. The Kyoto
Protocol states that the Parties are to implement measures in such a manner that
65
they minimize the adverse effects on international trade. WTO rules, on the other
hand, facilitate implementation of trade-related climate measures by ensuring that
measures are actually used to address climate change. However, the climate
regimes are preventative, while the WTO dispute system focuses on addressing
treaty violations, which leads to a lack of clarity in many instances, influencing the
choice of climate policies. 66
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, unlike other multilateral environmental
treaties, are not just focused on the environment. If fully implemented, these
instruments will shift the paradigm of economic activity, moving the global market
from a fossil-based economy to a low-carbon economy, in part by using the
market-based mechanisms. This leads to fundamental changes in the bases of
67
production and consumption, transport, investment, and sources of energy. None
of the climate treaties require that the Parties impose trade measures, yet together
with the market-based mechanisms available to the Parties and the non-compliance
mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, in addition to the trade-related measures utilized
domestically in their implementation, the treaties may well be inconsistent with the
WTO rules if they are not designed properly.68 However, the idea that WTO
operates in a vacuum is no longer viable. Making progress in addressing climate
change, especially in regards to the treaty or treaties that the Bali Roadmap is
scheduled to produce by 2009,69 calls for changes in the relationship between the
WTO and the climate change regime. Any trade measures inserted into the climate
treaties should be carefully written in order to avoid conflicts with the WTO rules
and the WTO rules need to become more sensitive to the new scenario of traderelated measures used to address climate change.70

One of the arguments for the tension between the WTO and the climate
regime is that the non-Parties to the climate regime will get a free ride or should be
considered to have a subsidy because they do not need to take measures to address
climate change. However, examining which States are Parties to the UNFCCC and
its Kyoto Protocol and which States are members of the WTO reveals that all
71
Parties to the UNFCCC are either members of the WTO or WTO observers.
64. UNFCCC, supra note 18, art. 3, 5. This principle is also referenced in the preamble of the
Kyoto Protocol.
65. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20, art. 2, 3.
66. Charnovitz, supra note 12, at 144.
67. See Aaron Cosbey, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at 1 (1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/kyoto.pdf.
68. Making the measures non-discriminatory, for instance, increases their chance of being WTOcompatible.
69. Rachmat Witoelar, President, 13th Session of Conference of Parties to the UN Framework
2007),
15,
1
(Dec.
Roadmap
The
Bali
Change,
Climate
on
Convention
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-l 3/application/pdf/close.stat-copl 3_president.pdf.
70. Charnovitz, supra note 12, at 141, 163.
71. To be considered a WTO observer you must have started accession negotiations, in other
words you are on your way to becoming a member. WTO, Understanding the WTO: How to Join the
WTO: the accession process, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org3_e.htm#join.
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Only six members of the WTO, along with four of the WTO observers, are not
Party to the Kyoto Protocol, yet all are members of the UNFCCC. n This indicates
that the membership of the WTO and the climate treaties are very nearly the same.
Therefore, the issue of discrimination against non-Parties is very unlikely to be a
big issue, except in the case of the United States, which is the only Annex I Party
of the UNFCCC which is a member of the WTO, but not a Party to the Kyoto
Protocol.
A lot of focus has been placed on the issue of what the EU is willing to do
vis-A-vis the United States in the case of competitiveness concerns because the
United States has failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. When the EU imports
products from the United States, the companies producing them have not been
subject to emission reduction measures such as carbon taxes. Hence, the American
companies enjoy a competitive advantage over the EU companies. The EU may
introduce border adjustment taxes to level the paying field. That way the goo
American goods would face a tax at the border equivalent to the carbon tax faced
by the domestic producers.73 Another option is for the EU to impose a carbon levy
directly on imported products from the United States, claiming that it is qualified
to do so directly under Art. XX(g). Specifically, the EU could claim that the
United States products are produced using PPMs that damage the environment.
In the use of flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, there is an ongoing debate as to whether the allowances or credits that Annex I Parties can buy
or sell to each other constitute "goods" or "products" under the WTO rules.
Trading exclusively between Annex I Parties may breach the most favored nation
(MFN) principle, discriminating against non-Annex I Parties under GATT 1994.74
Several scholars claim the allowances are more likely to be classified as
"securities," in other words, transferable financial instruments.75 In such cases, it is
not the GATT rules but the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) rules
that come into play. The MFN principle under GATS would mean allowing traders
from all countries to handle trades of allowances. 76
VI. REFORMING

THE WTO

Amending the WTO to include a clause similar to the NAFTA provision,
giving precedence to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) if NAFTA
obligations and MEAs are not compatible, would be one way to avoid some of the

72. WTO members that are members of the UNFCCC, but not Kyoto: Brunei, Darussalam, Chad,
Turkey, United States, and Zimbabwe. WTO observer governments that are Parties to the UNFCCC,
but not Kyoto: Afghanistan, Andorra, Holy See, and Tajikistan. UNFCCC has 192 parties and the
Kyoto Protocol has 182 Parties, while the WTO has 152 Member States. See WTO, Understanding the
WTO-Member and Observers List, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtose/whatise/tife/org6_e.htm
(last visited June 23, 2008); UNFCCC, supra note 18; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20.
73. Cinnamon Carlame, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions Between Free
Trade andEnvironmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71 (2006).
74. GATT, supra note 61.
75. See Carlame, supra note 73, at 45, 58.
76. See GATT, supra note 61, art. I.
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above-mentioned problems.77 Another possibility is to amend Article XX under
GATT 1994 to include a provision validating MEAs, making an exception for
trade measures adopted under MEAs 78 that would otherwise be questionable under
GATT.
Taking into account how urgent and all-encompassing the climate change
problem is, the WTO should adopt a an agreement on the trade-related aspects of
climate change law under is auspices. This agreement would address all the issues
described above and would include the transfer of clean technology and services as
already suggested by the EU and the United States. Also in the same overarching
perspective, a Committee on Trade and Climate Change should be established to
focus on all the trade issues that will arise in conjunction with the effects of
measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change in the short and long term.
VII. CONCLUSION

Climate change is a serious issue that needs urgent action immediately.
Measures taken under the climate change treaties should focus on how to take
advantage of trade liberalization while avoiding impediments to trade. 79 The
WTO needs to be working on how it can address climate change issues related to
trade in a comprehensive manner. 80 This paper has demonstrated how the climate
change treaties and the WTO regime have the same goal, namely, promoting
human welfare. This paper has also examined the relationship between the WTO
and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change with its Kyoto Protocol
and has indicated how the WTO needs to change in order to the enable the urgent
action needed to address climate change. This paper then suggested that, in the
course of the Doha negotiations on trade and environment, the WTO membership
should negotiate and adopt an agreement on the trade-related aspects of climate
change law to promote emissions trading, address labeling requirements for GHG
emissions and other climate-related PPM policy measures, and include the terms of
the proposed agreement on trade in climate friendly technology. 8' In addition the
WTO should establish a Committee on Trade and Climate Change to address all
areas where climate issues intersect with trade issues.

77. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 40, Sept. 14,
1993, 32 I.L.M.1480.
78. See Carlame, supra note 73, at 85.
79. Chamovitz, supra note 12 at 164.
80. Id.
81. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 14.
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On the topic of improving national enforcement as a key tool to better
governance under multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), I have the honor
to offer this short paper of recommendations. The views expressed here are
entirely my own and do not represent those of United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) or the U.S. Government. While I regret that I am
unable to attend the meeting, I hope that this paper will contribute to useful
discussion and outcomes.
Here I address "'enforcement" by national governments applying national law
against regulated enterprises (including "persons" of any type) to achieve

compliance with nationaf law to implement MEA obligations. More specifically, I
recommend steps by which (1) Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to MEAs and (2)
MEA Secretariats may support and strengthen "enforcement" by national
governments to this end. (I do not address related topics such as assuring

' For the past 14 years, Mr. Emory has served as a senior attorney in the international compliance
assurance unit of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. A 1967 graduate of Harvard Law School,
he has 29 years of government experience in both civil and criminal environmental enforcement. He
has worked at the state, national, and international levels, and in all three branches of government. The
views expressed herein are his own and do not represent the USEPA. This article is based only on
information previously published officially or reported publicly. Since 2006, only a very few revisions
have been made.
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"compliance" by national governments with their MEA obligations, the role of the
WTO, international law, or trade measures.)
In what follows, sections I-III describe structural and institutional measures to
enable MEAs to better support national enforcement. In addition, for the topic of
import/export control, section IV offers a number of solutions addressing mostly
systems, process, and operations.
I. ESTABLISH AN ENFORCEMENT COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIES

If the Parties to a MEA have the vision or goal that as national governments
they want more MEA enforcement, the Parties should form an Enforcement
Committee of the Parties. National representatives to Enforcement Committees of
the Parties should be persons who have had hands-on, on-duty enforcement
experience. This means that their expertise and identities should not or will not be
the same as that of:
" The high-level policy makers who are the National Focal Points for
MEAs,
" Persons who serve on chemical-selection, wildlife-listing, and other
such committees where scientific research, environmental
monitoring, and standard setting are done, or
" Persons, often with diplomatic or trade expertise, who serve on
Compliance Committees and address on a state-to-state basis
questions of national compliance and the application of MEA
compliance-assurance mechanisms to other nations.
While an Implementation Committee of the Parties may address enforcement,
"implementation" is a very broad word, and Implementation Committees have not
produced sufficient progress in enforcement. The most undiluted, immediate, and
effective enforcement results will be obtained by forming Enforcement
Committees of the Parties.
II. HIRE MORE STAFF WITH ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE
If the secretariat of a MEA has the vision or goal that, as an international civil
servant, he or she wants to support more MEA enforcement, hire staff with the
relevant experience. Such personnel would not enforce. They would credibly
interact with and support national authorities actually doing the enforcement.
MEA secretariats staffed with more enforcement experience should proactively
propose and (within their authority) take supportive actions, and raise issues of
enforcement policy for decisions by Enforcement Committees of the Parties and by
COPs.
III. DESIGNATE AND EMPOWER ONE UNIT OF UNEP TO BE THE COORDINATING
LEAD INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR SUPPORT TO NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

If the United Nations (UN) system and the COPs of the MEAs have the vision
or the goal that MEA enforcement should be more synergized, collectively
designate one unit of UNEP to be the coordinating lead agency for cross-cutting
enforcement issues affecting all or many MEAs. The unit that is "UNEP Lead for
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MEA Enforcement Support" will need some new (but limited) powers and duties,
including:
" Institutional responsibility for ongoing work to address and offer
synergistic solutions to improve national enforcement and
international cooperation supporting it for MEAs,"
" Authority to convene and to present for consideration new,
systematic approaches, and some new means to encourage
integration as may be needed among currently quite autonomous
individual MEA secretariats, and
" Representational authority to meet regularly with InterPol, the World
Customs Organization (WCO), the U.N. Centre for Trade
Facilitation and Electronic Business (CEFACT), and other public
(and non-governmental, as appropriate) international organizations,
to coordinate on behalf of all MEA secretariats on cross-cutting
issues.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The remaining solutions are focused on import/export control (I do not
address the many aspects of national enforcement that are domestic or internal).
To combat international trafficking that undercuts MEAs, there is enormous
potential for improved measures that are simple and effective. An ultimate goal
should be comprehensive data management with automated inter-ministerial data
linkages to assure real-time approvals and interdictions. Where today national
regulatory action is failing, it can become quick and accurate.
For constructive change to occur, directors of MEA secretariats and
concerned Parties should provide more vision and leadership. First, develop a
comprehensive vision of the prerequisites needed to enable effective national
enforcement - such as a more uniform and integrated international system and the
other steps or solutions offered in this paper - and a vision of what constitutes
effective national enforcement (some indicators or measures of enforcement
success). Second, establish more leadership to implement the steps to the visionleadership to cause steady, regular action on solutions offered in this paper.
Implementation of the following solutions usually would follow the same process,
1. Propose to all Parties,
2.

Pilot among willing Parties, and

3.

Prescribe by decisions of COPs that successful measures become
treaty obligations.
A. Designate and Empower One Unit among each Nation's MEA FocalPoints to
be "NationalLeadfor MEA Enforcement Coordination"
MEA secretariats individually and the "UNEP Lead for MEA Enforcement
Support" should encourage each Party to designate one unit among the MEA Focal
Points of a national government to be the lead agency for coordinating with the
national customs ministry on common (or '"cross-cutting") enforcement issues
affecting all or many of the MEAs to which the nation is a Party. The Party's unit
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that is "National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination" will be responsible at
the national level for moving toward integration and uniformity, to reduce the
fragmentation and confusion within and among national ministries that multiple
MEA Focal Points have created for customs officers.
Below the level of MEA Focal Points, in most countries the operational
national programs for approving and monitoring international trade are complex,
varied, and dispersed among and within ministries. It is essential that these
national programs organize themselves both to streamline operations and present
one window to front-line customs officers who need to know where to request
quick environmental assistance to implement MEAs at borders. National
ministries that are responsible for MEAs yet unable or unwilling to reform may
need a presidential order or legislation.
B. Link each Nation's Customs Ministry with the Nation's Environmental(and
other MEA Focal-Point)Ministries
MEA secretariats should suggest to or encourage Parties to focus on linking
customs ministries with environmental (and other MEA Focal-Point) ministries in
each Party nation.
For example, to integrate and channel all trade-data
communications in the U.S., Customs and Border Protection and each U.S.
national ministry wanting its help for trade control must create what is called the
"single-window." This data linkage will be a good foundation to enable full-scope
cooperation in all aspects of the inter-ministerial working relationship.
For delivery to each "National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination" of
a Party, the UNEP unit that is the "UNEP Lead for MEA Enforcement Support"
should develop a Model National Inter-Ministerial MEA Cooperation Agreement.
This document would provide a framework and offer generic details of effective
intra-governmental, domestic working relationships.
Within any Party, its
"National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination" would negotiate such an
agreement with the national customs ministry. Such agreements should make
arrangements for routine inter-ministerial information sharing, and should organize
these diverse ministries around the shared goals of permitting and tracking (i.e.,
monitoring compliance of) international shipments effectively (with speed and
accuracy).
Arrangements for inter-ministerial information sharing must be appropriate to
the state of development of any Party. A Model National Inter-Ministerial MEA
Cooperation Agreement should arrange for information to move by paper and fax.
As for Parties to an MEA (at least those that are advanced countries) that have the
vision or goal to use computers to achieve speed and accuracy in permitting and
tracking of international shipments, a Model National Inter-Ministerial MEA
Cooperation Agreement will establish the means for comprehensive data
management with automated inter-ministerial data linkages to assure real-time
approvals and interdictions.
C. Require Product-Specific Codes so that Modern Methods Including Computers
can be Used
If the Parties to an MEA have the vision or goal that modem methods
including computers should be usable to achieve speed and accuracy in permitting
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and tracking of international shipments, with the assistance of MEA secretariats,
Parties should move to develop and, by decisions of the COPs, to require as MEA
obligations that Parties use chemical-specific and other-product-specific codes. In
addition, codes should be explored and as soon as feasible required both for
business entities and "persons" of any type, and for physical plants or facilities
subject to regulation to implement MEAs.
As the WCO's HTS codes often are too broad or general to assure accurate
compliance monitoring, they can be supplemented by more detailed codes
sometimes called "qualifiers". For example, for chemicals the required coding
could well be the HTS code hyphenated to the CAS code. The WCO may
facilitate and accommodate such product-specific qualifiers, but it is not likely to
require them for environmental (non-customs) purposes. This is likely to be the
responsibility of MEAs. Achieving this overdue measure is a prerequisite to using
computers to manage MEA data needed for national approvals and interdictions.
D. Propose/Pilot/Prescribe
More StandardizedLicensingSchemes and Movement
Documents
Within MEA secretariats, design and propose to the Parties systematic
approaches to compliance monitoring for imports and exports. Presently, most
MEAs allow and (where lacking detailed models or standards) do little to
discourage a plethora of discordant national approaches. The burden on customs
officers to comprehend and recognize MEA requirements and covered trade is too
great. As examples:
" Even where licensing is required as a treaty obligation, the details of
any scheme may be whatever a nation imagines - or fails to imagine
properly.
" It is worse for shipping documents. For example, a customs officer,
instead of just one or perhaps 5 or 10 movement-documents formats,
may be faced with hundreds or a thousand or more (e.g., 5 MEAs X
200 countries = 1,000 different movement documents).
To customs officers, MEAs may be analogized to satellites in space. Both
seem unreal - impossibly remote, mysterious, and disconnected. Let us compare
to MEA secretariats the operators of television satellites in relation to their
customers, television owners wanting satellite programming. Like front-line
customs posts, individual television sets will fail to operate without having
essential and highly complex connections that their individual operators can
scarcely imagine or create for themselves. For this reason, satellite signal
providers carefully design and offer one system with the best means to make all
linkages (see para. IV(B) above on linkages), including dishes and cables all
properly coded (see para. IV(C) above on codes) to connect with end users.
Customs officers should enjoy an MEA system presenting a comprehensible
uniformity and connectedness from top to bottom, from MEA secretariat to
customs post. An MEA compliance-monitoring system would include an
international model or standardized (1) notification/application form, (2)
licensing/approval process, and (3) accompanying documentation form. In
addition to a paper process, there would be a parallel paperless process available

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 36:3/4

for advanced countries. The result of good MEA systems design for any customs
officer also could be a seamless "plug-in-and-play" experience, almost as ordinary
and simple as switching on a television properly connected to a satellite!
The system of passports (for humans exporting and importing themselves)
also is ordinary, routine, and unremarkable. It is a useful vision for what may be
achieved for shipments controlled by MEAs. For human travelers, Parties have
agreed to prescribe national passports that are highly standardized. Customs
officers instantly recognize human passports, and - because of their commonality
and compatibility-they know exactly what they mean and how to read them. The
shipment (a human) is recognized by two unique identifiers (the individual's
picture and file number or code), and for immediate verification usually there is an
automated inter-ministerial data linkage (a bar code) by which the customs officer
can check instantly with the approving ministry. At national option, visas can be
required to document prior informed consent to import a traveler.
For chemicals and other products, MEA secretariats could well move to offer
more detailed legal elements and programs for national compliance monitoring for
imports and exports, both for notification/approval/licensing schemes and for
movement documents. At least for electronic messaging, CEFACT provides an
existing forum bringing together industry (see para. IV(G) below), customs, and
environmental professionals. This work is similar to and may encompass
standardization for MEA import/export messaging processes. The "UNEP Lead
for MEA Enforcement Support" (see para. III above) could well join in the
CEFACT work. As models or proposed standards are developed for MEAs, during
any piloting or testing phase, Parties may chose to take up (plug in to) a proposed
model or standard. As these are refined and proven successful in testing, COPs
should convert them to become required elements of national law within
increasingly standardized international systems. As Parties adopt international
standards, they would reduce the confusion of discordant national schemes.
As with human passports and CEFACT, for chemicals (and other products
regulated by MEAs) the purpose of adopting an international system for
compliance monitoring would not be to diminish but to bolster national
sovereignty to deal with violations. These occur mostly in international travel and
trade between nations, when only briefly may violators (whether human
passengers or chemicals) be within the grasp of a nation's jurisdiction. Good
systems design will enable any nation - during the moment when a violator is
present at the national port or border - to enforce effectively. More international
standardization will not mean supra-national "world government." It will mean
that MEA secretariats and leading Parties will have done more to enable all Parties
to fulfill their treaty obligations to effective national enforcement.
E. Develop an Intelligence Capabilityto Anticipate Illegalityand Assess Threats
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol) failed to anticipate illegality, assess threats, and foresee that its
implementation would give rise to black markets and rampant smuggling by
organized and entrepreneurial criminals. This failure now should not be repeated.
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For example, while probably there will be little trade for most chemicals
covered by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(Stockholm Convention), for this and the Rotterdam Convention, each chemical
and its market should be studied. Analysts first would look domestically or
internally for black markets. If a black market is found, the analysis would extend
to possible foreign sources and users. If there are any, this finding would implicate
international trade. Some seaports or transit nations that are suspected smuggling
entrepots should be studied and be the subjects of intelligence threat assessments.
This work could be undertaken by key Parties on behalf of all, or perhaps by the
unit of UNEP designated to be the coordinating lead agency for cross-cutting
enforcement issues.
The resulting MEA risk assessments and inspection targeting criteria will be
welcomed by customs ministries. With this information, they will be able to
expedite apparently legitimate trade and have a rational basis for focusing their
scarce inspectional resources only on shipments most deserving close scrutiny.
For customs ministries, success will be finding more environmental violators by
better applying front-line resources that are not increasing.
F. Require that CriminalPenaltiesbe Available
If the Parties to a MEA want to maximize deterrence ("voluntary"
compliance) and (where there are serious violations) to interest prosecutors and
judges, they should enact explicit criminal penalties, including prison time. (It is
not enough to use "illegal," a word that at least includes minor infractions but does
not necessarily extend to what is "criminal.") The most serious punishments are
appropriate for many import/export violations, where usually there will be criminal
intent and culpability, for several reasons:
" Persons involved will have great sophistication (knowledge) to be in
the business of shipping in commercial quantities internationally,
" Groups of smugglers often are organized as criminal enterprises,
"

The large risk of harm and therefore wrongfulness, such as
contributing to species extinction, or mishandling of chemicals
globally recognized as most environmentally hazardous, it is or
should be obvious to persons involved, and
" The illegality of the conduct is known and intended, as proven by
evasive or clandestine behavior.
COPs should require as an MEA obligation that national law provide
available criminal penalties for appropriate cases.
To maintain balance, MEA secretariats and Parties should not speak only of
concern for investigating illegal trafficking and crime fighting. Of equal concern
should be promoting and monitoring compliance for all shipments, and for
expediting clearance of the majority of shipments that are legitimate. Front-line,
uniformed customs inspectors first must be enabled to succeed (in the routine
compliance monitoring and detection of suspect shipments) before there will be
many cases for law-enforcement officers who are criminal investigators. For
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routine infractions that do not rise to criminality, Parties should be encouraged to
provide administrative processes and penalties.
G. Engage Legitimate Industry as Partners
Here and in other import-export measures, when designing national regulatory
programs, MEA secretariats and Parties should engage legitimate industry (e.g.,
trade associations of importers and exporters). The leading stakeholders will:
" Know much (have useful intelligence) about their unlawful
competitors who are undercutting the stakeholders' legitimate
businesses,
" Use modem methods, including computers [available] commercially,
to achieve speed and accuracy in tracking of their international
shipments,
" Understand and apply systems design to their production and
transportation processes,
" Engage in international standardization efforts and organizations,
and
" Cooperate with governments to combat illegal enterprises and to
assist governments to develop information technology systems to
achieve on-line (computerized) notifications, applications, and
tracking of international shipments.
For example, to support the implementation of the Montreal Protocol by the
U.S. government in the enforcement of the U.S. Clean Air Act, the private sector
provided key assistance including intelligence and sampling equipment. The result
was the detection and criminal conviction of many smugglers of ozone-depleting
substances. This fruitful collaboration can be repeated. With outreach to private
stakeholders, secretariats and national governments can join with legitimate
industry to achieve as shared goals expedited clearance of proper shipments and
real-time detection and investigation of suspect shipments.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this paper has described solutions by which MEA secretariats
and concerned Parties may support and strengthen "enforcement" by national
governments. Paragraphs I
III described U.N. structural and institutional
measures to this end. For the key international topic import/export control, this
paper offered a vision of a more integrated system. To realize the improvements
described, MEA secretariats and concerned Parties should exercise more
leadership in a regular course of action to:
1. Proposemodels and possible standards to all Parties,
2.

Pilot these measures among willing Parties, and

3.

Prescribe by decisions of COPs that successful measures become
international standards and MEA (treaty) obligations.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TRADE AND EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT

W. DAVIS JONES*

I.

FREE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

A. Trade Agreements to Achieve High Levels of EnvironmentalProtection
There is a worldwide movement toward greater liberalization of international
trade. This is seen at a global level through the Doha round of negotiations of the
World Trade Organization. Regional examples include the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)' between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the
agreement between five countries in Central America, the Dominican Republic,
and the United States (CAFTA-DR),2 and trading agreements between countries in
other regions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 3 The United States has established
bilateral agreements with Israel, Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco,
Bahrain and Oman, and continues negotiations or is in the approval process with
South Korea, Peru, Panama, Colombia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.
The United States also is working toward comprehensive agreements that will
create the Free Trade Area of the Americas.4 It is a busy time at the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative and the associated agencies involved in these
negotiations. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)
continues to be an active part of the negotiating team to ensure that environmental
issues are appropriately addressed.

" International Enforcement Training Coordinator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Mail Code

2254A, Washington, DC 20460, jones.davis@epa.gov. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not represent the views of the USEPA.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?DetailID=78
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement, May 28, 2004,
119 Stat 462, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-

DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.htm [hereinafter CAFTA].
3. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 236 U.N.T.S. 1983;
Customs Union Agreement Between the Governments of Lesotho, Botswana, South American and
Swaziland Treaty, Dec. 11, 1969, 70 U.N.T.S. 1973.

4. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act, 110 Stat. 3058, 19 U.S.C. § 2112
(2008); Implementation of Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2008).
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The purpose of these agreements is to increase trade by reducing tariffs on
traded goods and services and reduce non-tariff trade barriers that could include
regulatory activities designed to protect or give advantages to domestic companies
over foreign investors. Pursuant to executive order, the United States is obligated
to level the economic playing field in a way that does not allow environmental
protection to be imperiled by increased trade. The United States also may not
allow low levels of environmental protection to create havens for polluting
industries seeking to create competitive
advantages by escaping the stringent
5
American environmental rules.
B. Effective Enforcement of EnvironmentalLaws
There are significant enforcement concerns with the various environmental
provisions of our free trade agreements (FTAs) and there have been a number of
challenges to U.S. regulatory decisions. Other countries can challenge USEPA
regulatory actions for violating trade rules, and investment provisions allow
challenges from foreign investors that are allegedly locked out of the U.S. market
by environmental rules. 6 Other provisions are included in FTAs to ensure that the
lack of environmental enforcement is not used as an incentive for environmentally
devastating activities. The USEPA and other government agencies have focused
on capacity-building
activities to improve the environmental governance of U.S.
7
trading partners.
In all of its recent FTAs, the United States has included environmental
chapters that contain core obligations to provide for high levels of environmental
protection. These chapters ensure effective enforcement of environmental laws, as
well as recognition that it is inappropriate to derogate from these laws to encourage
trade or investment. 8 These provisions recognize that an environmental legal
regime can only reach its goal of protecting human health and the environment if
the regulated entities put the requirements in practice and comply with those
requirements.
Compliance cannot be achieved if there is not an effective
compliance program to motivate people to change their behavior. Compliance
programs use compliance incentives and compliance assistance together with
compliance monitoring, sanctions and legal remedies when the regulated
community fails to meet its obligations under the law.
All recent FTA environment chapters include provisions to promote public
participation, provide appropriate remedies for violations of environmental laws,
and promote measures to enhance environmental performance.9 CAFTA-DR
5. Exee. Order No. 13141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999).
6. NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 1115-17.
7. CAFTA, supranote 2, at annex 17.9.
8. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., CAFTA-DR Countries Sign Environmental
Provisions
(Feb.
18,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2005/Februay/US,_CAFTADRCountriesSign TwoSupplementalAgreements toFacilitateImplementing.theFTAsEnviron
mentalProvisions.html. Chapter Seventeen of the CAFTA-DR agreement provides a good example.
CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 17,
9. U.S. Trade Representative Press Release, supranote 8.
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establishes a public submission process similar to that established under NAFTA,
and this has been a significant concern for the Central America and Dominican
negotiators where there are recognizable gaps in their compliance and enforcement
programs. 10 To quote from CAFTA-DR Article 17.2.1(a), "A Party shall not fail
to effectively enforce its environmental laws...."" Further, Article 17.7 outlines
an enforcement procedure to follow if that clause is violated: "Any person of a
Party may file a submission
asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its
12
environmental laws."
The Humane Society International (HSI) filed the first of these submissions
under CAFTA-DR on May 8, 2007, alleging that "by failing to complete a
comprehensive inventory of products made from sea turtles as required by
domestic law, the Dominican Republic is failing to effectively enforce sea turtle
protection laws prohibiting the sale of products manufactured from endangered sea
turtles that were captured and killed in the country after July 31, 2001." 13 On
December 5, 2007, the CAFTA-DR Secretariat for Environmental Matters (SEM)
determined that HSI's submission met the terms of the citizen submission
requirements in Article 17.7.4, and formally requested that the Dominican
Republic submit a response to the points raised in the submission. 14
II. WHAT IS EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT

A. U.S. Free Trade Agreements Do Not Clearly Define "Effective Enforcement"
What is meant by "effective enforcement?" The alleged failure to enforce
Dominican laws protecting endangered species cited above and submissions filed
under NAFTA regarding specific activities in the U.S., Canada or Mexico all
address specific examples where environmental laws have not been enforced in a
particular instance or at a particular facility or industry. But what about systemic,
programmatic shortcomings that cause widespread failure to effectively enforce
environmental laws that extend beyond a particular situation?
The definitions contained in the trade agreements are limited and do not
adequately recognize the full range of activities necessary to ensure compliance
with environmental laws. Article 17.13 of the CAFTA-DR defines "environmental
law," "statute and regulation," and "judicial or administrative proceedings," but

10. UNITED

STATES

TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE,

FINAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

REVIEW

OF THE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - CENTRAL AMERICA - UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 16-17

(2005),
available
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/CAFTA/asset upload-file953_7901 .pdf.
11. CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 17.2 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at art. 17.7 (emphasis added).
13. MARTA M. PRADO, ON BEHALF OF THE HUMANE SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL,

at

SECOND

SUBMISSION TO THE SECRETARIAT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICA -

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

UNITED

STATES FREE

TRADE AGREEMENT

1 (2007),

available at

http://www.saa-caftadr.sieca.org.gt/comunic-activas/tortugas/Revised%20Submission.pdf
14. CAFTA-DR SECRETARIAT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS, DETERMINATION ACCORDING TO
ARTICLES 17.7.2 AND 17.7.4 OF THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9 (2007), available at http://www.saa-

caftadr.sieca.org.gt/comunic-activas/tortugas/Determinacion%200riginalEng.pdf
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does not define "enforcement" or "effective." 15 Parties should know with greater
clarity what they are supposed to be effective at doing before agreeing to potential
trade sanctions or penalties for violating a provision of the agreement to which
they become a party.
CAFTA-DR outlines that there should be judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative proceedings in place to sanction and remedy violations. 16 Those
proceedings shall be fair, equitable and transparent, and appropriately and
effectively prescribe remedies or sanctions for violations. 17 The public should be
able to request that the government investigate violations, and the public should be
able to take action against violators themselves or the government if the
government fails to act. The agreement also recognizes the role that voluntary
18
mechanisms and incentives have in enhancing environmental performance.
While very important, these are only a small part of an effective enforcement
program. Of course, these comprise the enforcement sandbox where mostly
lawyers play, but it fails to recognize other aspects of a compliance program,
which are equally important to effectively achieve high levels of protection.
B. Enforcement Cycle Must Include a Full Range ofActivities
A fully functioning compliance and enforcement program is cyclical in
nature. The process begins with the awareness and understanding of the problem,
and continues with the planning and implementation of a program to address the
causes of that problem. The final phase is the evaluation of the effectiveness and
results and the determination of whether or not the goals have been achieved. Part
of that evaluation includes recommendations for changes along the way to improve
the various components of the cycle.
The initial step sets environmental goals that will help recognize and resolve
the problem. Those goals may be to reduce risks posed by particular activities to
human health and the environment, to attain higher levels of environmental quality
such as cleaning the water in a watershed, or reducing urban air contamination.
Prospective goals for pollution prevention or sustainable development may be set
as well as retrospective goals to correct past problems. Extensive information on
the problem is required in order to fully understand what goals may be achievable
given applicable technologies.
Once the goals have been established, management approaches are selected
which will be most effective to reach the goals. These may be regulatory,
voluntary measures, or a liability scheme that relies on individual actions in the
courts, but less on government intervention. Approaches such as the traditional
command and control mechanisms and economic or market based systems usually
have a strong regulatory component, and many voluntary schemes may require
additional laws to be effective. 19
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 17.13.
Id. at art. 17.3.
Id.
Id. at art. 17.4.
Id.
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If a regulatory approach is utilized, the legal requirements may be
implemented through a variety of methods stemming from constitutional
provisions, laws, regulations, individual permits or licenses, and even judicial
determinations that interpret the laws. Developing countries often look to the
United States for examples of these laws, but should be careful as most of the U.S.
laws could be improved or will not work in other contexts.
Once the rules are in place (or ideally, as they are being developed), strategies
and programs must be designed and implemented which program managers will
use to ensure compliance with the requirements. The development of these rules is
not usually considered part of the enforcement scheme, but without thinking of the
enforcement consequences, the laws may be impractical or impossible to
implement. Examples abound where countries have adopted regulations from
other countries that relied on laboratory or field measurement procedures that were
not readily available when the law took affect. 20

As a result, the regulated

community could not determine their own compliance, and the government could
not prove a violation. This can severely damage the credibility of the entire
regulatory structure. Instead of wholesale adoption, countries must adjust foreign
regulations to meet their specific situation and needs.
Programs must set priorities, especially given limited resources, to address
enforcement. The government must decide what industrial sectors or areas to
pursue first and how to efficiently dedicate resources for the greatest return. Part
of the efforts must be dedicated toward educating the regulated community and the
public about the environmental laws and why they should comply through
compliance assistance and compliance promotion. The regulators must develop
strategies to effectively monitor compliance, through government inspections,
industrial self-monitoring, or citizen monitoring and reporting.
Governments should also consider the punitive activity considered so
important to trade negotiators: responding to violations in a consistent, fair, and
appropriate manner. The response should follow standardized and transparent
national policies, yet take into consideration individual factors such as the
appropriate remedy of the violating situation, the economic benefit of the violation,
the gravity of the violation, and compensation for any harm caused.
Finally, the compliance program should be internally and externally evaluated
to determine if it is achieving the behavioral change that leads to environmental
results. Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Indicators 21 can help
demonstrate how resources have been utilized and the resulting benefits to the
environment. Demonstration of these results is crucial to show that the regulatory
authorities are properly using the public's resources and to establish the credibility
of the enforcement agencies. These results, or lack thereof, allow for the program
evaluation necessary to restart the cycle. The indicators point out whether the
20. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of InternationalCooperation,43 VA. J.INT'L L. 1, 69 (2002).
21. THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,
MANAGING RESOURCES, MEASURING PERFORMANCE, IMPROVING DECISION-MAKING 2 (2006),

available at http://inece.org/indicators/brochure.pdf.
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goals need to be changed, whether failures to achieve those goals may be a result
of bad law, or whether changes in our implementation strategies are necessary.
Without that type of program evaluation, the same mistakes will continue or
society will fail to make the innovations needed to solve our environmental
problems.
III. CONCLUSION
The "enforcement response," including sanctions and judicial determinations,
is only a small part of a larger program. For a compliance program to be effective,
every link in the chain must function together,22 and the program must evolve to
achieve continuous improvements. In recognition, each recent FTA now includes
side agreements for environmental cooperation, and the State Department, United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), USEPA and other partners
have expanded long term capacity building programs with trading partners to help
bolster their Environmental Compliance and Enforcement programs. These
programs do not only support the "enforcement response," but also address each of
the different components of the cycle with training on the development of law and
regulations, institutional strengthening, enforcement program design, inspections
and criminal investigations, prosecution of environmental crimes, training for the
judiciary, and the use of indicators for program management.23
It took USEPA over thirty years to evolve into the existing Compliance and
Enforcement program. Through cooperation with trading partners, the U.S.
government can use its experience in environmental control to share successes and
failures and accelerate the program development in countries worldwide to ensure
that everyone effectively enforces their environmental laws, achieving high levels
of environmental protection.

22. ANITA SUNDARI AKELLA & JAMES B. CANNON, STRENGTHENING THE WEAKEST LINKS 3

(2004),
available
at
http://web.conservation.org/ImageCache/CIWEB/content/programs/policy/ccgenforcementreport-2epdf
/v I/ccgenforcementreport.pdf
23. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, CAFTA-DR LABOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS FACT SHEET

(2006), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/73328.htm.

